The Memoirs of Admiral Lord Beresford
Parliament, once so general and so sincere, has now almost ceased to
exist. What that contemptuous indifference may portend, is another
question.
In June, 1885, the Liberal Government, having passed their Franchise
and Redistribution Bills, and having aroused general and deep
indignation concerning their conduct of {336} the Soudan campaign,
chose to resign upon an amendment to Mr. Childers's Budget. Lord
Salisbury accepted office, and wound up the session. The general
election took place during the autumn. I stood for East Marylebone, my
opponents being the Rev. J. R. Diggle and Mr. D. Grant. Mr. Diggle
apparently withdrew; for I find that my majority of 944 votes was over
Mr. Grant's poll. The main topic of my speeches was the necessity of
increasing the Fleet, and of maintaining the Union. For rumours that
Mr. Gladstone intended to bring forward a Home Rule policy were in the
air.
The result of the election was: Liberals 334, Conservatives 250, Irish
Nationalists 86; placing the Conservatives at the mercy of the Irish.
Lord Salisbury's Government were defeated upon an amendment to the
Address, brought forward by Mr. Jesse Collings, in January, 1886. Lord
Salisbury resigned, and Mr. Gladstone returned to office. Then came
his conversion to Home Rule, and the secession of the Liberal
Unionists. On 7th July, 1886, the Government were defeated on the Home
Rule Bill. At the general election which followed, the Radicals and
Home Rulers were returned in a minority of 118. I was again returned
for East Marylebone, my opponent being Professor Beesly, with an
increased majority. In the new Parliament, Lord Salisbury was Prime
Minister and Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs; Lord Randolph
Churchill, Chancellor of the Exchequer; Mr. W. H. Smith, Leader of the
House of Commons; and Lord George Hamilton, First Lord of the Admiralty.
It was during one of the Marylebone elections that I was visited by a
deputation of clergymen of various denominations, who solemnly assured
me that, if I persisted in supporting the proposal to open museums and
picture-galleries on Sundays, they would not vote for me.
"Gentlemen, has it ever occurred to you that I have not asked you to
vote for me?" said I. "Or that I have never in my life asked a man for
a vote?"
{337}
They looked at one another. In the ensuing silence, I told them that
if they did not approve of me, they ought, as honest men, to vote for
my opponent. They sadly and silently departed, and I saw them no more:
nor do I know for whom were cast the votes of those men of God; but I
was returned to Parliament.
Lord Folkestone was standing for Enfield; and when I went down to speak
for him, I found bread upon the waters which returned to me after many
days, in the shape and size of a Royal Marine. While I was speaking,
there arose a tumult at the back of the hall. So far as I could make
out from the platform, a man was insisting on being heard. I called to
him to come up to the platform, where, if he had anything to say, he
could say it. Whereupon a large, resolute and aggressive person came
swiftly up to me. I thought he wanted to fight, and was ready for him.
But he seized my hands in his, shook them warmly, then turned to the
audience and told them the whole story of how I had saved his life off
the Falkland Islands, years before, when I was a lieutenant in the
_Galatea_. The ship was lying at anchor; it was a dark night; when the
Marine somehow fell overboard I had just come on board from a shooting
expedition, and my pockets were full of cartridges. I dived after the
man and seized him. Catching the end of a coil of rope I went down and
down, wondering if the other end of the rope I held was fast, until at
last I felt myself and the Marine being pulled upwards. As we came to
the surface the ship's corporal, who had jumped overboard, got hold of
us, and we were hauled in-board by the quartermaster.
The story was received with great enthusiasm, and I cannot but suppose
it contributed to win the election for my friend, none the less because
there was no real connection whatever between its subject and politics.
Upon my return from Egypt in 1885, I was convinced of the superiority
in guns and armour and general excellence of the French ships of war
over our own, because I had utilised many opportunities of comparing
the vessels of {338} the two navies. Observation and reasoning had
also taught me that in many most essential respects the British Navy
was deficient. And above all, it was deficient in organisation for
war. In these opinions I was confirmed by a large number of my brother
officers, among whom I may mention Lord Alcester, Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Henry Keppel, Admiral Sir Thomas M. C. Symonds, Admiral Sir
Geoffrey T. Phipps Hornby, Captain E. R. Fremantle, Admiral Sir Charles
G. J. B. Elliot, Vice-Admiral Sir William Montagu Dowell, Vice-Admiral
Sir R. Vesey Hamilton.
Accordingly, I enforced the necessity of reform in these matters in my
public speeches, which were numerous. At that time, in the summer of
1885, I find that I was demanding a loan of twenty millions to be
expended upon a shipbuilding programme.
During the previous year, 1884, there had appeared in the _Pall Mall
Gazette_, then edited by the late Mr. W. T. Stead, the famous series of
articles over the signature of "One who knows the Facts," dealing with
the state of the Navy, which did more than any other Press
representations before or since to awaken public opinion to the true
condition of our defences. It was those articles, together with
articles in _The Times_ and other newspapers, and the excellent letters
of naval officers--notably those of Admiral of the Fleet Sir T.
Symonds--which prepared the way for me.
International relations with both France and Russia were uneasy; and
war was always a possibility. I knew that we were unprepared for war.
I knew that so long as there was no department charged with the duty of
representing what was required, why it was required, and how much it
would cost, that we should continue to be unprepared for war. I
believed it to be my duty to awaken public opinion to the danger in
which the country undoubtedly stood.
Nor was I alone in this respect. Not only a number of brother
officers, but many students of the subject, did {339} their best to
enlighten the nation. We were of course told that we were creating a
scare; but a study of the Press of those days shows that nearly every
great newspaper, irrespective of its politics, demanded the
strengthening and reorganisation of our defences. Personally, I
received great support from the Press. Writers on the subject of
national defence were at least sure that I had, personally, nothing to
gain by publishing the truth.
Indeed, I had thus early in my career, when I was a junior captain, to
choose between the stormy enterprise of the reformer, and the safer
course of official acquiescence and party obedience, leading to
promotion and to office. In making the choice, I had to consider that
as a naval officer advocating this and that in spite of the
authorities, I laid myself open to the charge that such matters were
none of my business, which was to obey orders. The argument is quite
legitimate. On the other hand, knowing the facts of the case, clearly
perceiving the danger, and (as I believed) knowing also how to remedy
what was wrong, I might (and did) justly contend that my duty to
Sovereign and country came before all. I admit that these things were
not necessarily my business; not, at least, until I made them my
business. But I may also remark that the deplorable condition of the
national defences in 1885 was the result of the united negligence of
the people whose business it was to maintain them, and who had no
department which could supply them with the necessary information; and
that, in consequence, someone had to do something. The history of
England was made by persons who did what it was not their business to
do, until they made it their business.
My difficulties were then, and have always been, inherent in the nature
of the case. It is part of the character of the English people to
trust in authority, as such; and they are quite right in principle;
whose observance, however, induces them to be slow to act when
authority has proved untrustworthy. Again, in order that my case
should be proved beyond cavil, the supreme demonstration of war was
required. It is not {340} enough that because my recommendations were
carried into execution, war was prevented; for only the few who know
the facts and who are acquainted with the complex shifts of
international policy, understand the value of potential armed force in
the exercise of diplomacy. I may claim, indeed, I do claim, that
sooner or later my recommendations have been adopted by the
authorities, who thereby proved the justice of my case. Nor do I
complain because they have gained the credit accruing to their action;
for it must always be the man who does the thing who earns the laurel.
And he who insists upon assuming the office of reformer, must make up
his mind at the beginning to renounce without bitterness whatever
delight he might discover in reward or fame or renown. Moreover, the
credit belongs to no one man, but to the many fearless officers who
urged reform, and not less to the great body of those officers of the
Service who silently and loyally kept the routine going, and without
whom no reforms could avail.
The whole position is of course quite illogical; as illogical as that
venerable anomaly, the British Constitution, which exists entirely in
the brains of the learned. A certain set of persons are selected to
govern the nation by a majority of votes, those votes being allocated
upon an accidental system which gives to a small number exactly the
same representation as an immensely larger number. Out of that set a
few are selected to form a governing committee called the Cabinet,
which is virtually omnipotent so long as it continues to act more or
less in accordance with the wishes of the majority which elected it.
The Cabinet is, therefore, in practice, constrained to act in
accordance with the known opinions of its supporters; a course of
action which is a totally different thing from the course which it is
theoretically supposed to follow. Theoretically, the Cabinet shapes
its policy to ensure the welfare of the whole nation. Theoretically,
the business of the Government is to govern. Theoretically, its
members are the men in the country best fitted for the work. Sometimes
they are; and in proportion as they are, they will {341} approximate to
the conventional theory and will depart from the common practice, and
will do what is right instead of what is expedient. Thus every
Government oscillates between pure opportunism and honest patriotism.
And in the result, the only method of obtaining reform in any direction
is so to persuade the public of its necessity, that the party in power
will perceive that it is more to their own profit to grant than to
withhold it. And in justice to the politicians, it should be added
that under the existing system, many concessions must be made by the
most austere statesman, if the Duke of Wellington's ultimate principle
is to be observed; the principle that the King's Government must be
carried on.
In July, 1884, Lord Northbrook, the First Lord of the Admiralty in Mr.
Gladstone's administration, publicly declared that if he had £3,000,000
to spend upon the Navy, that force was so sufficient and so efficient
that he would not know on what to spend the money. Before the end of
the year he was compelled to find out how to spend £5,500,000, and to