The Memoirs of Admiral Lord Beresford
knows, at least, that never again will he be employed at the Admiralty.
But when Sir Frederick Richards and his colleagues threatened
resignation, they were in fact risking the loss of employment and
incurring the possibility of spending the rest of their lives in
comparative penury. A later Liberal administration has dismissed one
Naval Lord after another, without a scruple.
In my case, I had the advantage of possessing a private income, so that
I was independent of the Service as a means of livelihood. It is
necessary to speak plainly upon this matter of resignation. It is most
unfair to expect naval officers to resign in the hope of bringing about
reform, when by so doing their income is greatly reduced. If the
British public desire it to be understood that a Sea Lord is expected
to resign should the Government in power fail to make what he believes
to be the necessary provision for the national security, then the
public must insist that the Sea Lords be granted an ample retiring
allowance.
In the following February (1888) Lord George Hamilton made a speech at
Ealing, in which he dealt with my protests in the most courteous
manner. He stated that I had resigned because I objected to the
exercise of the supreme authority of the First Lord over the Board of
Admiralty. I had certainly objected to its exercise in a particular
instance. {355} And at that time I was constantly urging that
Parliament and the country had a right to know who was responsible for
the actions of the Admiralty. My theory was that there should be some
means by which Parliament and the public should be assured that any
given course of action was founded upon professional advice. That no
such means existed was notorious. It was within the legal right of a
First Lord to announce a policy contravening or modifying the views of
the rest of the Board.
My view was, and is, the view tersely stated by Admiral Phipps Hornby,
who said that it was the right of the Cabinet to formulate a policy,
and that it was the duty of the Sea Lords to provide what was required
in order to carry that policy into execution; but that the Cabinet had
no right whatever to dictate to the Sea Lords in what the provision
should consist, for that was a matter of which the Sea Lords alone were
competent to judge.
But if the Board of Admiralty be placed under the supreme jurisdiction
of the First Lord, a civilian and a politician, the country has no
means of knowing whether or no the recommendations of the Sea Lords are
being carried into execution. I said at the time that some such means
should be instituted; afterwards, perceiving that no such demand would
be granted, I urged that the Cabinet at least ought to be precisely
informed what were the requirements stated by the Sea Lords to be
necessary in order to carry into execution the policy of the Government.
In claiming supreme authority as First Lord over the Board of
Admiralty, Lord George Hamilton was legally and constitutionally in the
right. The Royal Commission on the administration of the Navy and
Army, over which Lord Hartington presided, reported in 1890 (when I was
at sea) that the Admiralty had long ceased to be administered in
accordance with the terms of its original Patent, and that "the present
system of administration in the Admiralty is the result of
Parliamentary action upon what was once in fact as well as name an
executive and administrative {356} Board. The responsibility, and
consequently the power of the First Lord has continually increased, and
he is at present practically the Minister of Marine." In other words,
by slow degrees the politician had transferred the powers of the Board
to himself, where they remain; the other members of the Board becoming
merely his advisers. The result is that there is nothing, except the
personal influence of the Naval Lords upon the First Lord, to prevent
the Navy from being governed in accordance with party politics, without
reference to national and Imperial requirements; a system which
produces intermittent insecurity and periodical panics involving
extravagant expense.
The Commissioners also found that there was a difference of opinion
among the Naval Lords themselves concerning their responsibility with
regard to the strength and efficiency of the Fleet. It was, in a word,
nobody's business to state what were the requirements of the Fleet.
The First Lord might ask for advice, if he chose, in which case he
would get it. If he did not so choose, there was no one whose duty it
was to make representations on the subject. Admiral Sir Arthur Hood
stated that never in the whole course of his experience had he known a
scheme comprehending the naval requirements of the Empire to be laid
before the Board. He also stated that the method of preparing the Navy
Estimates was that the First Lord stated what sum the Cabinet felt
disposed to grant for the Navy, and that the Naval Lords then proceeded
to get as much value for their money as they could.
No wonder the Sea Lords were expected to sign the Estimates without
looking at them. When I was junior lord, responsible for the provision
of coal and stores among other trifles, a clerk came into my room with
a sheaf of papers in one hand and a wet quill pen in the other.
"Will you sign the Estimates?" says he.
"What?" said I.
"Will you sign the Estimates for the year?" he repeated.
"My good man," I said, "I haven't seen them."
{357}
The clerk looked mildly perturbed. He said:
"The other Lords have signed them, sir. It will be very inconvenient
if you do not."
"I am very sorry," said I. "I am afraid I am inconvenient in this
office already. But I certainly shall not sign the Estimates."
The clerk's countenance betrayed consternation.
"I must tell the First Lord, sir," said he, as one who presents an
ultimatum.
"I don't care a fig whom you tell," said I. "I can't sign the
Estimates, because I have not read them."
Nor did I sign them. They were brought before the House of Commons
without my signature. The First Lord said it did not really matter.
My point was that I would not take responsibility for a document I had
not seen. The fact was, that the custom of obtaining the signatures of
the Board is a survival of the time when the Sea Lords wielded the
power and responsibility conferred upon them by the original Patent.
The Commissioners also reported that the lack of "sufficient provision
for the consideration by either Service of the wants of the other" ...
was an "unsatisfactory and dangerous condition of affairs."
Here, then, were all the points for which my brother officers and
myself were contending, and in order to illuminate which I had
resigned, explicitly admitted. But the proofs did not appear until a
year after my resignation took effect, when the Select Committee on the
Navy Estimates began to take evidence; nor were they published for
another year.
In the meantime, the naval reformers fought as best they might. Freed
from the restraint necessarily imposed upon me by my official position
at the Admiralty, I was able to devote my whole energies to making
known the real state of affairs.
Upon the introduction of the Navy Estimates of 1888-9 I challenged the
votes for shipbuilding, the Secretary's {358} Department, the
Intelligence Department, the Reserve of merchant cruisers, the Royal
Naval Reserve and naval armaments, in order to call attention to
requirements.
In the course of the debates, the official formula was: "At no time was
the Navy more ready or better organised for any work which it might be
called upon to do than to-day." My reply was that these words "have
rung in our ears as often as the tune '_Britannia_ rules the waves,'
and have been invariably falsified when war appeared imminent." And
who would have to do the work? The officials who said that all was
ready, or the admirals who said that all was unready?
In May, a meeting to consider the needs of national defence was held in
the City, at which I delivered an address. Speaking at the Lord
Mayor's banquet in November, the First Lord admitted that there might
be room for improvement in the Navy. It was a dangerous, if a candid,
admission. For if the Navy were not strong enough, _how weak was it_?
Exactly how weak it was in June, 1888, in the opinion of the First Sea
Lord, Admiral Sir Arthur Hood, was explained by him before the Select
Committee on Navy Estimates (13th June, 1888). "I should have
preferred by the end of 1890 to have had six more fast cruisers. I do
not consider it a point of vital importance," said Admiral Hood. But
as, upon his own showing, within his recollection no one at the
Admiralty had ever produced a scheme comprehending the naval
requirements of the Empire, his view was hardly conclusive. I had the
audacity to consider that if no one had ever attempted, or thought of
attempting, to estimate the requirements of the naval defence of the
Queen's dominions, it was time that some one did attempt to do so, even
if that some one were myself. Accordingly, I made a careful
calculation of the work the Fleet might under probable contingencies be
required to perform, and upon that calculation based an estimate of the
classes and numbers of ships which would be needed.
{359}
I showed my estimate to Admiral Hornby, who said that, although the
ships were absolutely necessary, I was asking too much and I should in
consequence get nothing. He also pointed out that I had made no
provision for the increase of personnel required to man the proposed
new ships. I replied that if the ships were laid down, the authorities
would be obliged to find the men for them. The sequel showed that I
was wrong and that Admiral Hornby was right. He knew his responsible
authority better than I did. Six years later, when what should have
been the increased personnel would have been trained and available, the
Fleet was short of 20,000 men.
My cousin, General Sir Reginald Talbot, reminds me of a conversation
which befell between Mr. Goschen, then Chancellor of the Exchequer, and
myself, in November of the same year, 1888, when we were staying at
Wilton, the house of my cousin, Lady Pembroke. Mr. Goschen began to
talk about the Navy, and he was so good as to express high disapproval
of my course of action. He said I was doing a great deal of harm, that
I was presuming to set my rash opinion above the considered judgment of
old and distinguished officers who had commanded ships before I was
born, and so forth.
"Do you know what I am shortly going to propose to Parliament?" said I.
"No? I'll tell you. I am going to ask for seventy ships to cost
twenty million sterling."
Mr. Goschen became really angry. He said the notion was preposterous.
"You won't get them," he said. "You wouldn't get even three ships, if
you asked for them. And for a very simple reason. They are not
wanted."
"Mr. Goschen," said I, "I shall bring in that programme, and it will
cost twenty million; and you will all object to it and oppose it; and
yet I'll venture to make a prophecy. Before very long you will order
seventy ships at the cost of twenty million. And for a very simple
reason. Because you must."
{360}
On the 13th December, 1888, speaking on Vote 8 (ship-building, repairs
and maintenance), I expounded my ship-building programme to the House
of Commons. I based it upon the following principles:
"The existence of the Empire depends upon the strength of the Fleet,
the strength of the Fleet depends upon the Shipbuilding Vote.... I
maintain the Shipbuilding Vote is based on no policy, no theory, no
business-like or definite idea whatever, to enable it to meet the
requirements of the country, the primary object of its expenditure....