The Memoirs of Admiral Lord Beresford
I hold that the Government, which is and must be solely responsible,
should first lay down a definite standard for the Fleet, which standard
should be a force capable of defending our shores and commerce,
together with the punctual and certain delivery of our food supply,
against the Fleets of two Powers combined, one of which should be
France; and that the experts should then be called together and say
what is necessary to get that standard, and give the reasons for their
statement...."
The programme included four first-class ironclads, 10 second-class
ironclads, 40 cruisers of various classes, and torpedo craft: 70
vessels in all, to be built at a cost of £20,100,000.
I also affirmed the proposition made by Admiral Sir Anthony Hoskins,
the Secretary of the Admiralty, and the Civil Lord, to the effect that
"the British Fleet should be more than a match for the combined fleets
of any two European Powers that were likely to be our foes, one of
which must necessarily be France." Here, so far as I am aware, was the
first definite demand for the Two-Power Standard; which was maintained
until it was abandoned by the Government which came into power in 1906.
Lord George Hamilton received my proposals with caution. He was "far
from saying it (the Fleet) was strong enough." And he told the House
that next year he hoped {361} to lay before the House a larger and more
comprehensive programme than was provided by the current estimates,
"desiring that when they moved their movement should be genuine and
prolonged."
Twelve weeks later, Lord George Hamilton brought in a shipbuilding
programme consisting of 70 vessels, to be built at a cost of
£21,500,000.
Yet nothing had happened since the previous June, when Sir Arthur Hood
declared that he would have preferred six more cruisers, but that they
were not of vital importance?
Nothing, that is to say, with regard to the international situation,
and the increase of foreign navies, and the requirements of Imperial
defence. But several things had happened at home. Of the most
important of these, I knew nothing until many years afterwards. It was
that Captain W. H. Hall, Director of the new Intelligence Department,
whose institution I had recommended for this very purpose, had worked
out the problem of naval requirements independently, and, with all the
sources of information available in the Admiralty at his command, had
arrived at precisely the same result (except for an increase of cost)
as that to which I had arrived, without the information possessed by
Captain Hall. I may mention here that Captain Hall was a most
distinguished and patriotic officer, with whom no considerations of
personal interest ever weighed for an instant against what he conceived
to be his duty to his Sovereign and to his country. What happened at
the Admiralty when his report was laid before the Board, I do not know,
as I never had any communication with Captain Hall on the subject. All
I know is that his scheme, which was identical with the scheme which I
had presented to the House, was accepted by the First Lord.
Another circumstance which may have influenced the Government was the
very remarkable evidence, which I have already summarised, given before
the Select Committee on the Navy Estimates. And another factor, of
enduring import, was the famous Report of the Three Admirals: {362}
Admiral Sir William Dowell, K.C.B., Admiral Sir R. Vesey Hamilton,
K.C.B., and Vice-Admiral Sir Frederick Richards, K.C.B., on the Naval
Manoeuvres of 1888, presented to both Houses of Parliament in February,
1889. Sir Frederick Richards was mainly responsible for drawing up
that masterly document, which, extending beyond its terms of reference,
formulated the principles of British sea-power; and definitely affirmed
the absolute necessity for establishing and maintaining the Two-Power
Standard.
With reference to the condition of the Navy at the time, the Three
Admirals reported that the Navy was "altogether inadequate to take the
offensive in a war with only one Great Power"; and that "supposing a
combination of even two Powers to be allied as her enemies, the balance
of maritime strength would be against England."
How swiftly is the false coin of "official assurances" consumed by the
acid of professional knowledge! The whole episode of the Twenty-One
Million is so typical of the methods of British governance, that I have
thought it worth while to relate it somewhat at length. Those methods,
in a word, consist in the politicians very nearly losing the Empire,
and the Navy saving it just in time. The same thing happened all over
again in 1892. It occurred again 1909, with a difference. Both in
1892 and in 1909 I drew up shipbuilding proposals. In 1892, the
Government eventually adopted the Spencer programme, which was actually
larger than mine. In 1909, the opportunity of restoration was lost;
and the failure cost, and will cost, the country many millions.
One of these days we shall be hit, and hit hard, at the moment when the
politicians have been found out, and before the Navy has had time to
recover.
Something to this effect was said to me by Bismarck, when I visited
him, in February, 1889. In truth, I had a little wearied of the polite
and stubborn opposition of my own people, and I went to Berlin to see
what was happening abroad. Prince Bismarck invited me to lunch.
{363}
Bismarck said that he could not understand why my own people did not
listen to me (nor could I!); for (said he) the British Fleet was the
greatest factor for peace in Europe. We had a most interesting
conversation upon matters of defence and preparation for war; and his
tone was most friendly towards the English. He very kindly presented
me with his signed photograph. I stayed with him for two hours; and we
drank much beer; and all the time his gigantic boar-hound, lying beside
him, stared fixedly at me with a red and lurid eye.
{364}
CHAPTER XXXVII
H.M.S. _UNDAUNTED_
I. WITH THE MEDITERRANEAN FLEET
"Undaunteds be ready,
Undaunteds be steady,
Undaunteds stand by for a job!"
Bugle call of H.M.S. _Undaunted_
It was invented by the first lieutenant, William Stokes Rees (now
Vice-Admiral W. S. Rees, C.B.), who was one of the best gunnery
officers I have known. I was appointed to the command of the
_Undaunted_ in November, 1889. The commander was Robert S. Lowry (now
Vice-Admiral Sir Robert S. Lowry, K.C.B.). It was the _Undaunted's_
first commission. She was a twin-screw, first-class armoured cruiser
of 5600 tons displacement and 8500 h.p., ordered to join the
Mediterranean Fleet, under the command of Vice-Admiral Sir Anthony H.
Hoskins, K.C.B. He was succeeded in September, 1891, by my old friend,
Admiral Sir George Tryon, K.C.B., whose tragic death was so great a
loss to the Service and to the country.
The first essential of good discipline is to make officers and men as
happy and as comfortable as the exigencies of the Service permit. I
believe that the _Undaunted_ was a happy ship; I know that the loyalty,
enthusiasm and hard work of the officers and men under my command
earned her a good record.
In every vessel there are improvements to be made which, perhaps
trifling in themselves, greatly add to the {365} welfare of the
officers and ship's company. At that time, for instance, the
arrangements for the stokers were so bad, that there was only one bath
available for twenty men. My recommendation was that tubs of
galvanised iron should be supplied, fitting one into another in nests,
so that the extra baths occupied less space than the one regulation
bath. I also had lockers of lattice-work supplied for the stokers'
dirty clothing, instead of closed and insanitary lockers. It is true
that at first the men objected to the open-work, because their pipes
dropped through it. Again, the hatchway ladders were made with sharp
nosings, against which the men injured their legs; and I suggested that
these should be formed with rounded nosings instead. A ship of war is
naturally uncomfortable; but why make it unnecessarily disagreeable?
At that time, too, the rate of second-class petty officer did not exist
among the stokers. The result was that if a leading stoker was
disrated he was reduced to stoker. For this reason, I urged the
institution of the rate of second-class petty officer stoker, a reform
which was eventually instituted. Some years afterwards, the rate of
second-class officer was abolished altogether, a retrograde measure
which I believe to be injurious.
When a petty officer loses his rate in consequence of a mistake or a
lapse, he should be enabled to recover it by good behaviour.
One of my countrymen on board, whom we will call Patrick, an able
seaman of long service, perpetually failed to attain to the rating of
petty officer owing to his weakness for strong waters. In other
respects he was admirably qualified to rise. I sent for him, told him
I would give him a chance, and made him a second-class petty officer.
I believe that he succumbed once or twice, and that the commander let
him off. But one fine day Patrick returned on board from leave ashore,
fully attired--cap, coat, boots and socks--with the single exception of
his trousers. The case having been officially reported to me, I had up
the delinquent before the assembled petty officers. I made it a rule
{366} not to disrate a petty officer in the presence of the ship's
company.
The charge having been duly read, I asked Patrick what he had to say on
the subject.
"Do you moind now, sir," says Pat, "that I was drunk the same day last
year?"
I told him I did not remember anything of the sort.
"Well, sir," continued Patrick, unabashed, "to tell you the truth, 'tis
my mother's birthday, and I had a drop of drink taken."
I told him that it was impossible to allow petty officers to disgrace
the ship by coming on board without their trousers; that I should take
away his petty officer's rate, but that I would leave him his badges.
He had three badges. Had he lost them, he would have lost his badge
pay during a period of six months for each badge, so that it would take
him eighteen months of "very good" conduct to regain them. In
addition, he would have lost the good conduct medal, a part of his
pension and a part of his gratuity on leaving the Service. The
severity of the punishment in comparison with what is not perhaps a
serious offence, is not always recognised by authority.
"May I say a word to you, sir?" asked Patrick, having received his
sentence.
"You can say what you like," said I, "but I am afraid it won't save
your rate."
"Well, sir," says he, "'tis this way, sir. If you'll think over it the
way it is, I was fourteen years getting th' rate, and you'll be takin'
it away from me in one moment."
Pat used to delight his audiences at the ship's concerts. He sang
among other beautiful legends, the Irish ditty, "Brannagan's Pup." He
led upon the stage my bull-dog, who came very sulkily. It never could
be (as Pat would have said) that the concertina accompaniment began
when he began. When the concertina started ahead of him, Pat shifted
the bull-dog's leash to his other hand, put his hand to the side of his
mouth, and staring straight upon the {367} audience, uttered the
following stage direction in a furious whisper which was heard all over
the ship.
"Don't you shtart that ruddy pump till I hould up me hand!"
Some years after I had left the _Undaunted_, arriving in a P. and O.