The Memoirs of Admiral Lord Beresford
steamer off a Chinese port, I semaphored to a man-of-war asking the
captain to send me a boat, as I wished to have the pleasure of calling
upon him. The coxswain of the captain's boat was no other than my old
friend.
"I'm very glad to see you've kept the rate," said I. "I suppose you
run straight now and keep clear of liquor?"
"Well, sir," says Paddy, "to tell you the truth, I've taken an odd toss
or two since I saw you, but I've got it back again!"
He meant that he had been disrated again once or twice but had won back
his rate again; indeed, he had won it back while under my command. I
always told my men that if they were tried by court-martial--as the men
now desire to be tried--it would go harder with them. Had Patrick been
tried by court-martial, it is very unlikely that he would have got back
his rate; and his deprivation, being endorsed upon his certificate,
would have affected his chance of gaining employment in civil life upon
leaving the Service.
I had a case of a man who, because he put his helm over the wrong way,
ran into another boat, with the result that a man was drowned. The
culprit was disrated; but I gave him his rate again before I left the
ship. It is the personal knowledge of a man possessed by his captain
which alone enables his captain to make distinctions. A court-martial
must judge of the offence without personal knowledge of the character
of the offender.
I had a sergeant of Marines, a man with an excellent record, a strict
disciplinarian, popular among his men, who, within nine months of the
expiration of his time, came aboard blind drunk and disorderly. The
penalty was to be reduced to the ranks. But it is often forgotten what
under {368} such circumstances that penalty involves. The
non-commissioned officer loses his N.C.O.'s time and pension, his badge
pay for six months, and the gratuity of his rank. It is a tremendous
penalty to pay, when, except for the one mistake, he has a clean sheet
all through. I had the man up before the petty officers and
non-commissioned officers, explained that there were only two courses
of action: either to reduce him or to let him off altogether; and told
them that I intended to count his long and excellent service and
exemplary character as outweighing a single failure.
Here was an exceptional case; and because it was exceptional, it was
wise to depart from the rule, and to give reasons for disciplinary
action. Had no explanation been given, the next man disrated or
reduced might have considered that he had been unfairly treated; but he
could have no such grievance, when the circumstances in which the
non-commissioned officer had his punishment remitted had been made
known at the time.
Ships, like men, have their weaknesses; and the weakness of our fine
new steam navy consisted in the unprotected ends of our armoured
vessels, in which respect they were inferior to the French ships. The
section of a wooden man-of-war was, roughly speaking, V-shaped below
the water-line; and when she was pierced in action, the water entering
through the shot-holes ran down to the bottom of the vessel, where the
extra weight, although it might sink her lower in the water, acted as
additional ballast, resisting any tendency to capsize. But the section
of a steel man-of-war is roughly a square, with the lower edges
rounded. The protective steel deck, covering the engines, extends the
whole length and width of the ship. Above the water-line there are the
immense weights of armour and guns. If the ship is pierced in her
unprotected ends above the steel deck, the water, entering through the
holes, is held high up in the section, giving her a list, and dragging
her over, so that a badly wounded ship must capsize. Such was my
theory, which I set forth at length in a letter sent to the
commander-in-chief, {369} Sir Anthony Hoskins. He considered the point
of importance, but held that it was a matter rather for the constructor
than the seaman, a view with which I did not agree.
Sir Anthony Hoskins, who was about to haul down his flag, turned the
letter over to Sir George Tryon, who sent it to the Admiralty. The
Admiralty, I believe, considered that, under certain conditions, the
theory was correct.
Those conditions occurred on 22nd June, 1893, when the _Victoria_ was
rammed by the _Camperdown_ off Beyrout. The _Camperdown_ struck the
flagship on the starboard bow, and in ten minutes she had capsized and
sunk. As the _Victoria_ was carrying her scuttles open, and received
an injury equivalent to the damage which would be inflicted by a large
shell, the conditions of an action, in which the hull would be pierced
with many small holes and further wounded by heavy projectiles, were
produced, with the result whose probability, if not certainty, I had
indicated.
In dealing with this subject, I also represented that the French ships
of the period, having a powerful fore and aft fire, might choose in
time of war to fight a retreating action, in which case they could so
damage the unarmoured ends of our vessels, that our vessels could not
be steered, and, being forced to ease speed, would be placed at a
serious disadvantage.
The _Hecla_, torpedo school ship in the Mediterranean, was commanded by
my old friend, Captain John Durnford (now Admiral Sir John Durnford,
K.C.B., D.S.O.). Together with the officers under my command, I
attended the torpedo classes on board.
Captain Durnford accompanied me in the _Undaunted_ when we conducted
experiments in the dropping of mines. The mines were the clever
invention of Lieutenant Ottley (now Rear-Admiral Sir Charles C. Ottley,
K.C.M.G., C.B., M.V.O.). By means of an ingenious mechanical
contrivance, they sank themselves to the required depth. We designed
and constructed the dropping gear, rigging it abaft the propellers.
The mines were dropped by hand, the ship {370} steaming at 18 knots. A
certain area was fixed within which the mines were to be sown. We
steamed across it at night, in thick darkness, along a narrow channel.
Unable to take bearings, as the position of the scattered lights on
shore was unknown, we sent out two boats carrying lights. We touched
the ground once, the shock throwing Captain Durnford and myself against
the rail. In four minutes all the mines were dropped without a single
mistake. The experiment was also carried into execution in daylight.
In those days there were no mine-laying vessels, and the _Undaunted_
was somewhat of a pioneer in the science of mining waters at full speed.
My experience while in office at the Admiralty had led me profoundly to
suspect (among other things) the adequacy of the provision for reserve
ammunition. And upon making inquiries at Malta, I found that if the
_Undaunted_ in the event of war had expended the whole of her
ammunition, the renewal of the supply for her main armament of 6-inch
guns would (excluding practice ammunition) exhaust the whole reserve
supply. There were no spare guns in reserve at all. My
representations on the subject were by no means gratefully received by
the Admiralty, which considered that the supply of reserve ammunition
and guns was not the business of a captain. I suggested that the
ammunition papers should go to every captain; an arrangement which was
afterwards carried into execution. At this time I also represented
(but in other quarters) the urgent necessity of building a new mole at
Gibraltar, which was then not a naval but a military base, although in
time of war it would be required to serve as one of the most important
naval bases in the world, either for the blue water route or the narrow
sea route. My representations were made with the object of inducing
the Government to transform Gibraltar from a merely military fortress
to a properly equipped naval base. I took soundings and drew out a
scheme. The plan eventually adopted was an improvement upon mine.
It is not of course implied that I was alone in urging {371} these
reforms and such as these; there were many patriotic men, both in the
Service and outside it, who were engaged in the same endeavour. What I
did must be taken to represent the unrequited labours of others as
well. Sir George Tryon, my commander-in-chief, that splendid seaman
and admirable officer, was always most sympathetic and showed to me the
greatest kindness. I am proud to say that I never served under a
commander-in-chief with whom I was not upon the best of terms.
Sir George Tryon having received letters from H.H. the Khedive and from
the British Minister Plenipotentiary in Egypt, instructed me to proceed
to Alexandria with a small squadron. H.H. the Khedive welcomed me with
great cordiality, being so kind as to say that I had saved his father's
life during the troubles of 1882, when the _Condor_ kept guard over the
Ramleh Palace. I remained at Alexandria for some time, being senior
officer there.
In order to relieve the monotony of sea-routine, the men were landed by
companies in the Mex lines, a place with which I had many interesting
associations dating from 1882, for rifle practice, sleeping under
canvas. The water on shore being undrinkable, the men were ordered to
use the distilled water supplied daily from the ship.
Visiting the hospital tent, I thought one of the patients had cholera.
"It looks very like it," said the staff-surgeon.
"Have you been drinking the shore water?" I asked the patient.
He confessed that he had. I asked him why he had done so.
"Please, sir," said he, "the distilled water had no taste in it."
Having arranged with my old friend, Sir William Butler, commanding the
garrison at Alexandria, to combine with the soldiers in field exercise,
I took a landing-party ashore at Ras-el-Tin. We started early in the
morning, embarking the field-guns. The seamen waded ashore with them,
and {372} attacked a position held by the soldiers on the top of the
hill. It looked impregnable, the ground being a steep, sandy slope
covered with scrub. But the bluejackets dragged the guns up through
the sand and bushes. We battled all the morning with great enjoyment;
returned on board, and shifted into dry clothes in time for dinner.
The benefit of such exercises is that all learn something.
In July, 1891, was held at Alexandria the great regatta, in which 26
boats of all classes were entered, including a cutter from the
Portuguese sloop _Fieja_ and Arab boats. It was on this occasion that
the galley of the _Undaunted_ ran upon the breakwater, was knocked into
smithereens, and sank. By an extraordinary coincidence, she was an old
boat which the Admiralty had persistently refused to replace.
Upon leaving Alexandria, the _Undaunted_ touched a rock. We had been
helping the contractor to blow up the rocks in the Borghiz Channel (a
proceeding for which I was subsequently reproved) and left the harbour
steering by stern marks. The staff-commander knew exactly where he was
going, but by a slip of the tongue he gave the order "port" instead of
"starboard," adding that he wanted to close certain buoys marking the
passage. The injury to the ship was very slight, but peculiar. Her
bottom was pierced, and a little fish swam into the ship. I have the
fish with a small piece broken off the keel by the impact, in a bottle.
In December, 1891, the second annual regatta of the Mediterranean Fleet
was held in Marmorice Bay. In the officers' race, I pulled stroke in
the galley of the _Undaunted_, in spite of Sir George Tryon's kindly
warning that my heart would give way. We beat the _Australia's_ boat
by about two seconds. In the next race, held the following year, the
_Australia_ beat us.
There were seventeen ships on the station, and 9000 men. The
_Undaunted_ won 22 prizes (12 of them, I think, first prizes) out of