The Memoirs of Admiral Lord Beresford
common interests upon which depends the prosperity of the two
countries. That the English-speaking nations should combine to
preserve the peace of the world, has always seemed to me a reasonable
aspiration, and I have said so in both countries when opportunity
served.
In December, 1894, desiring to represent the interests of the Service
in Parliament as soon as might be, I applied once more to the Admiralty
to be permitted, according to precedent, to count my service in the
Soudan campaign as time spent in the command of a ship of war; but the
application was again refused. From many constituencies invitations to
stand were sent to me; among them were {399} Stockport, North
Kensington, Birkenhead, Liverpool, East Toxteth, Armagh, Dublin,
Cardiff, Chatham, Devonport, Pembroke and Portsmouth.
In those days Mr. W. L. Wyllie (now R.A.) used to haunt the Medway and
the Nore, boat-sailing and painting. He can handle a boat as well as
he handles his brush; that is, to perfection. Mr. Wyllie gave me a
boat which he had built with his own hands, I think out of biscuit
boxes. I tried it in a basin at Chatham, accompanied by a warrant
officer of the _Pembroke_. We were becalmed; a sudden puff came; and
over we went. In memory of the disaster, I gave the warrant officer a
pipe, the bowl of which was appropriately carved to represent a
death's-head.
While I was at Chatham, my home was Park Gate House, Ham Common. Here
I had a model farm, producing milk, eggs and poultry, which were
readily sold in Richmond, whose streets and thoroughfares were greatly
enlivened by the daily procession of my large and shining brass
milk-cans. I was not in the sad case of Captain Edward Pellew
(afterwards Lord Exmouth), who upon quitting the sea and taking a farm,
in 1791, complained that the crops grew so slowly that they made his
eyes ache.
During my absence a burglar entered the house. The butler, hearing a
noise, rose from his bed, took a revolver, and sought for the intruder,
who fled before him to the roof, whence he fell headlong through a
skylight. He must have been a good deal cut, for he bled all over the
place. The butler, following, also fell through the skylight; but,
presumably falling through the same hole, was little damaged.
Continuing the chase, he was brought up short by a wire entanglement
previously set by the burglar for the butler's confusion. So he sat
where he was, and continued to fire steadily in the direction he
supposed the burglar to have gone, until his ammunition was all
expended.
It may be interesting to recall that in September, 1893, Sir Augustus
Harris was appointed manager of Drury Lane Opera House by the committee
which was then organising {400} the opera in this country. I urged his
selection on account of his great administrative ability; and prevailed
over the objection that he was only skilled in pantomime.
The committee had been formed to improve the opera, which was then
performed at three different theatres: Covent Garden, Drury Lane, and
Her Majesty's; so that the available talent was scattered. Sir
Augustus Harris combined the three into one at Drury Lane.
In October, 1895, occurred the death of my brother, Lord Waterford, at
the age of fifty-one. He had been for long completely disabled by a
bad accident in the hunting field; and although his sufferings were
constant and acute, he continued staunchly to discharge his many duties
to the end. He was succeeded in the marquisate by his son.
My appointment at Chatham terminated in March, 1896; and a few days
later I delivered at Birmingham an address dealing with the
requirements of naval defence.
{401}
CHAPTER XLI
VIEWS AND REVIEWS
The three years succeeding the termination of my appointment at Chatham
were mainly occupied with questions of naval reform. The task was of
my own choosing; and if, in comparison with the life I led, the
existence of the early martyrs was leisured, dignified and luxurious,
it is not for me to draw the parallel. The chief difficulty
encountered by any reformer is not an evil but a good. It is the
native virtue of the English people, which leads them to place implicit
confidence in constituted authority. The advocacy of a change implies
that constituted authority is failing to fulfil its duty. You cannot
at the same time both trust and distrust the men in charge of affairs.
Again, reform often involves expenditure; and the dislike to spend
money upon an idea is natural to man. And it is the custom of
constituted authority to tell the people that all is well, in fact
never so well. They have all the weight of their high office behind
them; and people will believe what they are told by authority in
despite of the evidence of their senses.
Moreover, there are endless difficulties and disappointments inherent
in the very nature of the task of the naval or military reformer. The
problems of defence are highly intricate; and although the principles
governing them remain unaltered, the application of those principles is
constantly changing. The most skilled officers may differ one from
another; and a man who is devoting his whole time and energy to benefit
the Service to which he belongs, {402} will often be disheartened by
the opposition of his brother officers.
The influence of society, again, is often baneful. Society is apt to
admonish a public man, especially if he be popular, perpetually telling
him that he must not do this, and he must not say that, or he will
injure his reputation, ruin his career, and alienate his friends;
until, perhaps, he becomes so habitually terrified at what may happen,
that he ends by doing nothing, and spoiling his career at the latter
end after all. Public life to-day is permeated through and through
with a selfish solicitude for personal immunity. But it remains the
fact that he who intends to achieve a certain object, must first put
aside all personal considerations. Upon going into action, a fighting
man is occupied, not with speculations as to whether or not he will be
hit, and if so where, but in trying to find out where and how soon and
how hard he can hit the enemy. Even so, he may be beaten; but at least
he will have nothing to regret; he will be able to say that if it were
all to do again, he would do the same; for he will know that on any
other terms his defeat would be assured.
If, then, these pages record in brief the continual endeavours of those
who made it their business to represent to the nation the requirements
of Imperial defence, it is for the purpose of once more exemplifying
the defects in our system which periodically expose the country and the
Empire to dangers from without and panics from within, and involve them
in a series of false economies alternating with spasms of wasteful
expenditure. The remedy advocated was the constitution of a body whose
duty it should be to represent requirements. Such a body was not
created until 1912. In the meantime, more money was spent than would
purchase security, which was not always obtained. Nor have we yet
produced what is the first essential of national security, the feeling
of the officers and men of the fighting services that they are being
justly treated by the nation in the matter of pay and pension and
proper administrative treatment.
{403}
In 1896, the most pressing need of the Navy was for more officers and
men. As already explained, the failure to enter the number required to
man the ships of the Naval Defence Act of 1889, had now become
manifest. Battleships are a showy asset; the absence of men is not
noticed by the public; therefore the politician builds the ships and
omits the men. In an address delivered before the Liverpool Chamber of
Commerce in July, 1896, I stated that the deficiency in the personnel
was 27,562 men, including a deficiency of 5000 in engine-room ratings.
A resolution urging the necessity of an immediate increase in the
personnel was passed by the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce, and was sent
to the First Lord, Mr. Goschen.
The First Lord replied to the resolution, stating that the increase in
the personnel since 1889 had been 31,360. These figures, however,
included the whole of the numbers borne, without distinction of the
numbers available for sea service, and represented the numbers voted,
irrespective of deaths or retirements. The true increase was estimated
by me, upon the evidence of the Navy Estimates, at 17,262; and the
total number required at 105,000.
A good deal of public interest having been aroused on the subject, Mr.
Goschen stated in the House that it would be his duty next year "to
propose such a number of men for the Navy and Reserves as we judge to
be rendered necessary by the extension of the Fleet."
The increase of personnel was provided accordingly. Here is one
instance among many, of a responsible statesman declaring in all good
faith that matters were perfectly satisfactory as they were; being
obliged by the insistence of outside representations to examine
requirements; and then discovering that these were in fact what had
been represented. Mr. Goschen was necessarily dependent upon the
advice of the Sea Lords; but the Sea Lords themselves were immersed in
the mass of routine work involved in keeping the machine going. The
business of supply and the business of {404} organisation for war were
confused together; with the inevitable result that organisation for war
was neglected.
The personnel was increased in 1897-8 by 6300 (numbers voted). In the
following year, 1898-9, my estimate of 105,000 men was passed, the
numbers voted being 106,390; and, excepting intervals of false economy,
continued to rise until they now (1913) stand at 146,000.
The proposals with regard to the personnel were supported by (among
others) Admiral Sir R. Vesey Hamilton, who, in a letter to _The Times_
of 2nd April, 1897, stated that "an ex-Controller of the Navy said to
me when I was at the Admiralty, 'Your building programme is ahead of
the manning.' And he was right, more particularly in officers." Sir
R. Vesey Hamilton was a Lord Commissioner of the Admiralty from
January, 1889, the year of the Naval Defence Act, to September, 1891.
His testimony is therefore authoritative. It was, of course, no fault
of Sir Vesey Hamilton that the personnel was deficient.
It is not too much to say that owing to the omission from that Act of
the requisite increase in the personnel, the Navy has been short of men
ever since.
In December, 1896, I suggested in a letter to the Press that promotion
to flag-rank should take place at an earlier age in order that officers
might gain the necessary experience while still in the vigour of youth.
Officers who remain too long in a subordinate position are liable to
have the faculty of initiative taken out of them, and to fall into the
habit of thinking that things will last their time. The services of
old and experienced officers are of course invaluable; but officers
should acquire the knowledge of the duties of an admiral (upon whom in
modern warfare all depends) as early in life as possible. Progressive
pay for all ranks from lieutenants upwards, was also advocated.
The requirements of the time were set forth by me in an article
contributed to _The Nineteenth Century_ of February, 1897. Briefly,
these were as follows:
{405}
1. The necessity of obtaining the requisite number of personnel for
active service, long service ratings, such number to be definitely
specified by the Board of Admiralty as being necessary to fulfil stated
requirements.
2. A thorough reorganisation of the Royal Naval Reserve. A scheme of
reorganisation, founded on the proposals of Captain Joseph Honner,
Royal Navy, Captain Crutchley, R.N.R., and others, was explained by me