The Memoirs of Admiral Lord Beresford
to the Liverpool Chamber of Commerce. In order to meet the emergency,
it was suggested that 5000 men should be annually joined for five
years, after which they should pass into the first-class Reserve; at
the same time, 5000 men should be annually joined for two months'
training, after which they should pass into the second-class Reserve.
Such emergencies periodically occur, because the authorities neglect to
look ahead.
3. Seventeen old but useful ironclads to be re-armed with modern guns.
A list of these was drawn up; the proposed alterations in each vessel
were specified in detail, together with their cost; a task which took
me some three months to accomplish.
The principle of the suggestion was that the invention of the
quick-firing gun was actually a far more important revolution than the
change from muzzle-loading to breech-loading guns. It was calculated
that the older vessels were strong enough to withstand the increased
strain. The proposal was not made in order to avoid the necessity of
building new vessels, but as an expedient to make up a deficiency in
ships. Building new vessels was the preferable course of action, which
the Admiralty rightly decided to adopt.
4. The advisability of eliminating altogether from the number of ships
in commission or in reserve those vessels which could neither fight nor
run away, and of replacing them by modern vessels.
The scheme was carried into effect by degrees. Such an elimination
should take place periodically, upon the {406} industrial principle of
replacing obsolete plant with new machines. In later years, the
elimination of old vessels which was carried into effect by the
Admiralty, was effected without replacing them by new ships, a course
of action which contravened the very principle upon which it was
ostensibly based.
5. The advisability of holding annual manoeuvres in combination with
the Army at all naval bases of operation.
6. The designing of a definite plan of Imperial defence, or plan of
campaign; and the provision and equipment of such naval bases and
stations abroad as should enable such plan to be put into effective
operation.
It will be observed that all the aforesaid recommendations of my
brother officers and myself were directed to the fulfilment of Sir
Frederick Richards' great scheme of 1894-5, as already described. In
the result, the Naval Works Bill, March 1897, showed that work was in
progress at Gibraltar, Portland, Dover, Keyham, Portsmouth, Hong Kong,
Colombo, Pembroke, Haulbowline; on barracks at Chatham, Sheerness,
Portsmouth, Keyham, Walmer, the new college for engineers at Keyham and
new magazines, the money voted being just under a million.
Writing from Cairo, in March, 1897, to the secretary of the Guildhall
Club (the letter being published at the time) I said that Mr.
Brodrick's speech showed that the Government had a definite plan of
campaign, which was "proved by the proposal to fortify important
strategic bases at present absolutely undefended; ... without such
fortified bases it is palpable that no clear plan of campaign existed
at headquarters; and a happy-go-lucky method must have prevailed in the
event of war. The Government appear to me to have really begun to put
our defences into business-like trim and to have looked into and
endeavoured to make complete all those auxiliaries, any one of which
being imperfect would jeopardise the defences of the Empire as a
whole.... It is always very hard for authorities to make proposals
involving large sums of money unless the public {407} and the Press
combine to show that they wish such expenditure."
There remained, and still remains, an essential reform to be
accomplished. I have never ceased to advocate as a matter of
elementary justice such an increase of the pay of officers and men as
should bear some proportion to the responsibilities with which they are
charged and the duties which they fulfil. In 1897, the increase of the
officers' pay, the rate of which had hardly been altered since the time
of Nelson, was an urgent necessity. As a result of the steady refusal
of the Government to grant anything except the most meagre concessions,
officers are now leaving the Service almost daily, and among those who
remain there is considerable discontent. At that time, the pay of the
men was, if not generous, still adequate. Owing to a variety of
causes, it has since become totally inadequate; the concessions wrung
from the Government in response to perfectly reasonable demands are
ridiculously insufficient; and numbers of trained men are leaving the
Service as soon as they can.
In view of the obstinacy of the Government upon this matter, it is
worth recalling that, speaking at Newbury in May, 1897, I put the whole
case for the officers as plainly as possible. It was pointed out that
every condition of life had improved during the Queen's reign, except
the pay and prospects of the officers and men of the Royal Navy,
although their responsibilities had increased a hundred-fold. The
lieutenant's pay was £15 a month; after eight years he could get £3 a
month extra; and after twelve years another £3 extra. Except for
specialist duty, such as gunnery, torpedo and navigation, he could not
get another shilling. There were over 200 lieutenants then on the list
of over twelve years' service, who were only getting £21 a month. They
could get no more, although some among them had twenty-one years'
service. Half-pay, often compulsory, was a shameful scandal to the
country. It was not even half-pay, but very often barely a third.
Rear-admirals of forty {408} years' service were sent on shore with
£450 a year to live upon. Captains were even worse off, often getting
four years on compulsory half-pay at £200 a year.
That was sixteen years ago. The Government have done nothing worth
consideration in the interval.
The case was again publicly represented by me in 1912. By that time,
owing to the increase in price of the necessities of life and other
causes, the pay of the men had become grossly inadequate. In order
that it should be commensurate with the pay obtained by an equivalent
class of men in civil employment, it ought to have been doubled. All
that the Government did was to grant a trifling increase to men of a
certain term of service. How long will the nation allow the Navy to
continue a sweated industry?
Another measure of reform which is still far from accomplishment, is
the manning of British ships by British seamen. The principle, as I
stated in May, 1897, is that in dealing with the innumerable
emergencies inseparable from the life of the sea, it is better to
depend upon British seamen than upon foreigners. In May, 1897, it was
estimated that of the total number of men employed in the mercantile
marine, the proportion of British seamen was no more than three-fourths.
In the same year, 1897, the question of the contribution of the
Colonies to Imperial Naval Defence, which, for practical purposes, was
first raised at the Imperial Conference of 1887, was the subject of one
of those discussions which have occupied the public mind at intervals
ever since; and which have eventually resulted in the decision of
Australia and New Zealand to establish navies of their own.
In a letter written in reply to a correspondent and published in the
Press in June, 1897, I expressed the opinion that:
"It certainly would help in Imperial defence if the Colonies did
subscribe some portion of the money necessary to secure adequate
Imperial defence, but I think that all such proposals should emanate
from the Colonies in the first instance."
{409}
In another communication I observed that: "We can only be prepared for
war thoroughly when the Colonies offer to join us in a definite scheme
of Imperial defence, and the Colonies and their trade are inseparable
portions of the question of Imperial defence. We must, however, offer
them an inducing quid pro quo. We cannot expect that they will bear a
share of the costs unless we are prepared to give them a voice in the
administration of Imperial affairs. Imperial consolidation must be
real, not one-sided, and we must devise a scheme for admitting the
Colonies to Parliamentary representation on all questions affecting
Imperial policy."
And in a letter to the Secretary of the Toronto Branch of the Navy
League, I said: "The great necessity of the times is to have thoroughly
equipped and efficient naval bases in all the Colonies, so that no
matter where a British man-of-war meets the enemy, she will practically
be fighting in home waters with a good base within easy reach for
repairs, stores, coal, etc."
I still think that this was a practical suggestion. Some years
afterwards, Canada took over certain naval bases; but the result has
not been a success. But she took them over at a time when the British
Government were engaged in dismantling and abandoning naval bases all
over the world. These have still to be restored. But as the danger is
out of sight, the public do not perceive that the demolition of naval
bases abroad may very likely, in the event of war, result in disaster
to the British Navy.
In June, 1897, was celebrated the Diamond Jubilee of Her Majesty Queen
Victoria. Some observations contained in an article contributed by me
to _The Navy League Guide_ to the great naval review held at Spithead,
may perhaps be historically interesting. It was shown that the two
great naval reviews, that of the Jubilee in 1887 and the Diamond
Jubilee of 1897, mark important epochs in the history of the British
Navy. The Fleet of 1887 was in no way adequate to our needs at that
time, and many of the ships assembled for review could not have taken
their places in the fighting line. {410} (So it was represented at the
time; luckily, the supreme test of war was escaped; the proof that the
need existed, therefore, resides in its ultimate recognition by the
authorities.) In 1897, on the contrary, there was assembled a fleet of
warships representing a large proportion of the Navy we then possessed,
which was rapidly becoming equal to our necessities both in numbers and
efficiency. In 1887, the battleship fleet was represented by only four
vessels of less than ten years of age, _Collingwood_, _Edinburgh_,
_Conqueror_ and _Ajax_. Two out of the four were armed with
muzzle-loading guns, although all foreign navies had mounted nothing
but breech-loaders for several years previously. The contrast afforded
by the 1897 review was remarkable. Nothing could better have displayed
the giant strides we had made both in construction and fighting
efficiency, than the eleven splendid first-class battleships assembled
on 26th June, 1897.
A suggestion was added which was not adopted; nor has the proposal yet
been carried into execution upon a large scale, probably because the
authorities are afraid of accidents. "To make the review a success and
to test the capabilities of the captains, it would be well if the Fleet
could be got under way and ordered to pass the royal yacht which should
be anchored as the saluting base. Possibly a few accidents would
occur, but it would be a capital display of seamanship and the art of
handling ships; and no Fleet in the world could execute so imposing a
manoeuvre so well as our own."
Indeed, I have always held that a naval review should be conducted like
a military review. The Sovereign should first proceed between the
lines; then the ships should get under way and should steam past the
saluting base.
The Dean of Saint Paul's unexpectedly provided a diversion in naval
affairs. In order to make room in the Cathedral for the monument to be
erected to the memory of the late Lord Leighton, _P_.R.A., the Dean