The Memoirs of Admiral Lord Beresford
for British trade and commerce, was thus {437} frankly raised at the
beginning. Indeed, all hinged upon its solution. The safety of life
and property always depends ultimately upon disciplined force. The
force at the disposal of the Chinese Government was scattered,
ill-organised and largely inefficient. But, with the men, money and
resources actually available, it would have been perfectly feasible to
have formed an army of a million men. Such was my view at the time,
and I have seen no reason to change it since.
At the request of the Tsung-li Yamen, I drew up the entire scheme
complete in every detail for the organisation of the Chinese army; and
on several occasions it was discussed with me by the Chinese Ministers
at great length.
Briefly described, my scheme was based upon the principle upon which
the Imperial Maritime Customs had been formed. The Imperial Maritime
Customs was charged with the duty of collecting Custom House dues,
which were hypothecated to secure the external indebtedness of China.
All nations were represented upon it, and, because Great Britain
possessed by far the larger share of Chinese trade, a British officer
was placed at its head. The business was impartially managed under the
Chinese Government for the common welfare of China and of other
nations; and in the result the arrangement worked admirably.
The proposal was, then, to organise the army upon the same basis;
appointing officers of those nations who owned interests in China; and,
as Great Britain possessed the largest interests, placing a British
officer in command under the Chinese Government. Under these
conditions, the army would be enabled to secure China both against
foreign aggression and internal disturbance. In a word, it would
ensure stable government. Under existing conditions, stable government
was impossible; for the methods of the Empress Dowager consisted in
playing off one party against another, and one viceroy against another.
Tsu Hsi succeeded in maintaining her personal ascendancy; but at the
cost of so weakening the State, that it was liable to fall a prey to
foreign ambition and foreign cupidity.
{438}
The Chinese high officials argued the whole subject with great acumen.
They objected that the commander-in-chief might embark upon a career of
personal aggrandisement. I replied that as he would be under the
Chinese Government, and that as he would be further restricted by his
dependence upon an international body of officers, there could be no
such danger. And I asked the Chinese whether they had any reason to be
dissatisfied with Sir Robert Hart's administration of the Customs.
They answered at once that his services were invaluable to China, and
said that he worked so hard in Chinese interests that "he might have
been a Chinaman."
I then pointed out that a British officer at the head of the army would
occupy the same position with regard to the army as Sir Robert Hart
occupied with regard to the Customs; offered to select for them the
best general I could find for the executive command; and informed them
that I was myself prepared to undertake the administrative command.
The objection that the creation of such an army might offend foreign
susceptibilities, was also met by the argument that foreign officers
would command it.
In reply to a courteous question, I stated that my object in proposing
the scheme was to benefit China; and that the reason why I desired to
benefit China was that an improvement in Chinese administration must
necessarily profit British interests.
I also discussed the subject with his Excellency Yung Lu, he who had
executed the _coup d'état_ which resulted in the defeat of the
Reformers and the imprisonment of the Emperor Kuang Hsu. Yung Lu, who
commanded one of the foreign-drilled armies, stated that the
reorganisation of the Chinese army under British and foreign officers
would be carried into execution; and asked me whether, supposing that
China put the whole of her armies under British officers, Great Britain
would assist her in any quarrel that might arise between her and any
other Power.
{439}
The direct question was highly significant.
My reply, of course, was that I was unable to discuss political
questions; but that Great Britain had no desire to involve herself in
quarrels which might arise among other countries.
Yung Lu courteously invited me to visit the military forces then
quartered round Pekin; a privilege of which I afterwards availed myself.
Having formulated my scheme for the reorganisation of the Chinese army,
founded upon a general knowledge of the requirements of the situation,
I proceeded to fulfil in detail that part of my instructions received
from the President of the Associated Chambers of Commerce directing me
to report "whether the organisation of the Chinese civil and military
administration is sufficiently complete to ensure adequate protection
to commercial ventures." Accordingly, I visited all the forts and
arsenals forming the coast and river defences of the Chinese Empire,
and utilised the opportunities, most courteously extended to me by the
various viceroys, of inspecting the Imperial military forces.
For the sake of simplicity, the results of my investigations into
military and naval conditions are here grouped together; although these
investigations were necessarily conducted side by side with my
inquiries into commercial affairs, the two elements being often present
in the same locality.
China's military forces were then sharply divided between Manchu and
Chinese, or North and South. The Manchu, or Northern, forces were
manned and officered entirely by Manchus, and enjoyed privileges which
were denied to the Chinese army. Nearly every Southern army was
commanded by two generals, a Manchu and a Chinese, the Manchu being the
real head.
The provincial armies are maintained at the expense of the viceroys.
In the Province of Chihli, General Yuan Shih Kai's army, and the
Imperial armies at and around Pekin, are maintained by the Board of
Revenue out of {440} Imperial taxes; so that the Imperial armies
permanently quartered round Pekin are State-paid. The generals in
command of the Provinces administer their armies entirely according to
their own discretion. As these officers are responsible for the
payment and maintenance of the forces under their command, much of the
money which should go to the army is apt to stick with its general.
When I mentioned these circumstances to the members of the Tsung-li
Yamen, one of them blandly asked me if I included his army in my
description.
I replied that his Excellency could not but be aware that he received
supplies of pay, clothes and rice for an establishment of 10,000,
although the actual number was one half or less; and that when his army
was inspected, he filled the ranks by hiring coolies for the occasion.
My response evoked an irreverent outburst of applause from the
interested audience of coolies. "The English Mandarin," they cried,
"knows all about our old mandarins! That is just what happens."
YUAN SHIH KAI
In October, 1898, I went to Hsiao Chao to visit Yuan Shih Kai, the high
official who informed Yung Lu of the plot of the Reformers to seize the
Empress Dowager, and so brought about the _coup d'état_. I remained
two days and a night with the general; witnessed the parade of all his
troops, and their manoeuvres, and examined their equipment and
victualling. I was permitted to examine the pay-sheets, and obtained
every detail connected with the establishment and maintenance of the
force.
General Yuan Shih Kai is a Chinaman, and his army was composed of
Chinese. It numbered 7400 men. They appeared to be smart, of fine
physique, well fed, and their uniforms were well kept. Their parade
and manoeuvres were smartly executed, their discipline was excellent.
All their equipment was serviceable and efficient, with the exception
of their artillery.
{441}
It was on this occasion that I had a conversation with Yuan Shih Kai,
which, in the light of subsequent events in China, it may be not
uninteresting to recall.
Yuan Shih Kai expressed his anxiety concerning the future of his
country; which, he said, was in a lamentable state of weakness, and
which the States of Europe were desirous of dividing among themselves;
and in this connection he was inclined favourably to regard the
proposal to combine the various Chinese armies into one great Imperial
force.
Upon that, I asked Yuan if he were acquainted with the history of
China. Being one of the governing class, and therefore a scholar of
the ancient meticulous pedantic class, he probably knew the whole of it
by heart; and he replied in the affirmative.
"Then," I said, "have you not observed that every Chinese dynasty has
been founded by a successful general?"
The man who is now (1913) President of the Chinese Republic looked at
me impassive as a statue, and held his peace.
Yuan Shih Kai was well aware of the fact that throughout the East the
ruler is always "He," never "They"; and for this reason he subsequently
endeavoured, after the death of the Empress Dowager, to preserve the
authority of the Emperor.
Years afterwards, before leaving England for China, Dr. Sun Yat-sen,
who was accompanied by General Homer Lea of the United States, lunched
with me. General Homer Lea was, I think, to conduct the reorganisation
of the Chinese army.
ARMS AND MEN
The armies which I had the privilege of inspecting, or concerning which
I obtained information, were: the army of General Sung, distributed
along the coast about Kinchow, which apparently consisted of 10,000 men
out of a paper strength of 20,000; the army of General Soon Ching at
{442} Lutai, which was also at half strength, consisting of 7000 men
out of 15,000, distributed among 30 camps, and having some Russian
officers; and the army of General Tung Fu Chan, near Pekin, which was a
disorderly and an undisciplined rabble; the army of General Nieh, which
consisted of about 13,000 men, distributed among 30 camps between Hsiao
Chao and Tientsin, with five Russian instructors; the Pekin Field
Force, which was commanded from the Palace, and which consisted of
10,000 picked men, well armed but badly drilled; the cavalry camp at
Kaiping, theoretically consisting of 1500 men, and having three Russian
officers; and the army of General Yi Ke Tong, consisting of from 8000
to 15,000 men scattered about in Manchuria. I also saw the armies, or
some part of them, of the Viceroys Chung Chai Tung, Liu Kwen Yi, Hsu
Ying Kwei, Tau Chung Liu, and Kwei. Besides these, I was informed that
there were in Mongolia 100,000 cavalry.
Among the various armies were distributed 14 different patterns of
rifles, varying from the Mauser to the gingal. Some contingents were
armed with bows and arrows; others carried bird-cages and fans, being
distinguishable as soldiers only by their badge. The armies exhibited
as many degrees of efficiency among themselves as their weapons.
Nevertheless, I came to the conclusion that here was all the material
from which to evolve an excellent army. The Chinese have all the
qualities of a good soldier: they are sober, obedient, quick to learn
and courageous. The requirements were proper food, pay, clothing,
drill and competent officers.
While I was at Newchwang I obtained what information was available with
regard to the numbers and location of the Russian troops in Eastern
Siberia and in Manchuria The total number was then about 12,000 men.
In the course of my inspection, at the Viceroy's invitation, of the
powerful forts on the Yangtse River, I observed that one fort, which
was intended to fire up the river, was so constructed that only one gun