The Memoirs of Admiral Lord Beresford
that no more than a proportion of boys could be passed through them,
either the system should be abolished, or two squadrons of six ships
should be provided, and all boys trained in them. The Admiralty,
however, considered that it would be inadvisable to send away so many
young seamen; and they were right.
I hoisted my flag in H.M.S. _Ramillies_ on 12th January 1900. She was
a first-class battleship of the _Royal Sovereign_ {463} class, of
14,150 tons. At that time she was six or seven years old; at the time
of writing, although she is no more than twenty, she has been sold for
old iron; and when they took her away to break her up, she got adrift
in a seaway off the Isle of Wight.
I saw the last of my old flagship as I was passing through the gut of
Gibraltar, on board the R.M.S. _Orvieto_, on 25th November, 1913. She
was being towed by a small tug to her last home, the yard of an Italian
ship-knacker. I thought of the old happy days on board her, and all
the sport, when she held the record in the Fleet for most of the drills
and all the boat-racing.
The flag-captain was Robert S. Lowry (now Vice-Admiral Sir R. S. Lowry,
K.C.B.), who had been with me in the _Undaunted_ as commander. The
commander was the Hon. Horace L. A. Hood (now Rear-Admiral Hood, C.B.,
M.V.O., D.S.O.). The flag-lieutenant was Maurice J. G. Cay, and the
secretary, Paymaster John A. Keys (now Fleet Paymaster J. A. Keys), who
was with me afterwards in my flagships.
At that time, apart from being charged with the duty of carrying into
execution the orders of the commander-in-chief, an officer second in
command had no individual responsibility. In other words, he had
little opportunity of acquiring from his superior officer that
knowledge which, in the event of war, he would require in an emergency.
Upon the adequacy of the Mediterranean Fleet depends the safety of the
Empire in time of war; but although war was then waging in South
Africa, although the other European Powers regarded Great Britain with
open or covert hostility, and although a combination of France and
Russia against this country was by no means improbable, the
Mediterranean Fleet was barely sufficient to meet the French Fleet
alone with any reasonable certainty of success. In other words, so far
as numbers and composition were concerned, the Mediterranean Fleet was
incapable of carrying into execution the duties with which it must be
charged in {464} the event of war. Under the command of Sir John
Fisher, its efficiency was admirable.
The bare statement of the requirements sufficiently indicates their
necessity. An increase of the supply of reserve coal, then dangerously
deficient; the provision of fleet colliers, fully equipped, of
distilling ships, of telegraph ships, and of hospital ships, of which
until quite recently there was only one in the Navy, and that one a
present from the United States; of store ships, reserve ammunition
ships and parent ships for torpedo craft: thirty-four vessels in all,
representing those auxiliaries without which no Fleet is adequately
fitted to fulfil its duties in war. These deficiencies fall to be
recorded, because, although some of them have since been supplied, it
is still the habit of the authorities to neglect the provision of fleet
auxiliaries, and the public are taught to believe that a squadron of
battleships is self-sufficient.
The construction of submarines, which had long been the subject of
experiment in France, having been begun by the United States, induced
me to write to Lord Goschen, First Lord, observing that whether or not
the new arm might prove valuable in war, at least it ought to be
tested, and suggesting that two experimental boats should be ordered.
The Admiralty shortly afterwards purchased five submarines of the
Holland Torpedo Boat Company, U.S.A., of a similar design to the six
Hollands of the _Adder_ class ordered by the United States in June,
1900. The Hollands were followed by the construction in this country
of the "A" class; and as everyone knows, the type was rapidly developed
until Great Britain now possesses a large fleet of these vessels.
Having investigated when I was in the _Undaunted_ the French system of
nucleus crews, under which the older men and pensioners were employed
to form skeleton crews for the ships in Reserve, upon the understanding
that they were not to go to sea in full commission except in the event
of war, I sent home a report upon the subject, indicating the advantage
enjoyed by the French naval seaman, who, under {465} the nucleus crew
system, could look forward with certainty to spending the end of his
career comfortably in a home port, and suggesting that a modification
of the system might be introduced into our own Service. Under the
British system, the ships in the Steam Reserve were then kept in order
by working parties composed of men temporarily under training in the
depots attached to the dockyards, an arrangement which had the
disadvantage that the men who formed the crews in the event of war,
would not be the men who were familiar with the ships.
Some years later, the Admiralty introduced the nucleus crew system,
which differed entirely from the principle upon which was based the
French method, in that a proportion of active service ratings were
placed on board the ships of the Reserve, and that these crews were
being constantly shifted from ship to ship. After a series of
experiments, it was officially decided to man a number of ships in
active commission with nucleus crews, which are officially stated to be
as efficient as full crews; a state of things which is as dangerous to
the national security as it is unfair to officers and men.
The accident occurring on board the French man-of-war _Admiral
Duperré_, leading to the conclusion that if cordite were exposed to
heat above a certain temperature its ignition would cause an enormously
increased pressure upon the gun, induced me officially to represent the
necessity of keeping ammunition at an even temperature. Several years
afterwards, a large quantity of cordite distributed among the Fleet was
found to be in so dangerous a condition that it was destroyed, and the
ammunition chambers were equipped with cooling apparatus.
My interest in signalling inspired me to invent a new drill for the
signalmen, in which the men themselves represented ships. Linked
together with a tack-line, in order to keep them in station, the men
executed the evolutions of a fleet in obedience to signals. I also
advocated that all captains and commanders should pass the signal
school as {466} a qualification for flag-command. Every admiral ought
to be familiar with manoeuvre signals at least; for in default of that
knowledge, he does not know that a wrong signal has been hoisted in his
flagship until he sees the ships making a wrong manoeuvre. An admiral
who understands signals will seldom, if ever, be observed hoisting a
negative.
It was in the year 1900 that H.M.S. _Terrible_, commanded by Captain
Percy M. Scott (now Admiral Sir P. M. Scott, K.C.B., K.C.V.O.) on the
China station, distinguished herself by making a gunnery record of a
percentage of 76.92 hits, as compared with the mean percentage of all
ships in commission, of which the highest was 46.91 (10-inch gun), and
the lowest was 28.2 (16.25 inch and 13.5 inch). Comparing the
_Renown_, flagship of the Mediterranean, with the _Terrible_, both
really smart ships, it was clear that there must be something radically
wrong with our gunnery training, when the _Terrible_ made more than
twice the number of hits with her 6-inch guns in the same number of
rounds.
I wrote home, suggesting that, as Captain Percy Scott had solved the
difficulties with which we were all struggling it would be advisable to
send him to the various Fleets and Squadrons to teach us the right
methods. I also wrote to Captain Percy Scott, expressing my interest
in his achievement, and received from him a courteous reply, enclosing
much useful information: which enabled me to represent to the
commander-in-chief that consideration should be given to the new
arrangements for shooting instituted on the China station, owing to the
inventions and the industry of Captain Percy Scott. It was also urged
that a gunnery training ship should be attached to each Fleet.
Among the excellent practices introduced by the commander-in-chief, was
the writing of essays by officers upon a given subject--the interchange
of ideas being of much educational value; and perhaps of hardly less
utility, was the exercise in composition. Many naval officers evince
marked literary ability; but there is always a proportion who find
accurate expression a difficulty. Few, however, so {467} dismally
succumb to it as the author of the following signal, made in response
to a request from an admiral for the explanation of a mistake in
manoeuvring. The reply was:
"When signal A2 pendant was made ---- reduced to 30 revolutions and as
she gradually dropped astern to get astern of ---- observed her bearing
she suddenly seemed to stop and turn towards us and we stopped and went
astern on seeing flagship passing ahead of ---- altogether we had
turned 6 points by that time. My object was to get under her stern by
dropping and watching her thinking that she was dropping gradually to
get astern."
At this time, the Board of Admiralty effected many improvements. The
coal supply for the Mediterranean was increased, the Mediterranean
Fleet was strengthened, and provided with colliers and with a hospital
ship; better ships were allocated for gunnery training at the home
ports; the old coastguard ships were replaced with modern vessels;
submarines were added to the Fleet; the signalling was improved; the
regulations for training gunnery and torpedo ratings were revised;
obsolete ships were removed from the effective list; a naval tactical
school was established; and combined manoeuvres of the Channel and
Mediterranean Fleets were instituted.
While Vice-Admiral Sir John Fisher was commander-in-chief of the
Mediterranean Fleet, he greatly improved its fighting efficiency. As
the result of his representations, the stocks of coal at Malta and
Gibraltar were increased, the torpedo flotillas were strengthened, and
the new breakwaters at Malta were begun. Some of Sir John Fisher's
reforms are confidential; but among his achievements which became
common knowledge, the following are notable: From a 12-knot Fleet with
breakdowns, he made a 15-knot Fleet without breakdowns; introduced long
range target practice, and instituted the Challenge Cup for heavy gun
shooting; instituted various war practices for officers and men;
invited, with excellent results, officers to formulate their opinions
upon cruising and battle formation; drew up complete {468} instructions
for torpedo flotillas; exercised cruisers in towing destroyers and
battleships in towing one another, thereby proving the utility of the
device for saving coal in an emergency; and generally carried into
execution Fleet exercises based, not on tradition but, on the
probabilities of war.
The _Ramillies_ competing in rifle-shooting, hockey, pistol shooting
and the squadron athletic sports, took the Mediterranean Jewel and £1;
was first in the sweepstakes; tied first for the Pembroke Plate; won
the tug-of-war twice, and the greasy pig race twice; altogether, the
ship took six firsts, nine seconds, and five thirds, out of 19 events.
In the early days of motor-cars, a motor-car race between Captain
George Neville and myself was arranged, the course being from the
bottom to the top of the Rock of Gibraltar. My car broke down, and
Neville won the race. Another breakdown in the same car occurred 20