The Memoirs of Admiral Lord Beresford
Defence depended primarily upon the work of a War Staff; for its naval
and military members could only be placed in possession of the
information with regard to requirements which it was (theoretically)
their duty to impart to the political members, by means of a War Staff.
But for several years after the formation of the committee, there was
no War Staff in existence at the Admiralty.
In December, 1902, occurred an opportunity for introducing physical and
military instruction into the elementary schools. The Education Bill
was then before Parliament; in the elementary school system, the
machinery required to provide physical and military training already
existed and in my view, it should be utilised, "in order that our
manhood should have had some previous training if called upon to fight
in defence of the Empire." With regard to physical education, its
necessity was exemplified in the large number of recruits rejected for
disabilities during the South African war; and as to military
instruction, the proposal was based upon the necessity of teaching
discipline and the rudiments of manly accomplishments to the young, by
means of education in marching, giving orders, swimming, and shooting
with a small-bore rifle. These considerations were placed by me before
the Duke of Devonshire, who had charge of the Education Bill in the
House of Lords, at the same time asking him to exert his influence to
obtain the insertion of a clause embodying the proposals.
The Duke replied that Lord Londonderry, who was then Minister of
Education, was considering how far it was {483} possible for the Board
of Education to effect the objects desired. But he added the
surprising information that "a considerable portion" of my suggestions
"referred to matters which can only be dealt with by the War Office."
In the House of Commons, I moved that "physical and military
instruction shall be compulsory in all schools supported by public
funds." Then it was stated that the question of physical education
could not be debated with reference to the Bill, but that there would
be no objection to such a clause being inserted in the Education Code.
When I proposed accordingly that such a clause should be inserted in
the Code of Education, Lord Londonderry said that he agreed with the
Duke of Devonshire that such suggestions could only be dealt with by
the War Office. I had no idea then, nor have I any conception now,
what that cryptic statement meant. I pointed out at the time that it
was wholly incomprehensible, the War Office having nothing whatever to
do with elementary schools, but to no avail. The proposal was largely
supported in the Press, but without effect upon the Government. The
War Office phantom, which was about as relevant to the discussion as
the ghost of Cæsar, proved irresistible. Nothing was done; except that
the Government laid another brick in their favourite pathway of lost
opportunities.
The use of oil fuel in battleships began in February, 1903; when the
_Mars_ and _Hannibal_ went to sea, each fitted to burn oil in two
boilers out of eight. One ship emitted white smoke, the other yellow;
and both gave forth a smell so dreadful that, when I was in command of
the Fleet, I told the captains of those vessels that I should place
them to windward of the enemy as the two most formidable ships
available. Nothing is better than oil fuel, on one condition--that you
have got it.
The necessity of promoting officers to flag rank earlier, in order that
they might gain the requisite experience while still young, was again
urged by me, and to this end I advocated an increase of the
rear-admirals' list. An {484} improvement has since been made in this
respect. In 1902 there were 39 rear-admirals; in 1913, the number had
been increased to 55.
Early in 1903, I visited America (for the third time), being most
hospitably entertained by my old friend, Colonel Robert M. Thompson.
During my stay with Colonel Thompson, who has been connected with the
United States Navy, I saw much of the American Fleet, and had the
pleasure of becoming acquainted with many American naval officers.
Admiral Brownson I knew already; I had met Admiral Bob Evans in the
Mediterranean when he was a commander; and I had enjoyed a conversation
with Captain (now Admiral) Mahan upon his visit to England some years
previously.
Admiral Evans was kind enough to place a torpedo-boat at my disposal,
the _Worden_, in which I went from Pensacola to Pontagoorda. I
astonished the signalman by reading a semaphore signal made to me by
the flagship, before he did. The hospitality extended to me by the
officers of the United States Navy was almost embarrassing in its
profusion; and I shall always retain the pleasantest memories of that
Service.
At a dinner of the Pilgrims' Society held at the Waldorf Hotel, New
York, on 4th February, in the course of my address I observed that
"battleships are cheaper than battles"; accidentally inventing a maxim
of five words which does in fact contain the essence of naval policy,
and which, touching the practical American imagination, ran throughout
the United States.
In October, 1902, I was promoted to the rank of vice-admiral.
In February, 1903, having been offered the command the Channel Fleet, I
resigned my seat at Woolwich; where I was succeeded by Mr. Will Crooks,
who was elected on 11th March by a majority of 3229.
{485}
CHAPTER L
THE CHANNEL FLEET
H.M.S. _Majestic_, first-class battleship, completed in 1895, sister
ship to the _Magnificent_ (which was built at Chatham during my time at
that port as captain of the Steam Reserve), was one of nine ships of
the same class; the rest being _Magnificent_, _Hannibal_, _Prince
George_, _Victorious_, _Jupiter_, _Mars_, _Cæsar_ and _Illustrious_.
These represented an improvement on the preceding Royal Sovereign
class, the _Renown_, a beautiful, somewhat smaller vessel, being a
class by herself.
The _Majestic_ is of 14,900 tons displacement, carries four 12-inch and
twelve 6-inch guns, was of 17.5 knots designed speed, and had a
complement of 772. My flag was hoisted in the _Majestic_ on 17th
April, 1903. The Channel Fleet, of which I was now in command,
consisted of the _Majestic_ (flag of vice-admiral), _Magnificent_ (flag
of Rear-Admiral the Hon. A. G. Curzon-Howe, and afterwards of
Rear-Admiral the Hon. Hedworth Lambton), _Jupiter_, _Hannibal_, _Mars_,
and _Prince George_, battleships; _Hogue_ and _Sutlej_, armoured
cruisers; and _Doris_, _Pactolus_ and _Prometheus_, small cruisers.
Vice-Admiral Sir A. K. Wilson (now Admiral of the Fleet Sir A. K.
Wilson, V.C., G.C.B., O.M., G.C.V.O.), whom I relieved, was a
consummate master of the art of handling a Fleet, a great tactician, a
man inexorably devoted to the Service, to which he gave unsparing
labour.
The Staff in the _Majestic_ consisted of the flag-captain, Hugh
Evan-Thomas; the flag-commander, Michael Culme-Seymour; the
flag-lieutenant, Charles D. Roper; and the {486} secretary, John A.
Keys. The commander was Henry B. Pelly (now Captain Pelly, M.V.O.).
As the efficiency of the Fleet depends upon its admiral, so the admiral
depends upon the officers of his staff and upon the captains under his
command; because it is theirs to execute his policy. I have always
said that they were the officers who did the work and who were entitled
to the credit of it. In the conduct of a Fleet, it is first of all
necessary that the admiral and the officers of the Fleet should work
together in a common understanding. For this reason, the captains
should have access to the admiral at all times of the day or night, and
in all matters affecting the organisation and fighting efficiency of
the Fleet they should be in full possession of his views, and the
admiral of their views.
Efficiency consists in the maintenance of the most rigid discipline,
together with cheerfulness, contentment and smartness. To this end,
definite and strict orders must be issued; no mistake or failure,
however small, must be allowed to pass, and, conversely, merit should
be commended; and as much leave should be given as the exigencies of
the Service permit. The admiral is responsible for the whole
administration, smartness and efficiency of the Fleet. The captains
are responsible for the administration, smartness and discipline of the
individual ships of the Fleet. The officers and men of the Royal Navy
are loyal to the core; and when a mistake occurs, it is usually due,
not to a deficiency on their part but, to the failure of the senior
officer of the Fleet to give his orders clearly and to show beforehand
what is to be done and how it is to be done.
But for the adequate treatment of the subject of Fleet Administration,
a volume would be needed; the principles only can be indicated in these
pages, together with such instances of its practice as may serve a
useful purpose or may possess intrinsic interest.
The question of giving leave, for example, is of essential importance,
because the comfort and contentment of officers and men so largely
depend upon the system employed. In {487} the Channel Fleet, the
system was to give week-end leave, from after dinner on Saturday, every
week, the liberty men being due on board at seven o'clock on the
following Monday morning, so that, if the Fleet were at Portland, they
had only one night at home. Many of the men were therefore obliged to
spend Sunday night in travelling; often, if they were not to break
their leave, arriving at the port hours before they could get a boat
off to their ship, and spending the interval shelterless and miserable.
In the result the number of leave-breakers was usually very large.
By means of altering the system, the number was at once reduced to a
fraction, such, for instance, as eight men, all of whom were accounted
for. Under the new arrangement weekend leave was allowed once a month,
when the liberty men of one watch left their ships on Friday after
dinner instead of upon Saturday, and returned on board at noon on
Monday, instead of at seven o'clock in the morning. Thus they had
three nights at home once a month, instead of one night at home twice a
month; and had to pay only one fare for three nights, instead of two
fares for two nights. In these matters the question of expense should
always be considered. Another advantage was that whereas heretofore
one watch was always absent on Sundays, under the new arrangement all
officers and men were on board upon two Sundays in every month.
The Navy, unlike the Army, is always on active service, and is
perpetually practising in peace what it will be required to do in war.
In the Navy, the only difference between peace and war is that in war
the target fires back. Hence it is that the record of a command afloat
consists almost entirely of incessant routine work; such as the
evolutions of: _clear ship for action, boats pull round Fleet,
collision and grounding stations, fire stations, out fire engine, moor
ship, unmoor ship, out nets, in nets, taking in tow, casting off tow,
let go sheet anchor, let go stern, kedge, bower anchors, weigh and cat
sheet anchor by hand, in boom boats, let go and pick up both lifebuoys
at sea, coaling, flag-signalling, man and arm boats, running {488}
torpedoes, field-gun and company landing, rifle practice_, etc. These
are matters of course. The Fleet is constantly exercised in manoeuvres
and in tactics; there is gunnery practice; and there are the periodical
combined manoeuvres.
In the Fleet under my command, the drills and exercises were
particularly onerous; for it was a rule never to go to sea or to steam
from port to port without practising some exercise or tactical problem.
For every pound's worth of coal burnt, a pound's worth of training.