The Memoirs of Admiral Lord Beresford
Salute.
As the Emperor was leaving that night, the German flag and the Union
Jack were hoisted on the Rock, half the search-lights of the Fleet
being turned on the one flag, and half on the other. Precisely as the
_König Albert_ passed between the ends of the breakwaters, two stands
of a thousand rockets, each stand placed upon the end of a breakwater,
were ignited and rushing upwards, met in a triumphal arch of fire high
over the mast-heads of the Emperor's ship.
In the following October (1904) occurred one of those sudden and
unforeseen emergencies which test alike the readiness of the Fleet and
the temper of the nation. The Fleet was ready, and the nation lost its
temper.
The Russo-Japanese war was then waging. The Channel Fleet, which had
been coaling, left Portland at midday on 17th October for Gibraltar.
On the 21st, the Fleet left Lagos. On the same day, just before
midnight, the Russian Baltic Fleet, commanded by Admiral Rojdesvenski,
who believed that his Fleet was about to be attacked by Japanese
torpedo-boats, fired upon the British Gamecock Trawling Fleet in the
vicinity of the Dogger Bank, in the North Sea. The steam trawler
_Crane_ was sunk, her captain and third hand were killed, and the
Russian Fleet proceeded upon its course. Of these things we in the
Channel Fleet were of course ignorant. The next day, the Channel Fleet
was exercised in running torpedoes, and a torpedo attack for exercise
upon Gibraltar was arranged for the night of the 23rd-24th.
In the meantime, the news of the North Sea incident had run about the
world; democracy in England wanted war; and the occurrence of highly
strained relations between Great Britain and Russia coinciding with the
arrival of the Channel Fleet at Gibraltar, upon which the torpedo-boats
were innocently making a night attack, might have resulted in their
being mistaken for a real enemy. Fortunately {495} no such catastrophe
occurred. At seven o'clock upon the morning of the 24th, the Fleet was
anchored in the harbour of Gibraltar; I learned the news; received my
instructions by telegram, and made my dispositions.
On that day, peace and war hung in the balance. The Home, Channel and
Mediterranean Fleets were instructed to act in concert, a detachment of
the Mediterranean Fleet being ordered to reinforce the Channel Fleet at
Gibraltar. The Russian Baltic Fleet was then proceeding to Vigo, a
detachment of it being already at Tangier. On the following day (25th
October) King Edward received a message from the Czar expressing the
profound regret of his Imperial Majesty. It is a matter of history how
the negotiations proceeded until an amicable settlement was arranged.
The uncertainty, however, lasted until the 7th November.
It is a subject for thankfulness that there was no engagement. The
Russian ships were so loaded with coal and stores that their upper-deck
guns could not have been worked, and a fight would have been murder.
Nor would war have been justified. The popular indignation was due to
a misunderstanding, and the misunderstanding arose because the Russian
admiral did not proceed to the nearest British port and explain the
circumstances. If he believed that the Fleet was about to be attacked
by torpedo craft, he was right to fire upon what he thought was the
enemy, nor could he risk the time required to exchange recognition
signals.
The result of the Russian admiral's mistake was to kindle a sudden
resentment in this country which as nearly as possible forced a war
between the two nations. It is one of the dangers inherent in the
nature of democracy in all countries, that while democracy dislikes and
hinders organisation and preparation for war, the moment that its
vanity or self-respect is injured, democracy wants to fight. It is the
impulse of the mob. The North Sea incident was one example of this
disastrous tendency; the Spanish-American war was another.
{496}
But had war been most unfortunately declared by Great Britain in
October, 1904, the Navy would have been quite ready. All it had to do
was to proceed to the scene of operations. In this respect, it owns an
advantage over the Army, because the Navy is always on active service,
and does nothing in war which it is not doing every day in peace; if it
is not fighting an enemy, it is fighting the elements; and whether in
peace or in war, it goes to dinner at the same time. The Army, on the
other hand, must do in war what it cannot do in peace; it changes from
one condition to quite another; and the transition stage involves
immense organisation, expense and discomfort.
In December, 1904, owing to the redistribution of the Fleet, the
Channel Fleet became the Atlantic Fleet, which was under my command
until the 5th March, 1905, when I hauled down my flag.
{497}
CHAPTER LI
BOAT RACING
The enthusiasm which I have always felt for the noble sport of rowing
induced me, while in command of the _Undaunted_, to publish some notes
on the subject of men-of-war pulling races, and how to win them, the
substance of which is here reproduced, in the hope that they may still
prove of use in the Service.
One of the results of steam and machinery having succeeded masts, yards
and canvas in a man-of-war was the creation of greater interest in
pulling races. The regattas held in different fleets and squadrons had
become yearly events keenly looked forward to by both officers and men.
This was very desirable, not only for the sake of the exercise which it
encouraged (physical exercise of an arduous character being in a
measure lost to the Service since the necessity for masts and yards had
been so diminished) but, for the well-being and good feeling which
healthful exercise invariably produces. Committees were formed, rules
and regulations were laid down in a clear and business-like manner, and
sums of money were given in prizes; which sums amounted on the
Mediterranean Station to about £200--£50 or £60 being given by the
Malta Canteen, and the remainder being raised by subscription among the
officers of the fleet.
Man-of-war boats, being built for fighting and weight carrying are
different from boats built for racing purposes on fresh water; but the
prize will generally be gained by the crew of the man-of-war boat which
has carefully and {498} consistently followed the fundamental
principles upon which races pulled in racing boats on fresh water are
won.
From the time the boat's crew is selected, until her stem has passed
the winning-post, no detail which may add to the chance of a boat
winning should be omitted, no matter how small it may appear.
In selecting a boat's crew, endeavour should be made to have the men
near about the same height, in order to enable them all to take the
same length of stroke with ease to themselves and to make their effort
at the same moment. There should be no great disparity in their
weights. The men all round should be a fairly level lot, which will
make it easier for them to train as a whole. A crew resembles a chain,
in that a crew is no stronger than its weakest man, just as a chain is
no stronger than its weakest link. If a weak or an untrained man be
placed in a boat, he will, soon after the start, throw extra work on
the others. An indifferent crew of twelve men trained alike as to
condition, length of stroke, and pulling accurately together, provided
the boats are equal, will surely win a long race against a crew
composed of ten vastly superior and two indifferently trained men.
Similarly, a heavy boat with an indifferently sized crew, well trained,
will undoubtedly beat a magnificent crew in a good boat, untrained.
A rule should be strictly enforced that individual members of one crew
are not to be trained or to pull with another crew. It is very much
the habit at men-of-war regattas to encourage the best oars in a ship
to pull in two or three (sometimes in four or five) races. This
practice is much to be deprecated, not only in the interest of the man
himself, but in the interest of boat racing. If a man who pulls in
several boats be laid up, he probably jeopardises the chances of
winning several races.
The selection of a coxswain is a most important element in getting a
crew together. He should be a man of a certain seniority, who commands
attention, perfectly cool and collected, of good nerve and
determination. Coxswains {499} defective in these qualities have lost
many races, and coxswains possessing them have just pulled off many
races. The training of the crew must as a rule depend entirely on the
coxswain. For a 12-oared boat he should always, in order to provide
for contingencies, train at least two more men than the number required
in the race.
For smaller boats he should always arrange to train more men than the
actual crew; many races have been lost owing to this detail having been
neglected, and one of the crew having broken down in his training just
before the race.
After the crew is selected, the coxswain with their help and assistance
should draw up certain rules in order to ensure constant and regular
practice, as well as to avoid those hindrances to training to be found
after frequent visits to the canteen. One or two men taking a glass of
beer too much during training has indirectly been the cause of many a
race being lost, owing to the loss of practice to the crew as a whole,
and to the disturbance of that harmony which must exist if a boat's
crew is to be thoroughly trained.
Whether it is from his early training, or from the heavy and clumsy
nature of his oars, or from the weight of the boats he has to pull, the
British bluejacket, as a rule, pulls the worst oar possible to enable
him to stay and pull through to the end a well-contested long race. If
he be left to himself, he sits bolt upright on his thwart, beginning
his stroke from that position, and apparently under the impression that
the expression "Bend your back" indicates that he should bend his back
forward instead of bending it aft; and totally unconscious that when he
falls back towards the bow he only pulls his weight, but that when he
bends forward towards the stern he pulls his strength and his weight;
and he usually holds the loom of his oar with bent arms, frequently
giving one or two jerks during the stroke, the last one of which may
bring his oar out of the water and feather it considerably above his
shoulder. He sometimes adds to these movements a rocking motion from
side to {500} side, beginning by leaning towards the middle of the boat
and then throwing himself towards the boat's side. He almost
invariably has his head turned on his shoulder to see what his oar is
doing, and he often wears a tight belt round his stomach. All these
practices are entirely wrong and are totally opposed to a common-sense
method of urging a boat at speed through the water.
When the boat's crew has been selected, the first duty of the coxswain
is to show them how to pull and to ensure their motions being as one.
Starting from their laying on their oars, he should make them stretch
aft towards him as far as they can, with straight arms, sitting with
their chests square to their oars, with their hands, not too far from
and not too close to each other, firmly grasping the looms of the oars,
with their arms at about right angles to the body and themselves
looking the coxswain straight in the face (in river-pulling parlance
"eyes in the boat"). It is impossible for a man to sit square to his
oar if he is looking over his shoulder. The coxswain should begin
practising his crew in the above position, without allowing them to
catch the water until they are perfect.
The oars should catch the water with a firm and vigorous grip,
absolutely simultaneously, the great effort of the man being made as