The Memoirs of Admiral Lord Beresford
inside the breakwater, a puff came, over went the boat, and it went
down under me. Dowell, seeing that I was swimming safely and that the
boats of the Fleet were coming to pick me up, went on and won the race.
When I went to dine with him that night, he greeted me with:
"Last time I saw you, you were swimming about in the harbour."
In the meantime, owing to the device of ballasting my boat with chain
cable and buoying the end of it, we were able to pick her up. The
_Thunderer_ came over the place where she was sunk, hauled the cable up
to the hawse pipe, and hove the boat to the surface.
My old friend, Admiral Sir William Montague Dowell G.C.B., was a most
distinguished officer. He served in the China war, 1840-1, served as
gunnery lieutenant of the _Albion_ in the Black Sea, and was promoted
for services with the Naval Brigade at Sevastopol; served again in
China, in 1857, being present at the capture of Canton; commanded the
_Barrosa_ in the straits of Simonoseki, 1864, being specially
mentioned; received the C.B. for services in Japan. He was A.D.C. to
the Queen; commanded the West Coast of Africa and Cape of Good Hope
Station, 1867-71; after having been second in command of the Channel
Squadron, senior officer on the Coast of Ireland, and vice-admiral in
command of the Channel Squadron, he was temporarily attached to the
Mediterranean Fleet and served in the Egyptian war of 1882, receiving
the K.C.B., and the thanks of the House of Commons. He was afterwards
commander-in-chief in China, and subsequently commander-in-chief of
Devonport. {507} He was one of the Three Admirals who framed the
Report upon the Naval Manoeuvres of 1888, in which were formulated the
principles of British naval supremacy.
I won many races in a _Una_ boat, the _Weasel_, built at Cowes, during
the time of my command of the royal yacht _Osborne_. The Prince of
Wales built a similar boat. Prince Louis of Battenberg, steering the
Prince's boat, beat me in a most exciting race, in which the betting
was long odds on my boat. The fact was, that trying to be very clever,
I put too much ballast in the boat, and so lost the race.
{508}
CHAPTER LII
THE MEDITERRANEAN STATION
Forty-four years had elapsed since I was a midshipman in H.M.S.
_Marlborough_, flagship in the Mediterranean, when I hoisted my flag in
H.M.S. _Bulwark_ as commander-in-chief upon that station, in June 1905.
Those changeful years had seen the Old Navy out and the New Navy in;
their revolutions had transformed the whole material aspect of the
Navy; and the essential spirit of the Navy, adapting itself to new
conditions remained unaltered. One result, perhaps inevitable, of the
swift progress of scientific invention, was that the public attention
was concentrated upon purely material matters regarding the Navy as a
fighting machine automatically operated; and conceiving of officers and
men as workers in a factory, who had nothing to do but to press buttons
and to manipulate levers. This unfortunate delusion was fostered by
the politicians, who were quick to use it for their own ends.
The Mediterranean Fleet consisted of _Bulwark_ (flag), _Formidable_,
_Implacable_, _Irresistible_, _London_, _Prince of Wales_, _Queen_,
_Venerable_ (flag of second in command, Vice-Admiral Sir Harry T.
Grenfell, K.C.B., C.M.G., and afterwards of Rear-Admiral Francis C. B.
Bridgeman, M.V.O.); three attached cruisers, three special service
vessels; the Third Cruiser Squadron, _Leviathan_, (flag of Rear-Admiral
the Hon. Hedworth Lambton, C.V.O., C.B.), _Carnarvon_, _Lancaster_,
_Suffolk_, two attached ships, and 22 destroyers.
The Staff consisted of: chief of staff, Captain Frederick {509} C. D.
Sturdee, C.M.G, M.V.O.; flag-commander, Fawcet Wray; flag-lieutenant,
Charles D. Roper (signal officer); flag-lieutenant, Herbert T. C.
Gibbs; secretary, Fleet Paymaster John A. Keys; engineer-captain, Edwin
Little; intelligence officer, Major John M. Rose, R.M.A. The
flag-captain was Osmond de B. Brock; the commander Hugh P. E. T.
Williams.
The Mediterranean is the finest training station in the world; and it
is the more to be regretted that the Mediterranean Fleet is always so
deficient in numbers, that Fleet training must be conducted at a
disadvantage. Eight battleships represent the smallest practicable
unit for tactical purposes, nor does that number allow sufficient
margin for the necessary deductions due to the absence of ships under
repair or refitting. Upon one occasion, six out of the eight were
absent under repair at one time, and in all cases the absence was
unavoidable.
The eight battleships required twenty attached cruisers, as compared
with the three allocated. Although improvements had been effected, the
Fleet in 1905 was still deficient in auxiliaries, such as fleet
colliers, repair ships, depot ships.
The popular and political delusion that under modern conditions the
duties of the naval officer have become mechanical is so far from the
reality, that, in truth, they have never been more complex and onerous;
nor is it possible that they should be rightly performed in war, in
default of the most assiduous practice in peace. It is thus the
business of an admiral constantly to exercise the Fleet both
collectively and individually; and as the discharge of that duty tasks
his energies to the utmost, there is little to record during a sea
command except the cruises, exercises and manoeuvres which constantly
occupy a Fleet.
In June, 1905, for instance, the Mediterranean Fleet left Malta and
proceeded upon a cruise; met the Atlantic Fleet at the end of July;
exercised combined manoeuvres with the Atlantic Fleet; proceeded upon
another cruise, and so {510} on; never going to sea without practising
some exercise or manoeuvre. All exercises and manoeuvres of importance
were treated in a memorandum, in which was explained the lessons to be
learned from them, and which was circulated to the officers of the
Fleet.
Every morning when the Fleet was at sea, except on Sundays and in very
bad weather, small tactical and turning movements were executed from
7.30 to 8 a.m., the movements of each individual ship being carried out
by the officer of the watch, all lieutenants taking it in turn to
relieve the deck, and being put in charge of the ship for this period
of time. The captains did not interfere in the handling of the ship,
unless the officer of the watch placed the ship, or a consort, in a
position of danger. The lieutenants themselves made out the
commander-in-chief's signals and their purport without the assistance
of the captain or of the yeoman of signals. Officers of the watch were
informed that they need not be afraid of making a mistake; for,
everyone was liable to make a mistake; and the rest of the Fleet
learned more when an error occurred than when all went smoothly and
correctly.
During the forenoons, there was usually practised some short manoeuvre
in which an admiral or a captain took charge of the Fleet, and
manoeuvred it as he pleased, the commander-in-chief reserving to
himself the right to negative any signal which he might consider
dangerous or useless. After the admirals and captains had manoeuvred
the Fleet as a whole, it was divided into opposing Fleets, officers,
selected by the commander-in-chief, taking charge of these Fleets.
Each squadron endeavoured to gain the initial position or advantage.
Once that position was obtained, the Fleets were ordered to separate,
and two other officers respectively took charge of the opposing
squadrons.
Great care was observed that orders relative to speed, and to the
distance within which opposing fleets were not to trespass, were
rigidly observed. Officers were informed that all peace manoeuvres
must be regarded as a game, and that {511} no game should be played
unless the rules were implicitly obeyed. The principle was that no
manoeuvre should last very long, being much more instructive if it were
short, and were frequently practised.
The practice of taking the soldiers for short voyages was instituted.
About twenty men of the Royal Garrison Artillery at Malta, with an
officer, a sergeant and a corporal, were embarked in each vessel, the
non-commissioned officers and men messing and working with the Royal
Marines.
The periodical delivery of lectures by officers of all branches upon
Service subjects was instituted, the lectures taking place under the
presidency of the commander-in-chief at the Royal Naval Canteen, Malta.
Discussions were encouraged, and a great deal of interest and
enthusiasm was aroused.
My old friend and distinguished countryman, Sir George White, who was
then Governor of Gibraltar, asked me to deliver a lecture to the
soldiers of the garrison upon the advantages of temperance. In dealing
with this subject, I always tell men to box, run, ride, row, and by all
means to get physically fit, when they would be in a condition they
would not forfeit for the sake of indulgence. On this occasion, I said
that, although I was over sixty years of age, I could outlast a
youngster in endurance, adding that "I never took any liquor now." The
address must have been reported in the English papers; for I received a
letter from a dear old lady (quite unknown to me) telling me how
thankful she was that I, as a public man, had given up the dreadful
vice of intoxication.
After I had consulted the head of every department in every ship
collectively, two detailed plans of war organisation were drawn up:
one, a plan of preparation for war; two, a plan for immediate action.
The first contained the procedure to be followed if war was expected;
the second, the procedure to be followed on the eve of an engagement.
Both covered every detail of the internal organisation of every ship in
the Fleet, and specified the duties of every officer, man and {512}
boy. These plans were circulated to the officers of the Fleet.
Another important element of preparation for war is the rapid and
efficient repair of defects. Under the old system, a defect which
could not be repaired by the ship's artificers--as for instance, a
piece of work involving a heavy casting or forging--was left until the
ship visited the dockyard, when the dockyard officials came on board,
took measurements, executed the work and fitted it to the ship. The
result was that there were many complaints of defective fitting.
Under the new system, introduced in the Mediterranean Fleet, all
repairs which could not be effected in the ship, were specified by the
ship's artificers, who also made measured drawings of the new work
required. The specifications and drawings were forwarded by the senior
officer to the dockyard, with directions that the work should be
executed as soon as possible, so that upon the arrival of the ship at
the dockyard, the required fitting would be at once supplied to the
ship. It would then be fixed by the ship's artificers who had
furnished the working drawings to the dockyard, and who, provided that
the work was rightly executed, would thus be responsible both for
accuracy of manufacture and of fitting. By this means, delay was
avoided and the work was efficiently and promptly executed.
Before I left England to take up my appointment, I resolved to do my
best to eradicate that curse of the Service, Malta fever. The
authorities were naturally sceptical of my success; for, although many
attempts had been made to solve the problem, no one had hitherto
succeeded in abating the scourge.
Certain obvious precautions were at once enforced. Junior officers
were not allowed to remain on shore after sunset, without overcoats;
all milk received on board was boiled; the Fleet was kept away from
Malta as much as possible during the dangerous months of June, July,