The Memoirs of Admiral Lord Beresford
Sir Reginald Custance, instead of being placed {551} upon half-pay
until his retirement, was not appointed a Lord Commissioner of the
Admiralty.
The members of the Staff were: chief of staff, Captain Frederick C. D.
Sturdee, succeeded by Captain Montague E. Browning; flag-commander,
Fawcet Wray; intelligence officer at the Admiralty, Commander Godfrey
Tuke, succeeded by Captain Arthur R. Hulbert; signal officer,
Lieutenant Charles D. Roper; flag-lieutenant, Herbert T. G. Gibbs;
engineer-captain, Edwin Little: secretary, Fleet Paymaster John A.
Keys; flag-captain, Henry B. Pelly, M.V.O.; commander, G. H. Baird.
The navigating officer, Commander E. L. Booty, who had been with me in
the _Majestic_, was the best navigator I have known.
Of the two successive chiefs of staff, Captain (now Vice-Admiral)
Sturdee, and Captain (now Rear-Admiral) Browning, to whom I owe so
much, I desire to express my appreciation. Their powers of
organisation and their knowledge of what is required for organisation
for war are of a very high degree. Among other officers, all of whom
did service so excellent, I may mention Lieutenant (now Commander)
Roper, who was one of the best signal officers in the service;
Lieutenant Gibbs, a most charming and loyal companion, who met his
death by falling overboard in the Portland race, and the loss of whose
affectionate friendship I still mourn; and Fleet-Paymaster Keys, who
was with me for more than six years, and to whose brilliant services I
owe so much.
The composition of the Channel Fleet, in April, 1907, was 14
battleships (eight _King Edward VII_, two _Swiftsure_, two _Ocean_, two
_Majestic_), four armoured cruisers, two second-class cruisers, and one
third-class cruiser attached.
During this period, an extraordinary confusion prevailed at the
Admiralty. Its character may be briefly indicated by a summary of the
various changes in the organisation and distribution of the Fleet,
beginning in the previous year (1906).
In October, the sea-going Fleets were reduced in strength {552} by
about one-quarter, and a new Home Fleet was formed of nucleus crew
ships. The Channel Fleet was reduced from sixty-two fighting vessels
to twenty-one fighting vessels, the balance being transferred to the
Home Fleet. An order was issued under which ships taken from the
Channel, Atlantic and Mediterranean Fleets for purposes of refitting,
were to be replaced during their absence by ships from the Home Fleet.
In December, the Nore Division of the Home Fleet was given full crews
instead of nucleus crews.
In April, 1907, an order was issued that no more than two battleships
in each Fleet were to be refitted at one time.
In September, the Channel Fleet was increased from twenty-one vessels
to sixty vessels.
In August, 1908, the orders substituting Home Fleet ships for ships
from sea-going fleets under repair, and ordaining that no more than two
battleships should be absent at one time, were cancelled; with the
result that the Channel Fleet went to sea in the following December
short of eight battleships, two armoured cruisers, one unarmoured
cruiser, one scout, and 20 destroyers, 32 vessels in all.
When the Home Fleet was finally constituted, in March, 1907, there were
no less than three commanders-in-chief in Home Waters; one commanding
the Home Fleet, one the Nore Division, and one (myself) the Channel
Fleet. In time of war the supreme command was to be exercised by me,
over the whole number of fighting vessels, 244 in all. But in time of
peace they could not be trained or exercised together, nor had any one
of the commanders-in-chief accurate information at any given moment of
the state or disposition of the forces of any other commander-in-chief.
Such, briefly presented, was the situation with which I was confronted
in this my last command. It was fraught with difficulties so complex,
and potential dangers to the security of the country so palpable, that
many of my friends urged me to resign my command in the public
interest. I decided, however, that I should best serve His Majesty the
King, the Navy and the country by remaining at my post.
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In the summer of 1907, the Channel Fleet proceeded upon a United
Kingdom cruise, touching at various places round the coasts of these
islands. When the Fleet was at sea, individual ships were sent away
upon short cruises, in order to give the captains opportunities of
exercising independent command. When the Fleet was at anchor, the
ships were open to the public from half-past one to half-past six
daily, in order to increase their knowledge and encourage their
interest in the Royal Navy.
It was during one of these cruises that the Irishmen in the Fleet
displayed one of their national characteristics.
The anniversary of Saint Patrick's Day was drawing near when the Fleet
lay in Bantry Bay. On Saint Patrick's Day itself the Fleet was to
proceed to sea. Hitherto, as a rule, if the Irishmen in the Fleet
happened to be on leave on Saint Patrick's Day, many of them broke
their leave. When I made a signal, giving the Irishmen four days'
leave, and ordering them to return on board on Saint Patrick's Day, I
added that the commander-in-chief, himself an Irishman, expected every
Irishman to be back to his leave. There were 766 Irish liberty-men
went on shore for four days; and 766 were on board again ere the Fleet
sailed on the night of Saint Patrick's Day. It might be that the Saint
could mention the thing in conversation with Saint Peter at the Gate,
for future reference. For there were some 2000 Irishmen in the Fleet,
who, when the Fleet lay at Portland, could not, like the Englishmen,
visit their homes once a month. And when it is considered how
hospitable and convivial they become on the anniversary of their patron
Saint, I shall be understood when I say that the behaviour on this
occasion of the Irishmen in the Fleet affords a remarkable instance of
the Irish sense of honour. There are no other people so easily
handled, if the right way be taken with them.
The Fleet assembled at Spithead in November, 1907, to receive his
Majesty the Emperor of Germany; and in the following May, the Fleet
assembled at Dover to receive President Fallières.
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In the summer of 1908, the Fleet proceeded upon a cruise in Norwegian
waters. Their Majesties the King and Queen of Norway, with the little
Crown Prince Olaf, honoured the flagship with a visit when the Fleet
lay at Esbjerg. At Skagen, on the evening of 7th July, when the Fleet
was lying at anchor, the _Hohenzollern_, flying the flag of his Majesty
the Emperor of Germany, was suddenly sighted, together with the
escorting cruiser _Stettin_ and the destroyer _Sleipner_. By the time
his Imperial Majesty had reached the lines, the ships were manned and
dressed over all. A salute of twenty-one guns was fired; and the
_Hohenzollern_ was cheered as she steamed down the lines.
During my absence in Norwegian waters, I was the subject of a violent
attack in the Press and elsewhere, due to a misapprehension. I recall
the circumstance, because I am proud to remember that it was an
Irishman, and he a political opponent, who, alone among all the members
of the House of Commons, stood up and protested against an attack being
made upon a brother Irishman when he was absent and unable to reply.
Their Majesties King Edward and Queen Alexandra visited the Channel
Fleet on 7th August, 1908, in the _Victoria and Albert_, accompanied by
the Prince of Wales in the _Alexandra_. His Majesty honoured the _King
Edward VII_ and the _Hibernia_, second flag, with a visit. The
flag-officers of the Fleet had the honour of lunching with their
Majesties on board the _Victoria and Albert_.
Upon one of the Fleet cruises in the north, the flagship was passing
under the Forth Bridge, when a spar caught on a girder of the bridge
and carried away. Ere it could fall, Flag-Lieutenant Gibbs, with his
customary presence of mind and pluck, threw me upon the deck, and
himself on the top of me, to save me from the falling spar. Luckily,
it touched neither of us.
There being no provision against mines dropped in time of war, it was
suggested by me that the North Sea trawlers should be enlisted to sweep
for mines; because they were {555} accustomed to the difficult work of
towing and handling a trawl. The proposal was afterwards adopted.
In March, 1909, the Admiralty, in addition to other changes, having
suddenly reduced the length of ships' commissions from three years to
two years, I was ordered to haul down my flag and come on shore.
Accordingly, my flag was hauled down at Portsmouth on Wednesday, 24th
March, 1909, after fifty years' service.
I cannot close this chronicle without expressing my profound
appreciation of the loyalty and affection shown to me by my brother
officers and by the men of the Royal Navy. Few events in my life have
touched me more deeply than the presence of so many of my old shipmates
among the crowds which assembled upon Portsmouth Hard when I came on
shore after hauling down my flag, and which filled Waterloo Station and
its approaches when I arrived in London. Nor can I omit to record my
sense of the kind and generous reception given to me by my brother
officers, who attended, in numbers that constituted a record, the
dinner, over which I presided, given by the Royal Navy Club of 1765 and
1785, on the anniversary of the battle of Trafalgar next ensuing after
my coming on shore.
It was a satisfaction to me when I came on shore, and it is a
satisfaction to me now, to think that I pulled my pound in the Navy.
Doubtless, like other men of action, I have made mistakes. But I may
justly claim that I have always held one purpose with a single mind: to
do my best for the good of the Service and for the welfare of the
officers and men of the Royal Navy; and in following that purpose, I
have tried to disregard consequences which might affect my own
fortunes, and which, in fact, have often proved injurious to them. And
to the purpose which I have followed since I was a boy, I shall devote
the rest of my life.
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POSTSCRIPT
THE MAKING OF AN ADMIRAL
One of our greatest naval administrators, the late Admiral of the Fleet
Sir Frederick Richards, was constantly preoccupied with a problem, of
which he used often to speak. "How are we to make great admirals?" he
would say. It is a question of the highest moment. A great admiral
may be born, but he must also be made. The making of an admiral has
been the study of the best minds in the Navy for generations. And for
this reason: _In time of war, all must depend on one man, and that man
the admiral in command_. Upon his knowledge, ability and resolution
will rest the fate of the country and of the Empire. That simple fact
is not generally realised by the public. They do not understand that
in time of war the statesman, the diplomatist, the politician must all
give place to one man, the admiral in command at sea.
Every decade of naval officers has added something to the knowledge of
what must go to the making of a great sea-officer. The establishment
of the War College, the institution of the War Staff at the Admiralty,
the private studies of individual naval officers, the practice of
holding manoeuvres: all these things are valuable endeavours toward the
same end. It remains, however (I believe), the fact that there exists
no treatise on the ordinary administrative duties to be fulfilled by an
admiral.
During many years I had the habit of making notes concerning all
matters connected with the administration of a Fleet. These notes I
hope to arrange and to publish. In {557} the meantime, I have ventured