The Memoirs of Admiral Lord Beresford
to think that the contribution of some observations dealing with the
administrative duties of an admiral in command, embodying the results
of many years' experience at sea, might be of use.
There is no position in the world requiring more tact than that of a
commander-in-chief of a large Fleet. It is only by the exercise of
consummate tact that a Fleet can be maintained in the most rigid state
of discipline and, at the same time, cheery, happy and smart.
Therefore it is that a knowledge of human nature is essential to the
admiral.
Two admirals may do the same thing or may give the same order; one is
perfectly successful, the other is not. One knows HOW to give an
order, the other does not.
Success depends not only on _what_ is done, but on _the way in which_
it is done. Cheerful obedience to an order depends, not on the order
but, on the way the order is given. In handling men, much depends on
what is said, but much more depends upon the way in which it is said.
The art of successful administration of men consists in the prevention
of accident, misdemeanour, or regrettable incidents. It does not
consist in putting things right _after_ the unpleasant event has
occurred. Nearly all slackness and untoward incidents are preventable
by the exercise of forethought, common sense and good organisation.
Most of the matters that go wrong, causing irritation and fault-finding
on the part of the admiral, are often due to the failure to look ahead
of the admiral himself.
When a Fleet proceeds to sea, the cruisers are often to be observed
sobbing and sighing at full speed, trying to get into the position
ordered, after the Fleet has left the harbour, when, by the use of a
little judgment, they might have been sent out previously, and so have
got on the correct line of bearing at slow speed, without any trouble.
The usual method in life is to let a mistake occur, and then to put it
right afterwards. It is upon this point that the world forms most
unfair opinions. The man who _keeps_ {558} things right seldom gets
any credit. It is the man who puts things right who gets it. The
history of war affords many examples of this tendency.
A commander-in-chief who, by his organisation and by his appreciation
of facts and positions, wins an action with small loss, often gets
little credit. On the other hand, an officer who makes some blunder by
which he loses a number of officers and men, but who eventually wins
his action, is made a popular hero. In other words, the man with the
blind pluck of a bulldog gets more credit than the man who, by his
strategy and tactical ability, wins a more or less bloodless victory.
An admiral should remember that in peace or war he can satisfactorily
administer his Fleet only through the loyalty and zeal of his captains.
Frequent personal interviews promote confidence; and such confidence
must be of benefit to the admiral. He need not take his captains'
views, but he will gain a great deal of useful information from
officers who are just as keen to make the Fleet as perfect as possible
as he is himself.
Admirals should not publicly identify themselves with their own
flagships in the same way as a captain may identify himself with his
ship. To the admiral ALL ships should be the same, and private ships
should feel that the admiral takes quite as much interest in their
well-being and their whole life as he does in his own flagship. The
admiral should therefore avoid, even in private conversation, speaking
of "my commander," "our launch," etc. etc. A flagship, her officers
and men, have many advantages. In return for these privileges, a
flagship should make every effort to be a pattern of smartness and
efficiency; and the admiral must be constantly on the alert lest he
show partiality or favour to his flagship. Nothing makes more jealousy
in a Fleet than a belief that the flagship is favoured at the expense
of the rest of the Fleet, either in routine duty or in any other
respect.
Flagships must have many privileges, but they should not be increased.
For instance, her boats should take precedence {559} in drawing beef or
stores; but in all matters connected with competitive drills, carrying
out station orders, etc. etc., all ships must be equal in the
admiral's eye and mind.
An admiral should continually go on board the ships of the Fleet, talk
to the captains, and obtain their ideas and recommendations on various
subjects.
The best plan is to notify a ship a day or two beforehand that the
commander-in-chief is coming on board on Sunday at the time most
convenient to the captain; and to follow the captain's usual routine
for Sunday inspection. This method gives the captain an opportunity of
bringing to the admiral's notice any officer or man who has in any way
distinguished himself. It strengthens the captain's hands, and has a
good effect upon the Fleet. It lets the men see their admiral; while
the admiral can remark the state of the ship and run all his Fleet up
to the smartest ship.
It is wiser to administer a Fleet by _commendation_ than by
_condemnation_. If commendation is given for good and smart actions,
condemnation for bad, slackness becomes far more severely condemned,
and no sympathy for it is aroused.
Any smart action performed by an officer or man should be appreciated
publicly by signal. This is complimentary to the officer or man and to
the ship in which he is serving at the time. Every one is grateful for
appreciation.
The old style in the Navy was never to commend anything that was well
done; to do well was considered to be no more than a man's duty. On
the other hand, anything that was badly done led to severe reprimands.
When a good officer or man knows that the admiral appreciates his work,
it cheers the Fleet and raises its whole tone. It is right to be
severe on those who do their work lazily or badly; but it is quite as
necessary to appreciate those who do their work well.
An admiral should continually inspect some of the various departments
of the ships under his command. By personal observation he is certain
to find out something {560} which would not come to his notice in any
other way, and he may therefore prevent things from going wrong in
their initial stages.
The admiral should invariably inspect anything that may have gone wrong
in any of the ships under his command, owing to accident, carelessness,
or misadventure: such as a derrick, cable, or capstan carrying away, or
any defect in the engine or boiler rooms. He should then talk over the
method of repair with the captain and the departmental officers. This
procedure often saves time and trouble, as the admiral gives directions
for the accident to be repaired in the way he desires from the first,
thereby obviating the necessity of altering the plans afterwards. It
also encourages those who are going to execute the work.
The admiral should let the captains know that they can come on board
the flagship and consult him at any time they like, day or night, and
that he will always be glad to see them.
Captains should always come to see, or write to, the admiral on any
matter which they wish to be settled, no matter how trivial it may
appear. They should not go to the secretary; for, if they do, it puts
the secretary in a false position, and may cause mistakes and wrong
conceptions.
Captains may go to the chief of the staff upon minor questions; but it
is, as a rule, better for them to go straight to the admiral.
The consideration of captains, expressed by the words, "I don't think I
will bother the admiral about this question," is understood, but should
be regarded as mistaken. _It is the admiral's business to be bothered_.
The admiral should be considerate and courteous to all those under his
command, remembering that there are two sides to every question.
When the admiral personally inquires into any case, with the object of
fixing responsibility upon an individual, he should be suave in his
manner, even if condemnation is {561} given. He should endeavour to
send a man away wearing a smile rather than a scowl.
The admiral should remember this maxim particularly when he feels
irritated at seeing something done which appears careless, or opposed
to the orders laid down. He should always maintain an unruffled
demeanour, and be perfectly calm and collected under all circumstances.
To fail in this respect is to confuse both himself and those under his
command: a condition which cannot add to that smartness and coolness so
necessary when a difficulty or an accident occurs in the Fleet.
The management of a ship or a Fleet is full of irritation and worries.
These can only be decreased by officers remaining calm and collected.
All men are liable to make mistakes. The best men often make the most
glaring mistakes. A smart man acting under a mistake will move his
ship to starboard or to port quicker than a slow man, and his mistake
will therefore appear the greater.
An admiral should never make a signal to one of the captains (unless he
happens to have a very bad and slack captain), implying that the
captain could have done much better than he did. Captains, as a rule,
wish to obey loyally and thoroughly. Mistakes are not intentional.
If a signal is executed in a manner contrary to the intention of the
admiral, either it is an ambiguous signal, or it has been
misunderstood. Unforeseen contingencies of this kind are certain to
happen in war. Practices in peace illustrate what such contingencies
may be, and develop the necessary measures to prevent them.
A very common method of pointing out mistakes is to signal what was
_ordered_ and what should have _happened_, omitting to state what was
actually _done_. But _all_ these points should be inserted in the
signal.
Officers or men should never be allowed to state what _might_, _could_,
or _should_ have been done. The point at issue is what WAS or what IS.
Much valuable time is lost in {562} explaining the circumstances on the
theory of what might, could, or should have been done.
Before finding fault by signal, the admiral should ask the captain in
question how a mistake occurred. By so doing it can be seen whether it
is necessary to find fault or not. If the explanation is satisfactory
the captain should be so informed.
Much unnecessary irritation and bad feeling caused by sudden and
drastic signals may thus be avoided.
The admiral will often find that the mistake was a natural mistake,
which he himself might have made had he been in the captain's place.
When captains know that the admiral is scrupulously fair, they become
devoted to him.
An admiral should always be most careful that he is right himself
before finding fault with those under him. If he should afterwards
find that his contention was wrong, or that there was a
misunderstanding, the admiral should invariably acknowledge his
mistake. This action commands respect and is only chivalrous and
seamanlike.
When an admiral has satisfied himself that anything, no matter how
small, is not carried out according to orders, he should call attention
to it by signal (as a rule, by a general signal), and by thus pointing
out the mistake to the Fleet, he prevents the same error from occurring
again.
In such matters as clothes not properly stopped on, boats and booms not
square, etc., an admiral should inquire who is responsible. If men are
not standing to attention when the colours are hoisted, he should ask
for the name of the officer of the watch. If a boat is improperly
handled under sail or oars, he should ask for the name of the officer
or coxswain of the boat.
The admiral's staff should always inform him of such matters as boats