The Waterloo Roll Call
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Transcriber’s Note:
This version of the text cannot represent certain typographical effects.
Italics are delimited with the ‘_’ character as _italic_.
Minor errors, attributable to the printer, have been corrected. Please
see the transcriber’s note at the end of this text for details regarding
the handling of any textual issues encountered during its preparation.
The bulk of this text consists of annotated tables containing names,
dates, and ranks achieved of participants in the British Army at the
battle of Waterloo. Most entries are accompanied by brief biographical
sketches. The notes follow each table, as printed.
The numbering of the notes for each table has been retained, beginning
anew with ‘1’ for each table.
The footnotes to the prefatory material, and to the headings of many
tables, originally appeared as an asterisk. These have been re-sequenced
from A to W and appear after the paragraph where they are referenced.
THE
WATERLOO ROLL CALL.
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THE
WATERLOO ROLL CALL.
_WITH BIOGRAPHICAL NOTES AND ANECDOTES._
BY
CHARLES DALTON, F.R.G.S.,
AUTHOR OF “HISTORY OF THE WRAYS OF GLENTWORTH,” “LIFE OF GENERAL SIR
EDWARD CECIL,” “MEMOIR OF CAPTAIN JOHN DALTON, COMMANDANT OF
TRICHINOPOLY, 1752–1753”; AND EDITOR OF “ENGLISH ARMY
LISTS AND COMMISSION REGISTERS, 1661–1714,”
“THE BLENHEIM ROLL,” ETC.
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=Second Edition,=
_REVISED AND ENLARGED_.
LONDON:
EYRE AND SPOTTISWOODE,
=Government and General Publishers,=
EAST HARDING STREET, E.C.
1904
[_All Rights Reserved._]
=Dedicated=
TO
GEORGE TANCRED, ESQUIRE
(LATE CAPTAIN SCOTS GREYS),
OF
WEENS, ROXBURGHSHIRE.
PREFACE TO SECOND EDITION.
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Time does not diminish the interest of Waterloo, for that combat of
giants is indissolubly connected with Napoleon—the greatest master of
the art of war the world has ever known.
Since the publication of my ROLL CALL in 1890, I have received much
additional information from the relatives of Waterloo officers. This has
enabled me to bring out the present revised and enlarged edition. And I
wish particularly to mention that many of the obituary notices of
Waterloo officers given in the following pages were collected by the
late Mr. J.W. O’Brien, of the British Museum Library (formerly in the
ranks of the 4th Dragoon Guards), whose annotated copy of the ROLL CALL
came into my possession by purchase. Mr. O’Brien’s researches were not
made at my instigation or wish, but having been made, and brought to my
notice, I thought it advisable to secure and utilise this copy of my
book containing the aforesaid MS. entries.
A special feature of the Second Edition is the list of non-commissioned
officers and men (given in Part III.) who served at Waterloo, and
subsequently received commissions in the British army.
CHARLES DALTON.
_September 1st, 1904._
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CONTENTS.
PART I.
PAGE
Preface to Second Edition vii
Introduction to First Edition ix-xv
Abbreviations xvi
List of the Staff 1–8
Biographical Memoirs of the Staff 9–39
British and Hanoverian Army, as formed in Divisions and 40–44
Brigades on the 18th June, 1815
Annotated Lists of Regiments engaged at Waterloo 46–230
Medical Staff and Departmental Officers 231–235
Annotated Lists of Regiments which formed the Reserve 236–249
on 18th June, 1815
PART II.
Muster Roll of the Scots Greys 250–255
PART III.
Non-Commissioned Officers and Men at Waterloo who 256–266
subsequently received Commissions in the British
Army
PART IV.
A few Waterloo Heroes 267–273
Appendix 275–278
Index 279
INTRODUCTION TO FIRST EDITION.
_Ah! Je les tiens donc, ces Anglais!_—NAPOLEON.
Never since the days of Oliver Cromwell had any name caused so much fear
in England as did that of Napoleon Bonaparte. From 1802 until his first
downfall, in 1814, a spirit of alarm and uneasiness pervaded all classes
in Great Britain, from the King and his Ministers down to the most
illiterate peasant. Those who were witnesses of, and participators in,
this panic have now passed away, but the national pride which our
victory over Napoleon at Waterloo excited in every Briton’s breast is as
strong as ever, and will last till the crack of doom.
In July, 1803, a little pamphlet, entitled _Important Considerations for
the People of this Kingdom_, was published in London, and “sent to the
officiating minister of every parish in England.” This pamphlet, which
bears the Royal Arms of England, was an appeal from the Government to
the Nation, and a diatribe against Napoleon. Mark the closing lines of
this appeal: “Shall we, who are abundantly supplied with iron and steel,
powder and lead—shall we, who have a fleet superior to the maritime
force of all the world, and who are able to bring two millions of
fighting men into the field—shall we yield up this dear and happy land,
together with all the liberties and honours, to preserve which our
fathers so often dyed the land and the sea with their blood?... No, we
are not so miserably fallen; we cannot, in so short a space of time,
have become so detestably degenerate; we have the strength and the will
to repel the hostility, to chastise the insolence of the foe. Mighty,
indeed, must be our efforts, but mighty also is the need.” The idea of a
French invasion was slow in forcing its way into the minds of the
uneducated classes in England. When they first heard of such a
possibility they thought it of no more consequence than the invasion of
Scotland by Charles Edward Stuart with a mere handful of Frenchmen at
his back. They also thought less of the projected descent from having
heard so much in 1797, and during the Rebellion in Ireland in 1798, of a
French army coming to the relief of the National party in that kingdom:—
“For the French are on the sea,
Says the Shan Van Vaugh,
And Ireland will soon be free,
Says the Shan Van Vaugh.”
And yet nothing had come of all this talk! But when the nation at large
had fully grasped the possibility of a Napoleonic invasion, Pitt had no
difficulty in raising the sinews of war. No fewer than 300,000 men
enrolled themselves in volunteer corps and defence associations. The
army and navy were increased, and everything was done that was possible
to counteract the power of that wonderful man, who, in the short space
of a few years, had, speaking metaphorically, built a Great Wall of
China round the British Isles, shutting the English out of the commerce
of Europe. Our preparations were none too soon. In 1805 the battle of
Austerlitz established the supremacy of Napoleon over Austria and
Russia. Fortunately for England, Nelson’s crowning victory at Trafalgar
indefinitely postponed Napoleon’s invasion scheme; but we were still
engaged in a gigantic war, single-handed, with half of Europe our
declared, and the other half our enforced, enemies. Nelson was dead;
Pitt was dying from the weight of anxieties which pressed upon him in
this tremendous crisis; Hanover had been taken from us. The outlook was
very gloomy, and affairs became more complicated in 1807, when the
military expeditions, arranged by Lord Grenville’s ministry, against
Constantinople and Egypt, had turned out failures, and resulted in the
Turks declaring war against us and confiscating all British property.
And yet in 1807 Napoleon had not yet reached the zenith of his power.
For the next five years he held the destinies of nearly the whole of
Europe in his own hands. Monarchies of long standing were disestablished
and new kingdoms—Napoleonic kingdoms—were raised up in their place.
Immense French armies traversed Europe from Portugal to the heart of
Russia, and every capital within that limit was, in its turn, subjugated
to the French yoke. But in 1808 two British Generals stemmed the tide of
French conquest in the Peninsula, viz., Sir John Moore and Sir Arthur
Wellesley. The first met a soldier’s death at Corunna, and the latter
was superseded by an incapable commander. But the British Government
soon found that they had made a grievous mistake, and Wellesley was
again entrusted with the supreme command in Portugal. Then commenced
that series of brilliant campaigns which liberated Portugal and Spain
from the Napoleonic grasp, and only ceased after the battle of Toulouse
by Napoleon’s abdication at Fontainebleau. In the spring of 1814 England
had a large army, composed for the most part of seasoned veterans, who
were fit for anything and worth millions. When war broke out again, in
the spring of 1815, at least half of the Peninsular army had been
disbanded—dispersed—and not to be had at any price. Some of the best of
the old Peninsular regiments had been sent to America in 1814, and
several of them—the gallant 43rd Light Infantry being one—did not reach
Waterloo in time to take part in the battle. Raw levies took their
place, and foreign auxiliaries helped to bring up Wellington’s army in
Flanders to the required strength. Of Wellington’s 106,000 barely
one-third were British. The remainder consisted of “King’s German
Legion,” “Hanoverian Levies,” “Brunswick Contingent,” “Nassau
Contingent,” “Dutch and Belgian Troops,” and “Nassauers in Dutch
service.” Of this polyglot force the German Legion, both cavalry and
infantry, were deserving of the highest praise for their conduct on
Waterloo Day. They formed part of the British army for nearly a dozen
years, and many British officers held commissions in the “Legion.” I
have been obliged to leave out the German Legion officers in the
following ROLL CALL (excepting those who served on the Staff), and it
would be invidious, when all did so well, to pick out the British
officers who served in the “Legion” at Waterloo and record their
services when those of their German brother-officers are omitted. I
cannot even make an exception of Colonel (afterwards Baron) Hugh
Halkett, who, like a knight in the olden days of chivalry, singled out a
French general (Cambronne) in single combat, and took him prisoner.
The Hanoverian levies did well also, excepting one regiment, which
refused to charge the French when commanded so to do. And this was