Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography
contributed by the same corporation at the same time to two opposing
parties. Before I became Governor a bill had been introduced into the
New York Legislature to tax the franchises of these street railways. It
affected a large number of corporations, but particularly those in New
York and Buffalo. It had been suffered to slumber undisturbed, as none
of the people in power dreamed of taking it seriously, and both the
Republican and Democratic machines were hostile to it. Under the rules
of the New York Legislature a bill could always be taken up out of its
turn and passed if the Governor sent in a special emergency message on
its behalf.
After I was elected Governor I had my attention directed to the
franchise tax matter, looked into the subject, and came to the
conclusion that it was a matter of plain decency and honesty that these
companies should pay a tax on their franchises, inasmuch as they did
nothing that could be considered as service rendered the public in lieu
of a tax. This seemed to me so evidently the common-sense and decent
thing to do that I was hardly prepared for the storm of protest and
anger which my proposal aroused. Senator Platt and the other machine
leaders did everything to get me to abandon my intention. As usual,
I saw them, talked the matter all over with them, and did my best to
convert them to my way of thinking. Senator Platt, I believe, was quite
sincere in his opposition. He did not believe in popular rule, and he
did believe that the big business men were entitled to have things their
way. He profoundly distrusted the people--naturally enough, for the kind
of human nature with which a boss comes in contact is not of an exalted
type. He felt that anarchy would come if there was any interference
with a system by which the people in mass were, under various necessary
cloaks, controlled by the leaders in the political and business worlds.
He wrote me a very strong letter of protest against my attitude,
expressed in dignified, friendly, and temperate language, but using one
word in a curious way. This was the word "altruistic." He stated in his
letter that he had not objected to my being independent in politics,
because he had been sure that I had the good of the party at heart, and
meant to act fairly and honorably; but that he had been warned, before
I became a candidate, by a number of his business friends that I was a
dangerous man because I was "altruistic," and that he now feared that
my conduct would justify the alarm thus expressed. I was interested in
this, not only because Senator Platt was obviously sincere, but because
of the way in which he used "altruistic" as a term of reproach, as if it
was Communistic or Socialistic--the last being a word he did use to me
when, as now and then happened, he thought that my proposals warranted
fairly reckless vituperation.
Senator Platt's letter ran in part as follows:
"When the subject of your nomination was under consideration, there was
one matter that gave me real anxiety. I think you will have no
trouble in appreciating the fact that it was _not_ the matter of your
independence. I think we have got far enough along in our political
acquaintance for you to see that my support in a convention does
not imply subsequent 'demands,' nor any other relation that may not
reasonably exist for the welfare of the party. . . . The thing that did
bother me was this: I had heard from a good many sources that you were
a little loose on the relations of capital and labor, on trusts and
combinations, and, indeed, on those numerous questions which have
recently arisen in politics affecting the security of earnings and the
right of a man to run his own business in his own way, with due respect
of course to the Ten Commandments and the Penal Code. Or, to get at it
even more clearly, I understood from a number of business men, and among
them many of your own personal friends, that you entertained various
altruistic ideas, all very well in their way, but which before they
could safely be put into law needed very profound consideration. . . .
You have just adjourned a Legislature which created a good opinion
throughout the State. I congratulate you heartily upon this fact because
I sincerely believe, as everybody else does, that this good impression
exists very largely as a result of your personal influence in the
Legislative chambers. But at the last moment, and to my very great
surprise, you did a thing which has caused the business community of New
York to wonder how far the notions of Populism, as laid down in Kansas
and Nebraska, have taken hold upon the Republican party of the State of
New York."
In my answer I pointed out to the Senator that I had as Governor
unhesitatingly acted, at Buffalo and elsewhere, to put down mobs,
without regard to the fact that the professed leaders of labor furiously
denounced me for so doing; but that I could no more tolerate wrong
committed in the name of property than wrong committed against property.
My letter ran in part as follows:
"I knew that you had just the feelings that you describe; that is, apart
from my 'impulsiveness,' you felt that there was a justifiable anxiety
among men of means, and especially men representing large corporate
interests, lest I might feel too strongly on what you term the
'altruistic' side in matters of labor and capital and as regards the
relations of the State to great corporations. . . . I know that when
parties divide on such issues [as Bryanism] the tendency is to force
everybody into one of two camps, and to throw out entirely men like
myself, who are as strongly opposed to Populism in every stage as the
greatest representative of corporate wealth, but who also feel strongly
that many of these representatives of enormous corporate wealth have
themselves been responsible for a portion of the conditions against
which Bryanism is in ignorant revolt. I do not believe that it is wise
or safe for us as a party to take refuge in mere negation and to
say that there are no evils to be corrected. It seems to me that our
attitude should be one of correcting the evils and thereby showing that,
whereas the Populists, Socialists, and others really do not correct the
evils at all, or else only do so at the expense of producing others in
aggravated form; on the contrary we Republicans hold the just balance
and set ourselves as resolutely against improper corporate influence on
the one hand as against demagogy and mob rule on the other. I understand
perfectly that such an attitude of moderation is apt to be misunderstood
when passions are greatly excited and when victory is apt to rest with
the extremists on one side or the other; yet I think it is in the long
run the only wise attitude. . . . I appreciate absolutely [what Mr.
Platt had said] that any applause I get will be too evanescent for a
moment's consideration. I appreciate absolutely that the people who now
loudly approve of my action in the franchise tax bill will forget all
about it in a fortnight, and that, on the other hand, the very powerful
interests adversely affected will always remember it. . . . [The
leaders] urged upon me that I personally could not afford to take this
action, for under no circumstances could I ever again be nominated for
any public office, as no corporation would subscribe to a campaign fund
if I was on the ticket, and that they would subscribe most heavily to
beat me; and when I asked if this were true of Republican corporations,
the cynical answer was made that the corporations that subscribed most
heavily to the campaign funds subscribed impartially to both party
organizations. Under all these circumstances, it seemed to me there
was no alternative but to do what I could to secure the passage of the
bill."
These two letters, written in the spring of 1899, express clearly the
views of the two elements of the Republican party, whose hostility
gradually grew until it culminated, thirteen years later. In 1912 the
political and financial forces of which Mr. Platt had once been the
spokesman, usurped the control of the party machinery and drove out of
the party the men who were loyally endeavoring to apply the principles
of the founders of the party to the needs and issues of their own day.
I had made up my mind that if I could get a show in the Legislature
the bill would pass, because the people had become interested and the
representatives would scarcely dare to vote the wrong way. Accordingly,
on April 27, 1899, I sent a special message to the Assembly, certifying
that the emergency demanded the immediate passage of the bill. The
machine leaders were bitterly angry, and the Speaker actually tore up
the message without reading it to the Assembly. That night they were
busy trying to arrange some device for the defeat of the bill--which
was not difficult, as the session was about to close. At seven the
next morning I was informed of what had occurred. At eight I was in the
Capitol at the Executive chamber, and sent in another special message,
which opened as follows: "I learn that the emergency message which I
sent last evening to the Assembly on behalf of the Franchise Tax Bill
has not been read. I therefore send hereby another message on the
subject. I need not impress upon the Assembly the need of passing this
bill at once." I sent this message to the Assembly, by my secretary,
William J. Youngs, afterwards United States District Attorney of Kings,
with an intimation that if this were not promptly read I should come
up in person and read it. Then, as so often happens, the opposition
collapsed and the bill went through both houses with a rush. I had in
the House stanch friends, such as Regis Post and Alford Cooley, men of
character and courage, who would have fought to a finish had the need
arisen.
My troubles were not at an end, however. The bill put the taxation in
the hands of the local county boards, and as the railways sometimes
passed through several different counties, this was inadvisable. It was
the end of the session, and the Legislature adjourned. The corporations
affected, through various counsel, and the different party leaders
of both organizations, urged me not to sign the bill, laying especial
stress on this feature, and asking that I wait until the following year,
when a good measure could be put through with this obnoxious feature
struck out. I had thirty days under the law in which to sign the bill.
If I did not sign it by the end of that time it would not become a law.
I answered my political and corporation friends by telling them that I
agreed with them that this feature was wrong, but that I would rather
have the bill with this feature than not have it at all; and that I was
not willing to trust to what might be done a year later. Therefore, I
explained, I would reconvene the Legislature in special session, and if
the legislators chose to amend the bill by placing the power of taxation
in the State instead of in the county or municipality, I would be glad;
but that if they failed to amend it, or amended it improperly, I would
sign the original bill and let it become law as it was.
When the representatives of Mr. Platt and of the corporations affected
found they could do no better, they assented to this proposition.
Efforts were tentatively made to outwit me, by inserting amendments that
would nullify the effect of the law, or by withdrawing the law when the
Legislature convened; which would at once have deprived me of the
whip hand. On May 12 I wrote Senator Platt, outlining the amendments I
desired, and said: "Of course it must be understood that I will sign the
present bill if the proposed bill containing the changes outlined above
fails to pass." On May 18 I notified the Senate leader, John Raines,