Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography
desire to make the Government the most effective instrument in advancing
the interests of the people as a whole, the interests of the average men
and women of the United States and of their children. I do not think I
overstate the case when I say that most of the men who did the best work
under me felt that ours was a partnership, that we all stood on the same
level of purpose and service, and that it mattered not what position any
one of us held so long as in that position he gave the very best that
was in him. We worked very hard; but I made a point of getting a couple
of hours off each day for equally vigorous play. The men with whom I
then played, whom we laughingly grew to call the "Tennis Cabinet," have
been mentioned in a previous chapter of this book in connection with
the gift they gave me at the last breakfast which they took at the White
House. There were many others in the public service under me with whom I
happened not to play, but who did their share of our common work just as
effectively as it was done by us who did play. Of course nothing could
have been done in my Administration if it had not been for the zeal,
intelligence, masterful ability, and downright hard labor of these men
in countless positions under me. I was helpless to do anything except
as my thoughts and orders were translated into action by them; and,
moreover, each of them, as he grew specially fit for his job, used to
suggest to me the right thought to have, and the right order to give,
concerning that job. It is of course hard for me to speak with cold and
dispassionate partiality of these men, who were as close to me as were
the men of my regiment. But the outside observers best fitted to pass
judgment about them felt as I did. At the end of my Administration Mr.
Bryce, the British Ambassador, told me that in a long life, during which
he had studied intimately the government of many different countries, he
had never in any country seen a more eager, high-minded, and efficient
set of public servants, men more useful and more creditable to their
country, than the men then doing the work of the American Government in
Washington and in the field. I repeat this statement with the permission
of Mr. Bryce.
At about the same time, or a little before, in the spring of 1908, there
appeared in the English _Fortnightly Review_ an article, evidently by
a competent eye witness, setting forth more in detail the same views to
which the British Ambassador thus privately gave expression. It was in
part as follows:
"Mr. Roosevelt has gathered around him a body of public servants who
are nowhere surpassed, I question whether they are anywhere equaled, for
efficiency, self-sacrifice, and an absolute devotion to their country's
interests. Many of them are poor men, without private means, who have
voluntarily abandoned high professional ambitions and turned their backs
on the rewards of business to serve their country on salaries that are
not merely inadequate, but indecently so. There is not one of them
who is not constantly assailed by offers of positions in the world
of commerce, finance, and the law that would satisfy every material
ambition with which he began life. There is not one of them who could
not, if he chose, earn outside Washington from ten to twenty times the
income on which he economizes as a State official. But these men are
as indifferent to money and to the power that money brings as to the
allurements of Newport and New York, or to merely personal distinctions,
or to the commercialized ideals which the great bulk of their
fellow-countrymen accept without question. They are content, and more
than content, to sink themselves in the National service without a
thought of private advancement, and often at a heavy sacrifice of
worldly honors, and to toil on . . . sustained by their own native
impulse to make of patriotism an efficient instrument of public
betterment."
The American public rarely appreciate the high quality of the work
done by some of our diplomats--work, usually entirely unnoticed and
unrewarded, which redounds to the interest and the honor of all of
us. The most useful man in the entire diplomatic service, during my
presidency, and for many years before, was Henry White; and I say
this having in mind the high quality of work done by such admirable
ambassadors and ministers as Bacon, Meyer, Straus, O'Brien, Rockhill,
and Egan, to name only a few among many. When I left the presidency
White was Ambassador to France; shortly afterwards he was removed by Mr.
Taft, for reasons unconnected with the good of the service.
The most important factor in getting the right spirit in my
Administration, next to the insistence upon courage, honesty, and a
genuine democracy of desire to serve the plain people, was my insistence
upon the theory that the executive power was limited only by specific
restrictions and prohibitions appearing in the Constitution or imposed
by the Congress under its Constitutional powers. My view was that
every executive officer, and above all every executive officer in high
position, was a steward of the people bound actively and affirmatively
to do all he could for the people, and not to content himself with the
negative merit of keeping his talents undamaged in a napkin. I declined
to adopt the view that what was imperatively necessary for the Nation
could not be done by the President unless he could find some specific
authorization to do it. My belief was that it was not only his right
but his duty to do anything that the needs of the Nation demanded unless
such action was forbidden by the Constitution or by the laws. Under
this interpretation of executive power I did and caused to be done
many things not previously done by the President and the heads of the
departments. I did not usurp power, but I did greatly broaden the use of
executive power. In other words, I acted for the public welfare, I acted
for the common well-being of all our people, whenever and in whatever
manner was necessary, unless prevented by direct constitutional or
legislative prohibition. I did not care a rap for the mere form and
show of power; I cared immensely for the use that could be made of the
substance. The Senate at one time objected to my communicating with them
in printing, preferring the expensive, foolish, and laborious practice
of writing out the messages by hand. It was not possible to return to
the outworn archaism of hand writing; but we endeavored to have the
printing made as pretty as possible. Whether I communicated with the
Congress in writing or by word of mouth, and whether the writing was by
a machine, or a pen, were equally, and absolutely, unimportant matters.
The importance lay in what I said and in the heed paid to what I said.
So as to my meeting and consulting Senators, Congressmen, politicians,
financiers, and labor men. I consulted all who wished to see me; and if
I wished to see any one, I sent for him; and where the consultation took
place was a matter of supreme unimportance. I consulted every man
with the sincere hope that I could profit by and follow his advice; I
consulted every member of Congress who wished to be consulted, hoping to
be able to come to an agreement of action with him; and I always finally
acted as my conscience and common sense bade me act.
About appointments I was obliged by the Constitution to consult the
Senate; and the long-established custom of the Senate meant that in
practice this consultation was with individual Senators and even with
big politicians who stood behind the Senators. I was only one-half the
appointing power; I nominated; but the Senate confirmed. In practice,
by what was called "the courtesy of the Senate," the Senate normally
refused to confirm any appointment if the Senator from the State
objected to it. In exceptional cases, where I could arouse public
attention, I could force through the appointment in spite of the
opposition of the Senators; in all ordinary cases this was impossible.
On the other hand, the Senator could of course do nothing for any man
unless I chose to nominate him. In consequence the Constitution itself
forced the President and the Senators from each State to come to a
working agreement on the appointments in and from that State.
My course was to insist on absolute fitness, including honesty, as a
prerequisite to every appointment; and to remove only for good cause,
and, where there was such cause, to refuse even to discuss with the
Senator in interest the unfit servant's retention. Subject to these
considerations, I normally accepted each Senator's recommendations for
offices of a routine kind, such as most post-offices and the like, but
insisted on myself choosing the men for the more important positions.
I was willing to take any good man for postmaster; but in the case of
a Judge or District Attorney or Canal Commissioner or Ambassador, I
was apt to insist either on a given man or else on any man with a given
class of qualifications. If the Senator deceived me, I took care that he
had no opportunity to repeat the deception.
I can perhaps best illustrate my theory of action by two specific
examples. In New York Governor Odell and Senator Platt sometimes worked
in agreement and sometimes were at swords' points, and both wished to be
consulted. To a friendly Congressman, who was also their friend, I wrote
as follows on July 22, 1903:
"I want to work with Platt. I want to work with Odell. I want to support
both and take the advice of both. But of course ultimately I must be
the judge as to acting on the advice given. When, as in the case of the
judgeship, I am convinced that the advice of both is wrong, I shall act
as I did when I appointed Holt. When I can find a friend of Odell's
like Cooley, who is thoroughly fit for the position I desire to fill, it
gives me the greatest pleasure to appoint him. When Platt proposes to me
a man like Hamilton Fish, it is equally a pleasure to appoint him."
This was written in connection with events which led up to my refusing
to accept Senator Platt's or Governor Odell's suggestions as to a
Federal Judgeship and a Federal District Attorneyship, and insisting
on the appointment, first of Judge Hough and later of District Attorney
Stimson; because in each case I felt that the work to be done was of so
high an order that I could not take an ordinary man.
The other case was that of Senator Fulton, of Oregon. Through Francis
Heney I was prosecuting men who were implicated in a vast network of
conspiracy against the law in connection with the theft of public land
in Oregon. I had been acting on Senator Fulton's recommendations for
office, in the usual manner. Heney had been insisting that Fulton was
in league with the men we were prosecuting, and that he had recommended
unfit men. Fulton had been protesting against my following Heney's
advice, particularly as regards appointing Judge Wolverton as United
States Judge. Finally Heney laid before me a report which convinced me
of the truth of his statements. I then wrote to Fulton as follows, on
November 20, 1905: "My dear Senator Fulton: I inclose you herewith a
copy of the report made to me by Mr. Heney. I have seen the originals
of the letters from you and Senator Mitchell quoted therein. I do not
at this time desire to discuss the report itself, which of course I must
submit to the Attorney-General. But I have been obliged to reach the
painful conclusion that your own letters as therein quoted tend to show
that you recommended for the position of District Attorney B when you
had good reason to believe that he had himself been guilty of fraudulent
conduct; that you recommended C for the same position simply because it
was for B's interest that he should be so recommended, and, as there is