Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography
when discovered; and which should in addition effectively control and
regulate all big combinations, and should give honest business certainty
as to what the law was and security as long as the law was obeyed. Such
a Commission would furnish a steady expert control, a control adapted to
the problem; and dissolution is neither control nor regulation, but is
purely negative; and negative remedies are of little permanent avail.
Such a Commission would have complete power to examine into every big
corporation engaged or proposing to engage in business between the
States. It would have the power to discriminate sharply between
corporations that are doing well and those that are doing ill; and the
distinction between those who do well and those who do ill would
be defined in terms so clear and unmistakable that no one could
misapprehend them. Where a company is found seeking its profits through
serving the community by stimulating production, lowering prices, or
improving service, while scrupulously respecting the rights of others
(including its rivals, its employees, its customers, and the general
public), and strictly obeying the law, then no matter how large its
capital, or how great the volume of its business it would be encouraged
to still more abundant production, or better service, by the fullest
protection that the Government could afford it. On the other hand, if
a corporation were found seeking profit through injury or oppression
of the community, by restricting production through trick or device,
by plot or conspiracy against competitors, or by oppression of
wage-workers, and then extorting high prices for the commodity it had
made artificially scarce, it would be prevented from organizing if its
nefarious purpose could be discovered in time, or pursued and suppressed
by all the power of Government whenever found in actual operation. Such
a commission, with the power I advocate, would put a stop to abuses of
big corporations and small corporations alike; it would draw the line on
conduct and not on size; it would destroy monopoly, and make the biggest
business man in the country conform squarely to the principles laid down
by the American people, while at the same time giving fair play to the
little man and certainty of knowledge as to what was wrong and what was
right both to big man and little man.
Although under the decision of the courts the National Government had
power over the railways, I found, when I became President, that
this power was either not exercised at all or exercised with utter
inefficiency. The law against rebates was a dead letter. All the
unscrupulous railway men had been allowed to violate it with impunity;
and because of this, as was inevitable, the scrupulous and decent
railway men had been forced to violate it themselves, under penalty of
being beaten by their less scrupulous rivals. It was not the fault of
these decent railway men. It was the fault of the Government.
Thanks to a first-class railway man, Paul Morton of the Santa Fe, son of
Mr. Cleveland's Secretary of Agriculture, I was able completely to stop
the practice. Mr. Morton volunteered to aid the Government in abolishing
rebates. He frankly stated that he, like every one else, had been guilty
in the matter; but he insisted that he uttered the sentiments of
the decent railway men of the country when he said that he hoped the
practice would be stopped, and that if I would really stop it, and not
merely make believe to stop it, he would give the testimony which would
put into the hands of the Government the power to put a complete check
to the practice. Accordingly he testified, and on the information which
he gave us we were able to take such action through the Inter-State
Commerce Commission and the Department of Justice, supplemented by
the necessary additional legislation, that the evil was absolutely
eradicated. He thus rendered, of his own accord, at his own personal
risk, and from purely disinterested motives, an invaluable service to
the people, a service which no other man who was able to render was
willing to render. As an immediate sequel, the world-old alliance
between Blifil and Black George was immediately revived against Paul
Morton. In giving rebates he had done only what every honest railway
man in the country had been obliged to do because of the failure of the
Government to enforce the prohibition as regards dishonest railway
men. But unlike his fellows he had then shown the courage and sense of
obligation to the public which made him come forward and without
evasion or concealment state what he had done, in order that we might
successfully put an end to the practice; and put an end to the practice
we did, and we did it because of the courage and patriotism he had
shown. The unscrupulous railway men, whose dishonest practices were
thereby put a stop to, and the unscrupulous demagogues who were either
under the influence of these men or desirous of gaining credit with
thoughtless and ignorant people no matter who was hurt, joined in
vindictive clamor against Mr. Morton. They actually wished me to
prosecute him, although such prosecution would have been a piece of
unpardonable ingratitude and treachery on the part of the public toward
him--for I was merely acting as the steward of the public in this
matter. I need hardly say that I stood by him; and later he served under
me as Secretary of the Navy, and a capital Secretary he made too.
We not only secured the stopping of rebates, but in the Hepburn Rate
Bill we were able to put through a measure which gave the Inter-State
Commerce Commission for the first time real control over the railways.
There were two or three amusing features in the contest over this bill.
All of the great business interests which objected to Governmental
control banded to fight it, and they were helped by the honest men of
ultra-conservative type who always dread change, whether good or bad. We
finally forced it through the House. In the Senate it was referred to
a committee in which the Republican majority was under the control of
Senator Aldrich, who took the lead in opposing the bill. There was one
Republican on the committee, however, whom Senator Aldrich could
not control--Senator Dolliver, of Iowa. The leading Democrat on the
committee was Senator Tillman, of South Carolina, with whom I was not on
good terms, because I had been obliged to cancel an invitation to him to
dine at the White House on account of his having made a personal assault
in the Senate Chamber on his colleague from South Carolina; and later I
had to take action against him on account of his conduct in connection
with certain land matters. Senator Tillman favored the bill. The
Republican majority in the committee under Senator Aldrich, when they
acted adversely on the bill, turned it over to Senator Tillman, thereby
making him its sponsor. The object was to create what it was hoped would
be an impossible situation in view of the relations between Senator
Tillman and myself. I regarded the action as simply childish. It was a
curious instance of how able and astute men sometimes commit blunders
because of sheer inability to understand intensity of disinterested
motive in others. I did not care a rap about Mr. Tillman's getting
credit for the bill, or having charge of it. I was delighted to go with
him or with any one else just so long as he was traveling in my way--and
no longer.
There was another amusing incident in connection with the passage of the
bill. All the wise friends of the effort to secure Governmental control
of corporations know that this Government control must be exercised
through administrative and not judicial officers if it is to be
effective. Everything possible should be done to minimize the chance
of appealing from the decisions of the administrative officer to the
courts. But it is not possible Constitutionally, and probably would not
be desirable anyhow, completely to abolish the appeal. Unwise zealots
wished to make the effort totally to abolish the appeal in connection
with the Hepburn Bill. Representatives of the special interests wished
to extend the appeal to include what it ought not to include. Between
stood a number of men whose votes would mean the passage of, or the
failure to pass, the bill, and who were not inclined towards either
side. Three or four substantially identical amendments were proposed,
and we then suddenly found ourselves face to face with an absurd
situation. The good men who were willing to go with us but had
conservative misgivings about the ultra-radicals would not accept a good
amendment if one of the latter proposed it; and the radicals would not
accept their own amendment if one of the conservatives proposed it.
Each side got so wrought up as to be utterly unable to get matters into
proper perspective; each prepared to stand on unimportant trifles; each
announced with hysterical emphasis--the reformers just as hysterically
as the reactionaries--that the decision as regards each unimportant
trifle determined the worth or worthlessness of the measure. Gradually
we secured a measurable return to sane appreciation of the essentials.
Finally both sides reluctantly agreed to accept the so-called Allison
amendment which did not, as a matter of fact, work any change in the
bill at all. The amendment was drawn by Attorney-General Moody after
consultation with the Inter-State Commerce Commission, and was forwarded
by me to Senator Dolliver; it was accepted, and the bill became law.
Thanks to this law and to the way in which the Inter-State Commerce
Commission was backed by the Administration, the Commission, under men
like Prouty, Lane, and Clark, became a most powerful force for good.
Some of the good that we had accomplished was undone after the close of
my Administration by the unfortunate law creating a Commerce Court; but
the major part of the immense advance we had made remained. There was
one point on which I insisted, and upon which it is necessary always to
insist. The Commission cannot do permanent good unless it does justice
to the corporations precisely as it exacts justice from them. The
public, the shippers, the stock and bondholders, and the employees, all
have their rights, and none should be allowed unfair privileges at the
expense of the others. Stock watering and swindling of any kind should
of course not only be stopped but punished. When, however, a road is
managed fairly and honestly, and when it renders a real and needed
service, then the Government must see that it is not so burdened as to
make it impossible to run it at a profit. There is much wise
legislation necessary for the safety of the public, or--like workmen's
compensation--necessary to the well-being of the employee, which
nevertheless imposes such a burden on the road that the burden must be
distributed between the general public and the corporation, or there
will be no dividends. In such a case it may be the highest duty of the
commission to raise rates; and the commission, when satisfied that the
necessity exists, in order to do justice to the owners of the road,
should no more hesitate to raise rates, than under other circumstances
to lower them.
So much for the "big stick" in dealing with the corporations when they
went wrong. Now for a sample of the square deal.
In the fall of 1907 there were severe business disturbances and
financial stringency, culminating in a panic which arose in New York
and spread over the country. The damage actually done was great, and the
damage threatened was incalculable. Thanks largely to the action of
the Government, the panic was stopped before, instead of being merely a
serious business check, it became a frightful and Nation-wide calamity,
a disaster fraught with untold misery and woe to all our people. For