Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography
The Santo Domingan case was the less important; and yet it possessed a
real importance, and moreover is instructive because the action there
taken should serve as a precedent for American action in all similar
cases. During the early years of my administration Santo Domingo was in
its usual condition of chronic revolution. There was always fighting,
always plundering; and the successful graspers for governmental power
were always pawning ports and custom-houses, or trying to put them up as
guarantees for loans. Of course the foreigners who made loans under
such conditions demanded exorbitant interest, and if they were Europeans
expected their governments to stand by them. So utter was the disorder
that on one occasion when Admiral Dewey landed to pay a call of ceremony
on the President, he and his party were shot at by revolutionists in
crossing the square, and had to return to the ships, leaving the call
unpaid. There was default on the interest due to the creditors; and
finally the latter insisted upon their governments intervening. Two or
three of the European powers were endeavoring to arrange for concerted
action, and I was finally notified that these powers intended to take
and hold several of the seaports which held custom-houses.
This meant that unless I acted at once I would find foreign powers in
partial possession of Santo Domingo; in which event the very individuals
who, in the actual event deprecated the precaution taken to prevent such
action, would have advocated extreme and violent measures to undo the
effect of their own supineness. Nine-tenths of wisdom is to be wise in
time, and at the right time; and my whole foreign policy was based
on the exercise of intelligent forethought and of decisive action
sufficiently far in advance of any likely crisis to make it improbable
that we would run into serious trouble.
Santo Domingo had fallen into such chaos that once for some weeks there
were two rival governments in it, and a revolution was being carried
on against each. At one period one government was at sea in a small
gunboat, but still stoutly maintained that it was in possession of
the island and entitled to make loans and declare peace or war. The
situation had become intolerable by the time that I interfered. There
was a naval commander in the waters whom I directed to prevent any
fighting which might menace the custom-houses. He carried out his
orders, both to his and my satisfaction, in thoroughgoing fashion. On
one occasion, when an insurgent force threatened to attack a town in
which Americans had interests, he notified the commanders on both sides
that he would not permit any fighting in the town, but that he would
appoint a certain place where they could meet and fight it out, and that
the victors should have the town. They agreed to meet his wishes,
the fight came off at the appointed place, and the victors, who if I
remember rightly were the insurgents, were given the town.
It was the custom-houses that caused the trouble, for they offered the
only means of raising money, and the revolutions were carried on to
get possession of them. Accordingly I secured an agreement with the
governmental authorities, who for the moment seemed best able to speak
for the country, by which these custom-houses were placed under American
control. The arrangement was that we should keep order and prevent any
interference with the custom-houses or the places where they stood, and
should collect the revenues. Forty-five per cent of the revenue was then
turned over to the Santo Domingan Government, and fifty-five per cent
put in a sinking fund in New York for the benefit of the creditors. The
arrangement worked in capital style. On the forty-five per cent basis
the Santo Domingan Government received from us a larger sum than it
had ever received before when nominally all the revenue went to it. The
creditors were entirely satisfied with the arrangement, and no excuse
for interference by European powers remained. Occasional disturbances
occurred in the island, of course, but on the whole there ensued a
degree of peace and prosperity which the island had not known before for
at least a century.
All this was done without the loss of a life, with the assent of all
the parties in interest, and without subjecting the United States to
any charge, while practically all of the interference, after the
naval commander whom I have mentioned had taken the initial steps in
preserving order, consisted in putting a first-class man trained in our
insular service at the head of the Santo Domingan customs service. We
secured peace, we protected the people of the islands against foreign
foes, and we minimized the chance of domestic trouble. We satisfied the
creditors and the foreign nations to which the creditors belonged; and
our own part of the work was done with the utmost efficiency and with
rigid honesty, so that not a particle of scandal was ever so much as
hinted at.
Under these circumstances those who do not know the nature of the
professional international philanthropists would suppose that these
apostles of international peace would have been overjoyed with what we
had done. As a matter of fact, when they took any notice of it at all it
was to denounce it; and those American newspapers which are fondest
of proclaiming themselves the foes of war and the friends of peace
violently attacked me for averting war from, and bringing peace to, the
island. They insisted I had no power to make the agreement, and demanded
the rejection of the treaty which was to perpetuate the agreement. They
were, of course, wholly unable to advance a single sound reason of any
kind for their attitude. I suppose the real explanation was partly their
dislike of me personally, and unwillingness to see peace come through or
national honor upheld by me; and in the next place their sheer, simple
devotion to prattle and dislike of efficiency. They liked to have people
come together and talk about peace, or even sign bits of paper with
something about peace or arbitration on them, but they took no interest
whatever in the practical achievement of a peace that told for good
government and decency and honesty. They were joined by the many
moderately well-meaning men who always demand that a thing be done, but
also always demand that it be not done in the only way in which it is,
as a matter of fact, possible to do it. The men of this kind insisted
that of course Santo Domingo must be protected and made to behave
itself, and that of course the Panama Canal must be dug; but they
insisted even more strongly that neither feat should be accomplished in
the only way in which it was possible to accomplish it at all.
The Constitution did not explicitly give me power to bring about the
necessary agreement with Santo Domingo. But the Constitution did not
forbid my doing what I did. I put the agreement into effect, and I
continued its execution for two years before the Senate acted; and I
would have continued it until the end of my term, if necessary, without
any action by Congress. But it was far preferable that there should be
action by Congress, so that we might be proceeding under a treaty which
was the law of the land and not merely by a direction of the Chief
Executive which would lapse when that particular executive left office.
I therefore did my best to get the Senate to ratify what I had done.
There was a good deal of difficulty about it. With the exception of one
or two men like Clark of Arkansas, the Democratic Senators acted in that
spirit of unworthy partisanship which subordinates national interest to
some fancied partisan advantage, and they were cordially backed by all
that portion of the press which took its inspiration from Wall Street,
and was violently hostile to the Administration because of its attitude
towards great corporations. Most of the Republican Senators under
the lead of Senator Lodge stood by me; but some of them, of the more
"conservative" or reactionary type, who were already growing hostile
to me on the trust question, first proceeded to sneer at what had
been done, and to raise all kinds of meticulous objections, which they
themselves finally abandoned, but which furnished an excuse on which
the opponents of the treaty could hang adverse action. Unfortunately the
Senators who were most apt to speak of the dignity of the Senate, and to
insist upon its importance, were the very ones who were also most apt
to try to make display of this dignity and importance by thwarting the
public business. This case was typical. The Republicans in question
spoke against certain provisions of the proposed treaty. They then,
having ingeniously provided ammunition for the foes of the treaty,
abandoned their opposition to it, and the Democrats stepped into the
position they had abandoned. Enough Republicans were absent to prevent
the securing of a two-thirds vote for the treaty, and the Senate
adjourned without any action at all, and with a feeling of entire
self-satisfaction at having left the country in the position of assuming
a responsibility and then failing to fulfil it. Apparently the Senators
in question felt that in some way they had upheld their dignity. All
that they had really done was to shirk their duty. Somebody had to do
that duty, and accordingly I did it. I went ahead and administered the
proposed treaty anyhow, considering it as a simple agreement on the part
of the Executive which would be converted into a treaty whenever
the Senate acted. After a couple of years the Senate did act, having
previously made some utterly unimportant changes which I ratified and
persuaded Santo Domingo to ratify. In all its history Santo Domingo has
had nothing happen to it as fortunate as this treaty, and the passing of
it saved the United States from having to face serious difficulties with
one or more foreign powers.
It cannot in the long run prove possible for the United States
to protect delinquent American nations from punishment for the
non-performance of their duties unless she undertakes to make them
perform their duties. People may theorize about this as much as
they wish, but whenever a sufficiently strong outside nation becomes
sufficiently aggrieved, then either that nation will act or the United
States Government itself will have to act. We were face to face at one
period of my administration with this condition of affairs in Venezuela,
when Germany, rather feebly backed by England, undertook a blockade
against Venezuela to make Venezuela adopt the German and English view
about certain agreements. There was real danger that the blockade would
finally result in Germany's taking possession of certain cities or
custom-houses. I succeeded, however, in getting all the parties in
interest to submit their cases to the Hague Tribunal.
By far the most important action I took in foreign affairs during the
time I was President related to the Panama Canal. Here again there was
much accusation about my having acted in an "unconstitutional" manner--a
position which can be upheld only if Jefferson's action in acquiring
Louisiana be also treated as unconstitutional; and at different stages
of the affair believers in a do-nothing policy denounced me as having
"usurped authority"--which meant, that when nobody else could or would
exercise efficient authority, I exercised it.
During the nearly four hundred years that had elapsed since Balboa
crossed the Isthmus, there had been a good deal of talk about building
an Isthmus canal, and there had been various discussions of the subject
and negotiations about it in Washington for the previous half century.
So far it had all resulted merely in conversation; and the time had come
when unless somebody was prepared to act with decision we would have