Theodore Roosevelt: An Autobiography
way as commending it to the attention of The Hague Tribunal, I would
have to have a feasible and rational plan of action presented.
It seems to me that a general stop in the increase of the war navies
of the world _might_ be a good thing; but I would not like to speak too
positively offhand. Of course it is only in continental Europe that the
armies are too large; and before advocating action as regards them I
should have to weigh matters carefully--including by the way such a
matter as the Turkish army. At any rate nothing useful can be done
unless with the clear recognition that we object to putting peace second
to righteousness.
Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT.
HON. CARL SCHURZ, Bolton Landing, Lake George, N. Y.
In my own judgment the most important service that I rendered to
peace was the voyage of the battle fleet round the world. I had become
convinced that for many reasons it was essential that we should have
it clearly understood, by our own people especially, but also by other
peoples, that the Pacific was as much our home waters as the Atlantic,
and that our fleet could and would at will pass from one to the other of
the two great oceans. It seemed to me evident that such a voyage would
greatly benefit the navy itself; would arouse popular interest in and
enthusiasm for the navy; and would make foreign nations accept as a
matter of course that our fleet should from time to time be gathered in
the Pacific, just as from time to time it was gathered in the Atlantic,
and that its presence in one ocean was no more to be accepted as a mark
of hostility to any Asiatic power than its presence in the Atlantic
was to be accepted as a mark of hostility to any European power. I
determined on the move without consulting the Cabinet, precisely as
I took Panama without consulting the Cabinet. A council of war never
fights, and in a crisis the duty of a leader is to lead and not to take
refuge behind the generally timid wisdom of a multitude of councillors.
At that time, as I happen to know, neither the English nor the German
authorities believed it possible to take a fleet of great battleships
round the world. They did not believe that their own fleets could
perform the feat, and still less did they believe that the American
fleet could. I made up my mind that it was time to have a show down in
the matter; because if it was really true that our fleet could not get
from the Atlantic to the Pacific, it was much better to know it and be
able to shape our policy in view of the knowledge. Many persons publicly
and privately protested against the move on the ground that Japan would
accept it as a threat. To this I answered nothing in public. In private
I said that I did not believe Japan would so regard it because Japan
knew my sincere friendship and admiration for her and realized that we
could not as a Nation have any intention of attacking her; and that if
there were any such feeling on the part of Japan as was alleged that
very fact rendered it imperative that that fleet should go. When in the
spring of 1910 I was in Europe I was interested to find that high naval
authorities in both Germany and Italy had expected that war would come
at the time of the voyage. They asked me if I had not been afraid of it,
and if I had not expected that hostilities would begin at least by the
time that the fleet reached the Straits of Magellan? I answered that I
did not expect it; that I believed that Japan would feel as friendly in
the matter as we did; but that if my expectations had proved mistaken,
it would have been proof positive that we were going to be attacked
anyhow, and that in such event it would have been an enormous gain to
have had the three months' preliminary preparation which enabled the
fleet to start perfectly equipped. In a personal interview before they
left I had explained to the officers in command that I believed the trip
would be one of absolute peace, but that they were to take exactly the
same precautions against sudden attack of any kind as if we were at war
with all the nations of the earth; and that no excuse of any kind would
be accepted if there were a sudden attack of any kind and we were taken
unawares.
My prime purpose was to impress the American people; and this purpose
was fully achieved. The cruise did make a very deep impression abroad;
boasting about what we have done does not impress foreign nations at
all, except unfavorably, but positive achievement does; and the two
American achievements that really impressed foreign peoples during the
first dozen years of this century were the digging of the Panama Canal
and the cruise of the battle fleet round the world. But the impression
made on our own people was of far greater consequence. No single
thing in the history of the new United States Navy has done as much to
stimulate popular interest and belief in it as the world cruise. This
effect was forecast in a well-informed and friendly English periodical,
the London _Spectator_. Writing in October, 1907, a month before the
fleet sailed from Hampton Roads, the _Spectator said_:
"All over America the people will follow the movements of the fleet;
they will learn something of the intricate details of the coaling
and commissariat work under warlike conditions; and in a word
their attention will be aroused. Next time Mr. Roosevelt or his
representatives appeal to the country for new battleships they will do
so to people whose minds have been influenced one way or the other. The
naval programme will not have stood still. We are sure that, apart from
increasing the efficiency of the existing fleet, this is the aim which
Mr. Roosevelt has in mind. He has a policy which projects itself far
into the future, but it is an entire misreading of it to suppose that it
is aimed narrowly and definitely at any single Power."
I first directed the fleet, of sixteen battleships, to go round through
the Straits of Magellan to San Francisco. From thence I ordered them to
New Zealand and Australia, then to the Philippines, China and Japan,
and home through Suez--they stopped in the Mediterranean to help the
sufferers from the earthquake at Messina, by the way, and did this work
as effectively as they had done all their other work. Admiral Evans
commanded the fleet to San Francisco; there Admiral Sperry took it;
Admirals Thomas, Wainwright and Schroeder rendered distinguished service
under Evans and Sperry. The coaling and other preparations were made in
such excellent shape by the Department that there was never a hitch, not
so much as the delay of an hour, in keeping every appointment made.
All the repairs were made without difficulty, the ship concerned
merely falling out of column for a few hours, and when the job was done
steaming at speed until she regained her position. Not a ship was left
in any port; and there was hardly a desertion. As soon as it was known
that the voyage was to be undertaken men crowded to enlist, just as
freely from the Mississippi Valley as from the seaboard, and for the
first time since the Spanish War the ships put to sea overmanned--and by
as stalwart a set of men-of-war's men as ever looked through a porthole,
game for a fight or a frolic, but withal so self-respecting and with
such a sense of responsibility that in all the ports in which they
landed their conduct was exemplary. The fleet practiced incessantly
during the voyage, both with the guns and in battle tactics, and came
home a much more efficient fighting instrument than when it started
sixteen months before.
The best men of command rank in our own service were confident that the
fleet would go round in safety, in spite of the incredulity of foreign
critics. Even they, however, did not believe that it was wise to send
the torpedo craft around. I accordingly acquiesced in their views, as it
did not occur to me to consult the lieutenants. But shortly before the
fleet started, I went in the Government yacht Mayflower to inspect the
target practice off Provincetown. I was accompanied by two torpedo
boat destroyers, in charge of a couple of naval lieutenants, thorough
gamecocks; and I had the two lieutenants aboard to dine one evening.
Towards the end of the dinner they could not refrain from asking if the
torpedo flotilla was to go round with the big ships. I told them no,
that the admirals and captains did not believe that the torpedo boats
could stand it, and believed that the officers and crews aboard the
cockle shells would be worn out by the constant pitching and bouncing
and the everlasting need to make repairs. My two guests chorused an
eager assurance that the boats could stand it. They assured me that
the enlisted men were even more anxious to go than were the officers,
mentioning that on one of their boats the terms of enlistment of most
of the crew were out, and the men were waiting to see whether or not to
reenlist, as they did not care to do so unless the boats were to go on
the cruise. I answered that I was only too glad to accept the word of
the men who were to do the job, and that they should certainly go; and
within half an hour I sent out the order for the flotilla to be got
ready. It went round in fine shape, not a boat being laid up. I felt
that the feat reflected even more credit upon the navy than did the
circumnavigation of the big ships, and I wrote the flotilla commander
the following letter:
May 18, 1908.
My dear Captain Cone:
A great deal of attention has been paid to the feat of our battleship
fleet in encircling South America and getting to San Francisco; and it
would be hard too highly to compliment the officers and enlisted men of
that fleet for what they have done. Yet if I should draw any distinction
at all it would be in favor of you and your associates who have taken
out the torpedo flotilla. Yours was an even more notable feat, and every
officer and every enlisted man in the torpedo boat flotilla has the
right to feel that he has rendered distinguished service to the United
States navy and therefore to the people of the United States; and I wish
I could thank each of them personally. Will you have this letter read by
the commanding officer of each torpedo boat to his officers and crew?
Sincerely yours, THEODORE ROOSEVELT.
LIEUTENANT COMMANDER HUTCH. I. CONE, U. S. N., Commanding Second Torpedo
Flotilla, Care Postmaster, San Francisco, Cal.
There were various amusing features connected with the trip. Most of
the wealthy people and "leaders of opinion" in the Eastern cities
were panic-struck at the proposal to take the fleet away from Atlantic
waters. The great New York dailies issued frantic appeals to Congress
to stop the fleet from going. The head of the Senate Committee on Naval
Affairs announced that the fleet should not and could not go because
Congress would refuse to appropriate the money--he being from an Eastern
seaboard State. However, I announced in response that I had enough money
to take the fleet around to the Pacific anyhow, that the fleet would
certainly go, and that if Congress did not choose to appropriate enough
money to get the fleet back, why, it would stay in the Pacific. There
was no further difficulty about the money.
It was not originally my intention that the fleet should visit
Australia, but the Australian Government sent a most cordial invitation,
which I gladly accepted; for I have, as every American ought to have, a
hearty admiration for, and fellow feeling with, Australia, and I believe
that America should be ready to stand back of Australia in any serious
emergency. The reception accorded the fleet in Australia was wonderful,
and it showed the fundamental community of feeling between ourselves and
the great commonwealth of the South Seas. The considerate, generous, and