Treatises on Friendship and Old Age
them. And the whole essay on friendship is his. In reading it you will
recognise a picture of yourself.
2. _Fannius_. You are quite right, Laelius! there never was a better or
more illustrious character than Africanus. But you should consider that
at the present moment all eyes are on you. Everybody calls you "the
wise" _par excellence_, and thinks you so. The same mark of respect was
lately paid Cato, and we know that in the last generation Lucius Atilius
was called "the wise." But in both cases the word was applied with
a certain difference. Atilius was so called from his reputation as a
jurist; Cato got the name as a kind of honorary title and in extreme old
age because of his varied experience of affairs, and his reputation
for foresight and firmness, and the sagacity of the opinions which he
delivered in senate and forum. You, however, are regarded as wise in
a somewhat different sense not alone on account of natural ability and
character, but also from your industry and learning; and not in the
sense in which the vulgar, but that in which scholars, give that title.
In this sense we do not read of any one being called wise in Greece
except one man at Athens; and he, to be sure, had been declared by the
oracle of Apollo also to be "the supremely wise man." For those who
commonly go by the name of the Seven Sages are not admitted into the
category of the wise by fastidious critics. Your wisdom people believe
to consist in this, that you look upon yourself as self-sufficing and
regard the changes and chances of mortal life as powerless to affect
your virtue. Accordingly they are always asking me, and doubtless also
our Scaevola here, how you bear the death of Africanus. This curiosity
has been the more excited from the fact that on the Nones of this month,
when we augurs met as usual in the suburban villa of Decimus Brutus for
consultation, you were not present, though it had always been your
habit to keep that appointment and perform that duty with the utmost
punctuality.
_Scaevola_. Yes, indeed, Laelius, I am often asked the question
mentioned by Fannius. But I answer in accordance with what I have
observed: I say that you bear in a reasonable manner the grief which
you have sustained in the death of one who was at once a man of the most
illustrious character and a very dear friend. That of course you could
not but be affected--anything else would have been wholly unnatural in a
man of your gentle nature--but that the cause of your non-attendance at
our college meeting was illness, not melancholy.
_Laelius_. Thanks, Scaevola! You are quite right; you spoke the exact
truth. For in fact I had no right to allow myself to be withdrawn from
a duty which I had regularly performed, as long as I was well, by any
personal misfortune; nor do I think that anything that can happen will
cause a man of principle to intermit a duty. As for your telling me,
Fannius, of the honourable appellation given me (an appellation to
which I do not recognise my title, and to which I make no claim), you
doubtless act from feelings of affection; but I must say that you seem
to me to do less than justice to Cato. If any one was ever "wise,"--of
which I have my doubts,--he was. Putting aside everything else, consider
how he bore his son's death! I had not forgotten Paulus; I had seen with
my own eyes Gallus. But they lost their sons when mere children; Cato
his when he was a full-grown man with an assured reputation. Do not
therefore be in a hurry to reckon as Cato's superior even that same
famous personage whom Apollo, as you say, declared to be "the wisest."
Remember the former's reputation rests on deeds, the latter's on words.
3. Now, as far as I am concerned (I speak to both of you now), believe
me the case stands thus. If I were to say that I am not affected by
regret for Scipio, I must leave the philosophers to justify my conduct,
but in point of fact I should be telling a lie. Affected of course I am
by the loss of a friend as I think there will never be again, such as
I can fearlessly say there never was before. But I stand in no need of
medicine. I can find my own consolation, and it consists chiefly in my
being free from the mistaken notion which generally causes pain at the
departure of friends. To Scipio I am convinced no evil has befallen: mine
is the disaster, if disaster there be; and to be severely distressed at
one's own misfortunes does not show that you love your friend, but that
you love yourself.
As for him, who can say that all is not more than well? For, unless he
had taken the fancy to wish for immortality, the last thing of which he
ever thought, what is there for which mortal man may wish that he did
not attain? In his early manhood he more than justified by extraordinary
personal courage the hopes which his fellow-citizens had conceived of
him as a child. He never was a candidate for the consulship, yet was
elected consul twice: the first time before the legal age; the second at
a time which, as far as he was concerned, was soon enough, but was near
being too late for the interests of the State. By the overthrow of two
cities which were the most bitter enemies of our Empire, he put an end
not only to the wars then raging, but also to the possibility of others
in the future. What need to mention the exquisite grace of his manners,
his dutiful devotion to his mother, his generosity to his sisters, his
liberality to his relations, the integrity of his conduct to every
one? You know all this already. Finally, the estimation in which his
fellow-citizens held him has been shown by the signs of mourning which
accompanied his obsequies. What could such a man have gained by the
addition of a few years? Though age need not be a burden,--as I remember
Cato arguing in the presence of myself and Scipio two years before he
died,--yet it cannot but take away the vigour and freshness which Scipio
was still enjoying. We may conclude therefore that his life, from the
good fortune which had attended him and the glory he had obtained, was
so circumstanced that it could not be bettered, while the suddenness
of his death saved him the sensation of dying. As to the manner of his
death it is difficult to speak; you see what people suspect. Thus much,
however, I may say: Scipio in his lifetime saw many days of supreme
triumph and exultation, but none more magnificent than his last, on
which, upon the rising of the Senate, he was escorted by the senators
and the people of Rome, by the allies, and by the Latins, to his own
door. From such an elevation of popular esteem the next step seems
naturally to be an ascent to the gods above, rather than a descent to
Hades.
4. For I am not one of these modern philosophers who maintain that our
souls perish with our bodies, and that death ends all. With me ancient
opinion has more weight: whether it be that of our own ancestors, who
attributed such solemn observances to the dead, as they plainly would
not have done if they had believed them to be wholly annihilated; or
that of the philosophers who once visited this country, and who by their
maxims and doctrines educated Magna Graecia, which at that time was in a
flourishing condition, though it has now been ruined; or that of the man
who was declared by Apollo's oracle to be "most wise," and who used to
teach without the variation which is to be found in most philosophers
that "the souls of men are divine, and that when they have quitted the
body a return to heaven is open to them, least difficult to those who
have been most virtuous and just." This opinion was shared by Scipio.
Only a few days before his death--as though he had a presentiment
of what was coming--he discoursed for three days on the state of the
republic. The company consisted of Philus and Manlius and several
others, and I had brought you, Scaevola, along with me. The last part of
his discourse referred principally to the immortality of the soul; for
he told us what he had heard from the elder Africanus in a dream. Now if
it be true that in proportion to a man's goodness the escape from what
may be called the prison and bonds of the flesh is easiest, whom can
we imagine to have had an easier voyage to the gods than Scipio? I am
disposed to think, therefore, that in his case mourning would be a sign
of envy rather than of friendship. If, however, the truth rather is that
the body and soul perish together, and that no sensation remains, then
though there is nothing good in death, at least there is nothing bad.
Remove sensation, and a man is exactly as though he had never been born;
and yet that this man was born is a joy to me, and will be a subject of
rejoicing to this State to its last hour.
Wherefore, as I said before, all is as well as possible with him. Not so
with me; for as I entered life before him, it would have been fairer
for me to leave it also before him. Yet such is the pleasure I take
in recalling our friendship, that I look upon my life as having been a
happy one because I have spent it with Scipio. With him I was associated
in public and private business; with him I lived in Rome and served
abroad; and between us there was the most complete harmony in our
tastes, our pursuits, and our sentiments, which is the true secret of
friendship. It is not therefore in that reputation for wisdom mentioned
just now by Fannius--especially as it happens to be groundless--that
I find my happiness so much, as in the hope that the memory of our
friendship will be lasting. What makes me care the more about this is
the fact that in all history there are scarcely three or four pairs of
friends on record; and it is classed with them that I cherish a hope of
the friendship of Scipio and Laelius being known to posterity.
_Fannius_. Of course that must be so, Laelius. But since you have
mentioned the word friendship, and we are at leisure, you would be doing
me a great kindness, and I expect Scaevola also, if you would do as it
is your habit to do when asked questions on other subjects, and tell
us your sentiments about friendship, its nature, and the rules to be
observed in regard to it.
_Scaevola_. I shall of course be delighted. Fannius has anticipated the
very request I was about to make. So you will be doing us both a great
favour.
5. _Laelius_. I should certainly have no objection if I felt confidence
in myself. For the theme is a noble one, and we are (as Fannius has
said) at leisure. But who am I? and what ability have I? What you
propose is all very well for professional philosophers, who are used,
particularly if Greeks, to have the subject for discussion proposed to
them on the spur of the moment. It is a task of considerable difficulty,
and requires no little practice. Therefore for a set discourse on
friendship you must go, I think, to professional lecturers. All I can
do is to urge on you to regard friendship as the greatest thing in the
world; for there is nothing which so fits in with our nature, or is so
exactly what we want in prosperity or adversity.
But I must at the very beginning lay down this principle--_friendship
can only exist between good men_. I do not, however, press this
too closely, like the philosophers who push their definitions to a
superfluous accuracy. They have truth on their side, perhaps, but it is
of no practical advantage. Those, I mean, who say that no one but the
"wise" is "good." Granted, by all means. But the "wisdom" they mean is
one to which no mortal ever yet attained. We must concern ourselves
with the facts of everyday life as we find it--not imaginary and
ideal perfections. Even Gaius Fannius, Manius Curius, and Tiberius
Coruncanius, whom our ancestors decided to be "wise," I could never
declare to be so according to their standard. Let them, then, keep