Cicero's Tusculan Disputations
humor that proceeded from not being of sound mind; yet such a person
might perform his ordinary duties, and discharge the usual and
customary requirements of life: but they considered one that was raving
as afflicted with a total blindness of the mind, which, notwithstanding
it is allowed to be greater than madness, is nevertheless of such a
nature that a wise man may be subject to raving (_furor_), but cannot
possibly be afflicted by insanity (_insania_). But this is another
question: let us now return to our original subject.
VI. I think you said that it was your opinion that a wise man was
liable to grief.
_A._ And so, indeed, I think.
_M._ It is natural enough to think so, for we are not the offspring of
flints; but we have by nature something soft and tender in our souls,
which may be put into a violent motion by grief, as by a storm; nor did
that Crantor, who was one of the most distinguished men that our
Academy has ever produced, say this amiss: "I am by no means of their
opinion who talk so much in praise of I know not what insensibility,
which neither can exist, nor ought to exist. "I would choose," says he,
"never to be ill; but should I be so, still I should choose to retain
my sensation, whether there was to be an amputation or any other
separation of anything from my body. For that insensibility cannot be
but at the expense of some unnatural ferocity of mind, or stupor of
body." But let us consider whether to talk in this manner be not
allowing that we are weak, and yielding to our softness.
Notwithstanding, let us be hardy enough, not only to lop off every arm
of our miseries, but even to pluck up every fibre of their roots. Yet
still something, perhaps, may be left behind, so deep does folly strike
its roots: but whatever may be left it will be no more than is
necessary. But let us be persuaded of this, that unless the mind be in
a sound state, which philosophy alone can effect, there can be no end
of our miseries. Wherefore, as we began, let us submit ourselves to it
for a cure; we shall be cured if we choose to be. I shall advance
something further. I shall not treat of grief alone, though that indeed
is the principal thing; but, as I originally proposed, of every
perturbation of the mind, as I termed it; disorder, as the Greeks call
it: and first, with your leave, I shall treat it in the manner of the
Stoics, whose method is to reduce their arguments into a very small
space; afterward I shall enlarge more in my own way.
VII. A man of courage is also full of faith. I do not use the word
confident, because, owing to an erroneous custom of speaking, that word
has come to be used in a bad sense, though it is derived from
confiding, which is commendable. But he who is full of faith is
certainly under no fear; for there is an inconsistency between faith
and fear. Now, whoever is subject to grief is subject to fear; for
whatever things we grieve at when present we dread when hanging over us
and approaching. Thus it comes about that grief is inconsistent with
courage: it is very probable, therefore, that whoever is subject to
grief is also liable to fear, and to a broken kind of spirits and
sinking. Now, whenever these befall a man, he is in a servile state,
and must own that he is overpowered; for whoever admits these feelings,
must admit timidity and cowardice. But these cannot enter into the mind
of a man of courage; neither, therefore, can grief: but the man of
courage is the only wise man; therefore grief cannot befall the wise
man. It is, besides, necessary that whoever is brave should be a man of
great soul; that whoever is a man of a great soul should be invincible;
whoever is invincible looks down with contempt on all things here, and
considers them, beneath him. But no one can despise those things on
account of which he may be affected with grief; from whence it follows
that a wise man is never affected with grief: for all wise men are
brave; therefore a wise man is not subject to grief. And as the eye,
when disordered, is not in a good condition for performing its office
properly; and as the other parts, and the whole body itself, when
unsettled, cannot perform their office and business; so the mind, when
disordered, is but ill-fitted to perform its duty. The office of the
mind is to use its reason well; but the mind of a wise man is always in
condition to make the best use of his reason, and therefore is never
out of order. But grief is a disorder of the mind; therefore a wise man
will be always free from it.
VIII. And from these considerations we may get at a very probable
definition of the temperate man, whom the Greeks call [Greek: sophron]:
and they call that virtue [Greek: sophrosynen], which I at one time
call temperance, at another time moderation, and sometimes even
modesty; but I do not know whether that virtue may not be properly
called frugality, which has a more confined meaning with the Greeks;
for they call frugal men [Greek: chresimous], which implies only that
they are useful; but our name has a more extensive meaning: for all
abstinence, all innocency (which the Greeks have no ordinary name for,
though they might use the word [Greek: ablabeia], for innocency is that
disposition of mind which would offend no one) and several other
virtues are comprehended under frugality; but if this quality were of
less importance, and confined in as small a compass as some imagine,
the surname of Piso[36] would not have been in so great esteem. But as
we allow him not the name of a frugal man (_frugi_), who either quits
his post through fear, which is cowardice; or who reserves to his own
use what was privately committed to his keeping, which is injustice; or
who fails in his military undertakings through rashness, which is
folly--for that reason the word frugality takes in these three virtues
of fortitude, justice, and prudence, though it is indeed common to all
virtues, for they are all connected and knit together. Let us allow,
then, frugality itself to be another and fourth virtue; for its
peculiar property seems to be, to govern and appease all tendencies to
too eager a desire after anything, to restrain lust, and to preserve a
decent steadiness in everything. The vice in contrast to this is called
prodigality (_nequitia_). Frugality, I imagine, is derived from the
word _fruge_, the best thing which the earth produces; _nequitia_ is
derived (though this is perhaps rather more strained; still, let us try
it; we shall only be thought to have been trifling if there is nothing
in what we say) from the fact of everything being to no purpose
(_nequicquam_) in such a man; from which circumstance he is called also
_Nihil_, nothing. Whoever is frugal, then, or, if it is more agreeable
to you, whoever is moderate and temperate, such a one must of course be
consistent; whoever is consistent, must be quiet; the quiet man must be
free from all perturbation, therefore from grief likewise: and these
are the properties of a wise man; therefore a wise man must be free
from grief.
IX. So that Dionysius of Heraclea is right when, upon this complaint of
Achilles in Homer,
Well hast thou spoke, but at the tyrant's name
My rage rekindles, and my soul's in flame:
'Tis just resentment, and becomes the brave,
Disgraced, dishonor'd like the vilest slave[37]--
he reasons thus: Is the hand as it should be, when it is affected with
a swelling? or is it possible for any other member of the body, when
swollen or enlarged, to be in any other than a disordered state? Must
not the mind, then, when it is puffed up, or distended, be out of
order? But the mind of a wise man is always free from every kind of
disorder: it never swells, never is puffed up; but the mind when in
anger is in a different state. A wise man, therefore, is never angry;
for when he is angry, he lusts after something; for whoever is angry
naturally has a longing desire to give all the pain he can to the
person who he thinks has injured him; and whoever has this earnest
desire must necessarily be much pleased with the accomplishment of his
wishes; hence he is delighted with his neighbor's misery; and as a wise
man is not capable of such feelings as these, he is therefore not
capable of anger. But should a wise man be subject to grief, he may
likewise be subject to anger; for as he is free from anger, he must
likewise be free from grief. Again, could a wise man be subject to
grief, he might also be liable to pity, or even might be open to a
disposition towards envy (_invidentia_); I do not say to envy
(_invidia_), for that can only exist by the very act of envying: but we
may fairly form the word _invidentia_ from _invidendo_, and so avoid
the doubtful name _invidia;_ for this word is probably derived from
_in_ and _video_, looking too closely into another's fortune; as it is
said in the Melanippus,
Who envies me the flower of my children?
where the Latin is _invidit florem._ It may appear not good Latin, but
it is very well put by Accius; for as _video_ governs an accusative
case, so it is more correct to say _invideo florem_ than _flori._ We
are debarred from saying so by common usage. The poet stood in his own
right, and expressed himself with more freedom.
X. Therefore compassion and envy are consistent in the same man; for
whoever is uneasy at any one's adversity is also uneasy at another's
prosperity: as Theophrastus, while he laments the death of his
companion Callisthenes, is at the same time disturbed at the success of
Alexander; and therefore he says that Callisthenes met with man of the
greatest power and good fortune, but one who did not know how to make
use of his good fortune. And as pity is an uneasiness which arises from
the misfortunes of another, so envy is an uneasiness that proceeds from
the good success of another: therefore whoever is capable of pity is
capable of envy. But a wise man is incapable of envy, and consequently
incapable of pity. But were a wise man used to grieve, to pity also
would be familiar to him; therefore to grieve is a feeling which cannot
affect a wise man. Now, though these reasonings of the Stoics, and
their conclusions, are rather strained and distorted, and ought to be
expressed in a less stringent and narrow manner, yet great stress is to
be laid on the opinions of those men who have a peculiarly bold and
manly turn of thought and sentiment. For our friends the Peripatetics,
notwithstanding all their erudition, gravity, and fluency of language,
do not satisfy me about the moderation of these disorders and diseases
of the soul which they insist upon; for every evil, though moderate, is
in its nature great. But our object is to make out that the wise man is
free from all evil; for as the body is unsound if it is ever so
slightly affected, so the mind under any moderate disorder loses its
soundness; therefore the Romans have, with their usual accuracy of
expression, called trouble, and anguish, and vexation, on account of
the analogy between a troubled mind and a diseased body, disorders. The
Greeks call all perturbation of mind by pretty nearly the same name;
for they name every turbid motion of the soul [Greek: pathos], that is
to say, a distemper. But we have given them a more proper name; for a
disorder of the mind is very like a disease of the body. But lust does
not resemble sickness; neither does immoderate joy, which is an elated
and exulting pleasure of the mind. Fear, too, is not very like a
distemper, though it is akin to grief of mind, but properly, as is also
the case with sickness of the body, so too sickness of mind has no name
separated from pain. And therefore I must explain the origin of this
pain, that is to say, the cause that occasions this grief in the mind,