Cicero's Tusculan Disputations
of pleasure and entertainment for his mind? Were it not so, would
Anaxagoras, or this very Democritus, have left their estates and
patrimonies, and given themselves up to the pursuit of acquiring this
divine pleasure? It is thus that the poets who have represented
Tiresias the Augur as a wise man and blind never exhibit him as
bewailing his blindness. And Homer, too, after he had described
Polyphemus as a monster and a wild man, represents him talking with his
ram, and speaking of his good fortune, inasmuch as he could go wherever
he pleased and touch what he would. And so far he was right, for that
Cyclops was a being of not much more understanding than his ram.
XL. Now, as to the evil of being deaf. M. Crassus was a little thick of
hearing; but it was more uneasiness to him that he heard himself ill
spoken of, though, in my opinion, he did not deserve it. Our Epicureans
cannot understand Greek, nor the Greeks Latin: now, they are deaf
reciprocally as to each other's language, and we are all truly deaf
with regard to those innumerable languages which we do not understand.
They do not hear the voice of the harper; but, then, they do not hear
the grating of a saw when it is setting, or the grunting of a hog when
his throat is being cut, nor the roaring of the sea when they are
desirous of rest. And if they should chance to be fond of singing, they
ought, in the first place, to consider that many wise men lived happily
before music was discovered; besides, they may have more pleasure in
reading verses than in hearing them sung. Then, as I before referred
the blind to the pleasures of hearing, so I may the deaf to the
pleasures of sight: moreover, whoever can converse with himself doth
not need the conversation of another. But suppose all these misfortunes
to meet in one person: suppose him blind and deaf--let him be afflicted
with the sharpest pains of body, which, in the first place, generally
of themselves make an end of him; still, should they continue so long,
and the pain be so exquisite, that we should be unable to assign any
reason for our being so afflicted--still, why, good Gods! should we be
under any difficulty? For there is a retreat at hand: death is that
retreat--a shelter where we shall forever be insensible. Theodorus said
to Lysimachus, who threatened him with death, "It is a great matter,
indeed, for you to have acquired the power of a Spanish fly!" When
Perses entreated Paulus not to lead him in triumph, "That is a matter
which you have in your own power," said Paulus. I said many things
about death in our first day's disputation, when death was the subject;
and not a little the next day, when I treated of pain; which things if
you recollect, there can be no danger of your looking upon death as
undesirable, or, at least, it will not be dreadful.
That custom which is common among the Grecians at their banquets
should, in my opinion, be observed in life: Drink, say they, or leave
the company; and rightly enough; for a guest should either enjoy the
pleasure of drinking with others, or else not stay till he meets with
affronts from those that are in liquor. Thus, those injuries of fortune
which you cannot bear you should flee from.
XLI. This is the very same which is said by Epicurus and Hieronymus.
Now, if those philosophers, whose opinion it is that virtue has no
power of itself, and who say that the conduct which we denominate
honorable and laudable is really nothing, and is only an empty
circumstance set off with an unmeaning sound, can nevertheless maintain
that a wise man is always happy, what, think you, may be done by the
Socratic and Platonic philosophers? Some of these allow such
superiority to the goods of the mind as quite to eclipse what concerns
the body and all external circumstances. But others do not admit these
to be goods; they make everything depend on the mind: whose disputes
Carneades used, as a sort of honorary arbitrator, to determine. For, as
what seemed goods to the Peripatetics were allowed to be advantages by
the Stoics, and as the Peripatetics allowed no more to riches, good
health; and other things of that sort than the Stoics, when these
things were considered according to their reality, and not by mere
names, his opinion was that there was no ground for disagreeing.
Therefore, let the philosophers of other schools see how they can
establish this point also. It is very agreeable to me that they make
some professions worthy of being uttered by the mouth of a philosopher
with regard to a wise man's having always the means of living happily.
XLII. But as we are to depart in the morning, let us remember these
five days' discussions; though, indeed, I think I shall commit them to
writing: for how can I better employ the leisure which I have, of
whatever kind it is, and whatever it be owing to? And I will send these
five books also to my friend Brutus, by whom I was not only incited to
write on philosophy, but, I may say, provoked. And by so doing it is
not easy to say what service I may be of to others. At all events, in
my own various and acute afflictions, which surround me on all sides, I
cannot find any better comfort for myself.
THE NATURE OF THE GODS.
* * * * *
BOOK I.
I. There are many things in philosophy, my dear Brutus, which are not
as yet fully explained to us, and particularly (as you very well know)
that most obscure and difficult question concerning the Nature of the
Gods, so extremely necessary both towards a knowledge of the human mind
and the practice of true religion: concerning which the opinions of men
are so various, and so different from each other, as to lead strongly
to the inference that ignorance[72] is the cause, or origin, of
philosophy, and that the Academic philosophers have been prudent in
refusing their assent to things uncertain: for what is more unbecoming
to a wise man than to judge rashly? or what rashness is so unworthy of
the gravity and stability of a philosopher as either to maintain false
opinions, or, without the least hesitation, to support and defend what
he has not thoroughly examined and does not clearly comprehend?
In the question now before us, the greater part of mankind have united
to acknowledge that which is most probable, and which we are all by
nature led to suppose, namely, that there are Gods. Protagoras[73]
doubted whether there were any. Diagoras the Melian and Theodorus of
Cyrene entirely believed there were no such beings. But they who have
affirmed that there are Gods, have expressed such a variety of
sentiments on the subject, and the disagreement between them is so
great, that it would be tiresome to enumerate their opinions; for they
give us many statements respecting the forms of the Gods, and their
places of abode, and the employment of their lives. And these are
matters on which the philosophers differ with the most exceeding
earnestness. But the most considerable part of the dispute is, whether
they are wholly inactive, totally unemployed, and free from all care
and administration of affairs; or, on the contrary, whether all things
were made and constituted by them from the beginning; and whether they
will continue to be actuated and governed by them to eternity. This is
one of the greatest points in debate; and unless this is decided,
mankind must necessarily remain in the greatest of errors, and ignorant
of what is most important to be known.
II. For there are some philosophers, both ancient and modern, who have
conceived that the Gods take not the least cognizance of human affairs.
But if their doctrine be true, of what avail is piety, sanctity, or
religion? for these are feelings and marks of devotion which are
offered to the Gods by men with uprightness and holiness, on the ground
that men are the objects of the attention of the Gods, and that many
benefits are conferred by the immortal Gods on the human race. But if
the Gods have neither the power nor the inclination to help us; if they
take no care of us, and pay no regard to our actions; and if there is
no single advantage which can possibly accrue to the life of man; then
what reason can we have to pay any adoration, or any honors, or to
prefer any prayers to them? Piety, like the other virtues, cannot have
any connection with vain show or dissimulation; and without piety,
neither sanctity nor religion can be supported; the total subversion of
which must be attended with great confusion and disturbance in life.
I do not even know, if we cast off piety towards the Gods, but that
faith, and all the associations of human life, and that most excellent
of all virtues, justice, may perish with it.
There are other philosophers, and those, too, very great and
illustrious men, who conceive the whole world to be directed and
governed by the will and wisdom of the Gods; nor do they stop here, but
conceive likewise that the Deities consult and provide for the
preservation of mankind. For they think that the fruits, and the
produce of the earth, and the seasons, and the variety of weather, and
the change of climates, by which all the productions of the earth are
brought to maturity, are designed by the immortal Gods for the use of
man. They instance many other things, which shall be related in these
books; and which would almost induce us to believe that the immortal
Gods had made them all expressly and solely for the benefit and
advantage of men. Against these opinions Carneades has advanced so much
that what he has said should excite a desire in men who are not
naturally slothful to search after truth; for there is no subject on
which the learned as well as the unlearned differ so strenuously as in
this; and since their opinions are so various, and so repugnant one to
another, it is possible that none of them may be, and absolutely
impossible that more than one should be, right.
III. Now, in a cause like this, I may be able to pacify well-meaning
opposers, and to confute invidious censurers, so as to induce the
latter to repent of their unreasonable contradiction, and the former to
be glad to learn; for they who admonish one in a friendly spirit should
be instructed, they who attack one like enemies should be repelled. But
I observe that the several books which I have lately published[74] have
occasioned much noise and various discourse about them; some people
wondering what the reason has been why I have applied myself so
suddenly to the study of philosophy, and others desirous of knowing
what my opinion is on such subjects. I likewise perceive that many
people wonder at my following that philosophy[75] chiefly which seems
to take away the light, and to bury and envelop things in a kind of
artificial night, and that I should so unexpectedly have taken up the
defence of a school that has been long neglected and forsaken. But it
is a mistake to suppose that this application to philosophical studies
has been sudden on my part. I have applied myself to them from my
youth, at no small expense of time and trouble; and I have been in the
habit of philosophizing a great deal when I least seemed to think about
it; for the truth of which I appeal to my orations, which are filled
with quotations from philosophers, and to my intimacy with those very
learned men who frequented my house and conversed daily with me,
particularly Diodorus, Philo, Antiochus, and Posidonius,[76] under whom
I was bred; and if all the precepts of philosophy are to have reference
to the conduct of life, I am inclined to think that I have advanced,
both in public and private affairs, only such principles as may be
supported by reason and authority.
IV. But if any one should ask what has induced me, in the decline of
life, to write on these subjects, nothing is more easily answered; for