Cicero's Tusculan Disputations
when I found myself entirely disengaged from business, and the
commonwealth reduced to the necessity of being governed by the
direction and care of one man,[77] I thought it becoming, for the sake
of the public, to instruct my countrymen in philosophy, and that it
would be of importance, and much to the honor and commendation of our
city, to have such great and excellent subjects introduced in the Latin
tongue. I the less repent of my undertaking, since I plainly see that I
have excited in many a desire, not only of learning, but of writing;
for we have had several Romans well grounded in the learning of the
Greeks who were unable to communicate to their countrymen what they had
learned, because they looked upon it as impossible to express that in
Latin which they had received from the Greeks. In this point I think I
have succeeded so well that what I have done is not, even in
copiousness of expression, inferior to that language.
Another inducement to it was a melancholy disposition of mind, and the
great and heavy oppression of fortune that was upon me; from which, if
I could have found any surer remedy, I would not have sought relief in
this pursuit. But I could procure ease by no means better than by not
only applying myself to books, but by devoting myself to the
examination of the whole body of philosophy. And every part and branch
of this is readily discovered when every question is propounded in
writing; for there is such an admirable continuation and series of
things that each seems connected with the other, and all appear linked
together and united.
V. Now, those men who desire to know my own private opinion on every
particular subject have more curiosity than is necessary. For the force
of reason in disputation is to be sought after rather than authority,
since the authority of the teacher is often a disadvantage to those who
are willing to learn; as they refuse to use their own judgment, and
rely implicitly on him whom they make choice of for a preceptor. Nor
could I ever approve this custom of the Pythagoreans, who, when they
affirmed anything in disputation, and were asked why it was so, used to
give this answer: "He himself has said it;" and this "he himself," it
seems, was Pythagoras. Such was the force of prejudice and opinion that
his authority was to prevail even without argument or reason.
They who wonder at my being a follower of this sect in particular may
find a satisfactory answer in my four books of Academical Questions.
But I deny that I have undertaken the protection of what is neglected
and forsaken; for the opinions of men do not die with them, though they
may perhaps want the author's explanation. This manner of
philosophizing, of disputing all things and assuming nothing certainly,
was begun by Socrates, revived by Arcesilaus, confirmed by Carneades,
and has descended, with all its power, even to the present age; but I
am informed that it is now almost exploded even in Greece. However, I
do not impute that to any fault in the institution of the Academy, but
to the negligence of mankind. If it is difficult to know all the
doctrines of any one sect, how much more is it to know those of every
sect! which, however, must necessarily be known to those who resolve,
for the sake of discovering truth, to dispute for or against all
philosophers without partiality.
I do not profess myself to be master of this difficult and noble
faculty; but I do assert that I have endeavored to make myself so; and
it is impossible that they who choose this manner of philosophizing
should not meet at least with something worthy their pursuit. I have
spoken more fully on this head in another place. But as some are too
slow of apprehension, and some too careless, men stand in perpetual
need of caution. For we are not people who believe that there is
nothing whatever which is true; but we say that some falsehoods are so
blended with all truths, and have so great a resemblance to them, that
there is no certain rule for judging of or assenting to propositions;
from which this maxim also follows, that many things are probable,
which, though they are not evident to the senses, have still so
persuasive and beautiful an aspect that a wise man chooses to direct
his conduct by them.
VI. Now, to free myself from the reproach of partiality, I propose to
lay before you the opinions of various philosophers concerning the
nature of the Gods, by which means all men may judge which of them are
consistent with truth; and if all agree together, or if any one shall
be found to have discovered what may be absolutely called truth, I will
then give up the Academy as vain and arrogant. So I may cry out, in the
words of Statius, in the Synephebi,
Ye Gods, I call upon, require, pray, beseech, entreat, and
implore the attention of my countrymen all, both young and
old;
yet not on so trifling an occasion as when the person in the play
complains that,
In this city we have discovered a most flagrant iniquity:
here is a professed courtesan, who refuses money from her
lover;
but that they may attend, know, and consider what sentiments they ought
to preserve concerning religion, piety, sanctity, ceremonies, faith,
oaths, temples, shrines, and solemn sacrifices; what they ought to
think of the auspices over which I preside;[78] for all these have
relation to the present question. The manifest disagreement among the
most learned on this subject creates doubts in those who imagine they
have some certain knowledge of the subject.
Which fact I have often taken notice of elsewhere, and I did so more
especially at the discussion that was held at my friend C. Cotta's
concerning the immortal Gods, and which was carried on with the
greatest care, accuracy, and precision; for coming to him at the time
of the Latin holidays,[79] according to his own invitation and message
from him, I found him sitting in his study,[80] and in a discourse with
C. Velleius, the senator, who was then reputed by the Epicureans the
ablest of our countrymen. Q. Lucilius Balbus was likewise there, a
great proficient in the doctrine of the Stoics, and esteemed equal to
the most eminent of the Greeks in that part of knowledge. As soon as
Cotta saw me, You are come, says he, very seasonably; for I am having a
dispute with Velleius on an important subject, which, considering the
nature of your studies, is not improper for you to join in.
VII. Indeed, says I, I think I am come very seasonably, as you say; for
here are three chiefs of three principal sects met together. If M.
Piso[81] was present, no sect of philosophy that is in any esteem would
want an advocate. If Antiochus's book, replies Cotta, which he lately
sent to Balbus, says true, you have no occasion to wish for your friend
Piso; for Antiochus is of the opinion that the Stoics do not differ
from the Peripatetics in fact, though they do in words; and I should be
glad to know what you think of that book, Balbus. I? says he. I wonder
that Antiochus, a man of the clearest apprehension, should not see what
a vast difference there is between the Stoics, who distinguish the
honest and the profitable, not only in name, but absolutely in kind,
and the Peripatetics, who blend the honest with the profitable in such
a manner that they differ only in degrees and proportion, and not in
kind. This is not a little difference in words, but a great one in
things; but of this hereafter. Now, if you think fit, let us return to
what we began with.
With all my heart, says Cotta. But that this visitor (looking at me),
who is just come in, may not be ignorant of what we are upon, I will
inform him that we were discoursing on the nature of the Gods;
concerning which, as it is a subject that always appeared very obscure
to me, I prevailed on Velleius to give us the sentiments of Epicurus.
Therefore, continues he, if it is not troublesome, Velleius, repeat
what you have already stated to us. I will, says he, though this
new-comer will be no advocate for me, but for you; for you have both,
adds he, with a smile, learned from the same Philo to be certain of
nothing.[82] What we have learned from him, replied I, Cotta will
discover; but I would not have you think I am come as an assistant to
him, but as an auditor, with an impartial and unbiassed mind, and not
bound by any obligation to defend any particular principle, whether I
like or dislike it.
VIII. After this, Velleius, with the confidence peculiar to his sect,
dreading nothing so much as to seem to doubt of anything, began as if
he had just then descended from the council of the Gods, and Epicurus's
intervals of worlds. Do not attend, says he, to these idle and
imaginary tales; nor to the operator and builder of the World, the God
of Plato's Timaeus; nor to the old prophetic dame, the [Greek: Pronoia]
of the Stoics, which the Latins call Providence; nor to that round,
that burning, revolving deity, the World, endowed with sense and
understanding; the prodigies and wonders, not of inquisitive
philosophers, but of dreamers!
For with what eyes of the mind was your Plato able to see that
workhouse of such stupendous toil, in which he makes the world to be
modelled and built by God? What materials, what tools, what bars, what
machines, what servants, were employed in so vast a work? How could the
air, fire, water, and earth pay obedience and submit to the will of the
architect? From whence arose those five forms,[83] of which the rest
were composed, so aptly contributing to frame the mind and produce the
senses? It is tedious to go through all, as they are of such a sort
that they look more like things to be desired than to be discovered.
But, what is more remarkable, he gives us a world which has been not
only created, but, if I may so say, in a manner formed with hands, and
yet he says it is eternal. Do you conceive him to have the least skill
in natural philosophy who is capable of thinking anything to be
everlasting that had a beginning? For what can possibly ever have been
put together which cannot be dissolved again? Or what is there that had
a beginning which will not have an end? If your Providence, Lucilius,
is the same as Plato's God, I ask you, as before, who were the
assistants, what were the engines, what was the plan and preparation of
the whole work? If it is not the same, then why did she make the world
mortal, and not everlasting, like Plato's God?
IX. But I would demand of you both, why these world-builders started up
so suddenly, and lay dormant for so many ages? For we are not to
conclude that, if there was no world, there were therefore no ages. I
do not now speak of such ages as are finished by a certain number of
days and nights in annual courses; for I acknowledge that those could
not be without the revolution of the world; but there was a certain
eternity from infinite time, not measured by any circumscription of
seasons; but how that was in space we cannot understand, because we
cannot possibly have even the slightest idea of time before time was. I
desire, therefore, to know, Balbus, why this Providence of yours was
idle for such an immense space of time? Did she avoid labor? But that
could have no effect on the Deity; nor could there be any labor, since
all nature, air, fire, earth, and water would obey the divine essence.
What was it that incited the Deity to act the part of an aedile, to
illuminate and decorate the world? If it was in order that God might be
the better accommodated in his habitation, then he must have been
dwelling an infinite length of time before in darkness as in a dungeon.
But do we imagine that he was afterward delighted with that variety
with which we see the heaven and earth adorned? What entertainment
could that be to the Deity? If it was any, he would not have been