Cicero's Tusculan Disputations
little; reflect what a figure the Deity would make if he were to be
idly thinking of nothing through all eternity but "It is very well with
me, and I am happy;" nor do I see why this happy Deity should not fear
being destroyed, since, without any intermission, he is driven and
agitated by an everlasting incursion of atoms, and since images are
constantly floating off from him. Your Deity, therefore, is neither
happy nor eternal.
Epicurus, it seems, has written books concerning sanctity and piety
towards the Gods. But how does he speak on these subjects? You would
say that you were listening to Coruncanius or Scaevola, the
high-priests, and not to a man who tore up all religion by the roots,
and who overthrew the temples and altars of the immortal Gods; not,
indeed, with hands, like Xerxes, but with arguments; for what reason is
there for your saying that men ought to worship the Gods, when the Gods
not only do not regard men, but are entirely careless of everything,
and absolutely do nothing at all?
But they are, you say, of so glorious and excellent a nature that a
wise man is induced by their excellence to adore them. Can there be any
glory or excellence in that nature which only contemplates its own
happiness, and neither will do, nor does, nor ever did anything?
Besides, what piety is due to a being from whom you receive nothing? Or
how can you, or any one else, be indebted to him who bestows no
benefits? For piety is only justice towards the Gods; but what right
have they to it, when there is no communication whatever between the
Gods and men? And sanctity is the knowledge of how we ought to worship
them; but I do not understand why they are to be worshipped, if we are
neither to receive nor expect any good from them.
XLII. And why should we worship them from an admiration only of that
nature in which we can behold nothing excellent? and as for that
freedom from superstition, which you are in the habit of boasting of so
much, it is easy to be free from that feeling when you have renounced
all belief in the power of the Gods; unless, indeed, you imagine that
Diagoras or Theodorus, who absolutely denied the being of the Gods,
could possibly be superstitious. I do not suppose that even Protagoras
could, who doubted whether there were Gods or not. The opinions of
these philosophers are not only destructive of superstition, which
arises from a vain fear of the Gods, but of religion also, which
consists in a pious adoration of them.
What think you of those who have asserted that the whole doctrine
concerning the immortal Gods was the invention of politicians, whose
view was to govern that part of the community by religion which reason
could not influence? Are not their opinions subversive of all religion?
Or what religion did Prodicus the Chian leave to men, who held that
everything beneficial to human life should be numbered among the Gods?
Were not they likewise void of religion who taught that the Deities, at
present the object of our prayers and adoration, were valiant,
illustrious, and mighty men who arose to divinity after death?
Euhemerus, whom our Ennius translated, and followed more than other
authors, has particularly advanced this doctrine, and treated of the
deaths and burials of the Gods; can he, then, be said to have confirmed
religion, or, rather, to have totally subverted it? I shall say nothing
of that sacred and august Eleusina, into whose mysteries the most
distant nations were initiated, nor of the solemnities in Samothrace,
or in Lemnos, secretly resorted to by night, and surrounded by thick
and shady groves; which, if they were properly explained, and reduced
to reasonable principles, would rather explain the nature of things
than discover the knowledge of the Gods.
XLIII. Even that great man Democritus, from whose fountains Epicurus
watered his little garden, seems to me to be very inferior to his usual
acuteness when speaking about the nature of the Gods. For at one time
he thinks that there are images endowed with divinity, inherent in the
universality of things; at another, that the principles and minds
contained in the universe are Gods; then he attributes divinity to
animated images, employing themselves in doing us good or harm; and,
lastly, he speaks of certain images of such vast extent that they
encompass the whole outside of the universe; all which opinions are
more worthy of the country[102] of Democritus than of Democritus
himself; for who can frame in his mind any ideas of such images? who
can admire them? who can think they merit a religious adoration?
But Epicurus, when he divests the Gods of the power of doing good,
extirpates all religion from the minds of men; for though he says the
divine nature is the best and the most excellent of all natures, he
will not allow it to be susceptible of any benevolence, by which he
destroys the chief and peculiar attribute of the most perfect being.
For what is better and more excellent than goodness and beneficence? To
refuse your Gods that quality is to say that no man is any object of
their favor, and no Gods either; that they neither love nor esteem any
one; in short, that they not only give themselves no trouble about us,
but even look on each other with the greatest indifference.
XLIV. How much more reasonable is the doctrine of the Stoics, whom you
censure? It is one of their maxims that the wise are friends to the
wise, though unknown to each other; for as nothing is more amiable than
virtue, he who possesses it is worthy our love, to whatever country he
belongs. But what evils do your principles bring, when you make good
actions and benevolence the marks of imbecility! For, not to mention
the power and nature of the Gods, you hold that even men, if they had
no need of mutual assistance, would be neither courteous nor
beneficent. Is there no natural charity in the dispositions of good
men? The very name of love, from which friendship is derived, is dear
to men;[103] and if friendship is to centre in our own advantage only,
without regard to him whom we esteem a friend, it cannot be called
friendship, but a sort of traffic for our own profit. Pastures, lands,
and herds of cattle are valued in the same manner on account of the
profit we gather from them; but charity and friendship expect no
return. How much more reason have we to think that the Gods, who want
nothing, should love each other, and employ themselves about us! If it
were not so, why should we pray to or adore them? Why do the priests
preside over the altars, and the augurs over the auspices? What have we
to ask of the Gods, and why do we prefer our vows to them?
But Epicurus, you say, has written a book concerning sanctity. A
trifling performance by a man whose wit is not so remarkable in it, as
the unrestrained license of writing which he has permitted himself; for
what sanctity can there be if the Gods take no care of human affairs?
Or how can that nature be called animated which neither regards nor
performs anything? Therefore our friend Posidonius has well observed,
in his fifth book of the Nature of the Gods, that Epicurus believed
there were no Gods, and that what he had said about the immortal Gods
was only said from a desire to avoid unpopularity. He could not be so
weak as to imagine that the Deity has only the outward features of a
simple mortal, without any real solidity; that he has all the members
of a man, without the least power to use them--a certain unsubstantial
pellucid being, neither favorable nor beneficial to any one, neither
regarding nor doing anything. There can be no such being in nature; and
as Epicurus said this plainly, he allows the Gods in words, and
destroys them in fact; and if the Deity is truly such a being that he
shows no favor, no benevolence to mankind, away with him! For why
should I entreat him to be propitious? He can be propitious to none,
since, as you say, all his favor and benevolence are the effects of
imbecility.
* * * * *
BOOK II.
I. When Cotta had thus concluded, Velleius replied: I certainly was
inconsiderate to engage in argument with an Academician who is likewise
a rhetorician. I should not have feared an Academician without
eloquence, nor a rhetorician without that philosophy, however eloquent
he might be; for I am never puzzled by an empty flow of words, nor by
the most subtle reasonings delivered without any grace of oratory. But
you, Cotta, have excelled in both. You only wanted the assembly and the
judges. However, enough of this at present. Now, let us hear what
Lucilius has to say, if it is agreeable to him.
I had much rather, says Balbus, hear Cotta resume his discourse, and
demonstrate the true Gods with the same eloquence which he made use of
to explode the false; for, on such a subject, the loose, unsettled
doctrine of the Academy does not become a philosopher, a priest, a
Cotta, whose opinions should be, like those we hold, firm and certain.
Epicurus has been more than sufficiently refuted; but I would willingly
hear your own sentiments, Cotta.
Do you forget, replies Cotta, what I at first said--that it is easier
for me, especially on this point, to explain what opinions those are
which I do not hold, rather than what those are which I do? Nay, even
if I did feel some certainty on any particular point, yet, after having
been so diffuse myself already, I would prefer now hearing you speak in
your turn. I submit, says Balbus, and will be as brief as I possibly
can; for as you have confuted the errors of Epicurus, my part in the
dispute will be the shorter. Our sect divide the whole question
concerning the immortal Gods into four parts. First, they prove that
there are Gods; secondly, of what character and nature they are;
thirdly, that the universe is governed by them; and, lastly, that they
exercise a superintendence over human affairs. But in this present
discussion let us confine ourselves to the first two articles, and
defer the third and fourth till another opportunity, as they require
more time to discuss. By no means, says Cotta, for we have time enough
on our hands; besides that, we are now discussing a subject which
should be preferred even to serious business.
II. The first point, then, says Lucilius, I think needs no discourse to
prove it; for what can be so plain and evident, when we behold the
heavens and contemplate the celestial bodies, as the existence of some
supreme, divine intelligence, by which all these things are governed?
Were it otherwise, Ennius would not, with a universal approbation, have
said,
Look up to the refulgent heaven above,
Which all men call, unanimously, Jove.
This is Jupiter, the governor of the world, who rules all things with
his nod, and is, as the same Ennius adds,
----of Gods and men the sire,[104]
an omnipresent and omnipotent God. And if any one doubts this, I really
do not understand why the same man may not also doubt whether there is
a sun or not. For what can possibly be more evident than this? And if
it were not a truth universally impressed on the minds of men, the
belief in it would never have been so firm; nor would it have been, as
it is, increased by length of years, nor would it have gathered
strength and stability through every age. And, in truth, we see that
other opinions, being false and groundless, have already fallen into
oblivion by lapse of time. Who now believes in Hippocentaurs and
Chimaeras? Or what old woman is now to be found so weak and ignorant as
to stand in fear of those infernal monsters which once so terrified
mankind? For time destroys the fictions of error and opinion, while it
confirms the determinations of nature and of truth. And therefore it is
that, both among us and among other nations, sacred institutions and