Cicero's Tusculan Disputations
tyrant Gelo[283] had given out of the spoils of the Carthaginians, and
at the same time, in a jesting manner, he said "that a golden mantle
was too heavy in summer and too cold in winter;" and then, throwing a
woollen cloak over the statue, added, "This will serve for all
seasons." At another time, he ordered the golden beard of AEsculapius of
Epidaurus to be taken away, saying that "it was absurd for the son to
have a beard, when his father had none." He likewise robbed the temples
of the silver tables, which, according to the ancient custom of Greece,
bore this inscription, "To the good Gods," saying "he was willing to
make use of their goodness;" and, without the least scruple, took away
the little golden emblems of victory, the cups and coronets, which were
in the stretched-out hands of the statues, saying "he did not take, but
receive them; for it would be folly not to accept good things from the
Gods, to whom we are constantly praying for favors, when they stretch
out their hands towards us." And, last of all, all the things which he
had thus pillaged from the temples were, by his order, brought to the
market-place and sold by the common crier; and, after he had received
the money for them, he commanded every purchaser to restore what he had
bought, within a limited time, to the temples from whence they came.
Thus to his impiety towards the Gods he added injustice to man.
XXXV. Yet neither did Olympian Jove strike him with his thunder, nor
did AEsculapius cause him to die by tedious diseases and a lingering
death. He died in his bed, had funeral honors[284] paid to him, and
left his power, which he had wickedly obtained, as a just and lawful
inheritance to his son.
It is not without concern that I maintain a doctrine which seems to
authorize evil, and which might probably give a sanction to it, if
conscience, without any divine assistance, did not point out, in the
clearest manner, the difference between virtue and vice. Without
conscience man is contemptible. For as no family or state can be
supposed to be formed with any reason or discipline if there are no
rewards for good actions nor punishment for crimes, so we cannot
believe that a Divine Providence regulates the world if there is no
distinction between the honest and the wicked.
But the Gods, you say, neglect trifling things: the little fields or
vineyards of particular men are not worthy their attention; and if
blasts or hail destroy their product, Jupiter does not regard it, nor
do kings extend their care to the lower offices of government. This
argument might have some weight if, in bringing Rutilius as an
instance, I had only complained of the loss of his farm at Formiae; but
I spoke of a personal misfortune, his banishment.[285]
XXXVI. All men agree that external benefits, such as vineyards, corn,
olives, plenty of fruit and grain, and, in short, every convenience and
property of life, are derived from the Gods; and, indeed, with reason,
since by our virtue we claim applause, and in virtue we justly glory,
which we could have no right to do if it was the gift of the Gods, and
not a personal merit. When we are honored with new dignities, or
blessed with increase of riches; when we are favored by fortune beyond
our expectation, or luckily delivered from any approaching evil, we
return thanks for it to the Gods, and assume no praise to ourselves.
But who ever thanked the Gods that he was a good man? We thank them,
indeed, for riches, health, and honor. For these we invoke the all-good
and all-powerful Jupiter; but not for wisdom, temperance, and justice.
No one ever offered a tenth of his estate to Hercules to be made wise.
It is reported, indeed, of Pythagoras that he sacrificed an ox to the
Muses upon having made some new discovery in geometry;[286] but, for my
part, I cannot believe it, because he refused to sacrifice even to
Apollo at Delos, lest he should defile the altar with blood. But to
return. It is universally agreed that good fortune we must ask of the
Gods, but wisdom must arise from ourselves; and though temples have
been consecrated to the Mind, to Virtue, and to Faith, yet that does
not contradict their being inherent in us. In regard to hope, safety,
assistance, and victory, we must rely upon the Gods for them; from
whence it follows, as Diogenes said, that the prosperity of the wicked
destroys the idea of a Divine Providence.
XXXVII. But good men have sometimes success. They have so; but we
cannot, with any show of reason, attribute that success to the Gods.
Diagoras, who is called the atheist, being at Samothrace, one of his
friends showed him several pictures[287] of people who had endured very
dangerous storms; "See," says he, "you who deny a providence, how many
have been saved by their prayers to the Gods." "Ay," says Diagoras, "I
see those who were saved, but where are those painted who were
shipwrecked?" At another time, he himself was in a storm, when the
sailors, being greatly alarmed, told him they justly deserved that
misfortune for admitting him into their ship; when he, pointing to
others under the like distress, asked them "if they believed Diagoras
was also aboard those ships?" In short, with regard to good or bad
fortune, it matters not what you are, or how you have lived. The Gods,
like kings, regard not everything. What similitude is there between
them? If kings neglect anything, want of knowledge may be pleaded in
their defence; but ignorance cannot be brought as an excuse for the
Gods.
XXXVIII. Your manner of justifying them is somewhat extraordinary, when
you say that if a wicked man dies without suffering for his crimes, the
Gods inflict a punishment on his children, his children's children, and
all his posterity. O wonderful equity of the Gods! What city would
endure the maker of a law which should condemn a son or a grandson for
a crime committed by the father or the grandfather?
Shall Tantalus' unhappy offspring know
No end, no close, of this long scene of woe?
When will the dire reward of guilt be o'er,
And Myrtilus demand revenge no more?[288]
Whether the poets have corrupted the Stoics, or the Stoics given
authority to the poets, I cannot easily determine. Both alike are to be
condemned. If those persons whose names have been branded in the
satires of Hipponax or Archilochus[289] were driven to despair, it did
not proceed from the Gods, but had its origin in their own minds. When
we see AEgistus and Paris lost in the heat of an impure passion, why are
we to attribute it to a Deity, when the crime, as it were, speaks for
itself? I believe that those who recover from illness are more indebted
to the care of Hippocrates than to the power of AEsculapius; that Sparta
received her laws from Lycurgus[290] rather than from Apollo; that
those eyes of the maritime coast, Corinth and Carthage, were plucked
out, the one by Critolaus, the other by Hasdrubal, without the
assistance of any divine anger, since you yourselves confess that a
Deity cannot possibly be angry on any provocation.
XXXIX. But could not the Deity have assisted and preserved those
eminent cities? Undoubtedly he could; for, according to your doctrine,
his power is infinite, and without the least labor; and as nothing but
the will is necessary to the motion of our bodies, so the divine will
of the Gods, with the like ease, can create, move, and change all
things. This you hold, not from a mere phantom of superstition, but on
natural and settled principles of reason; for matter, you say, of which
all things are composed and consist, is susceptible of all forms and
changes, and there is nothing which cannot be, or cease to be, in an
instant; and that Divine Providence has the command and disposal of
this universal matter, and consequently can, in any part of the
universe, do whatever she pleases: from whence I conclude that this
Providence either knows not the extent of her power, or neglects human
affairs, or cannot judge what is best for us. Providence, you say, does
not extend her care to particular men; there is no wonder in that,
since she does not extend it to cities, or even to nations, or people.
If, therefore, she neglects whole nations, is it not very probable that
she neglects all mankind? But how can you assert that the Gods do not
enter into all the little circumstances of life, and yet hold that they
distribute dreams among men? Since you believe in dreams, it is your
part to solve this difficulty. Besides, you say we ought to call upon
the Gods. Those who call upon the Gods are individuals. Divine
Providence, therefore, regards individuals, which consequently proves
that they are more at leisure than you imagine. Let us suppose the
Divine Providence to be greatly busied; that it causes the revolutions
of the heavens, supports the earth, and rules the seas; why does it
suffer so many Gods to be unemployed? Why is not the superintendence of
human affairs given to some of those idle Deities which you say are
innumerable?
This is the purport of what I had to say concerning "the Nature of the
Gods;" not with a design to destroy their existence, but merely to show
what an obscure point it is, and with what difficulties an explanation
of it is attended.
XL. Balbus, observing that Cotta had finished his discourse--You have
been very severe, says he, against a Divine Providence, a doctrine
established by the Stoics with piety and wisdom; but, as it grows too
late, I shall defer my answer to another day. Our argument is of the
greatest importance; it concerns our altars,[291] our hearths, our
temples, nay, even the walls of our city, which you priests hold
sacred; you, who by religion defend Rome better than she is defended by
her ramparts. This is a cause which, while I have life, I think I
cannot abandon without impiety.
There is nothing, replied Cotta, which I desire more than to be
confuted. I have not pretended to decide this point, but to give you my
private sentiments upon it; and am very sensible of your great
superiority in argument. No doubt of it, says Velleius; we have much to
fear from one who believes that our dreams are sent from Jupiter,
which, though they are of little weight, are yet of more importance
than the discourse of the Stoics concerning the nature of the Gods. The
conversation ended here, and we parted. Velleius judged that the
arguments of Cotta were truest; but those of Balbus seemed to me to
have the greater probability.[292]
ON THE COMMONWEALTH.
* * * * *
PREFACE BY THE EDITOR.
This work was one of Cicero's earlier treatises, though one of those
which was most admired by his contemporaries, and one of which he
himself was most proud. It was composed 54 B.C. It was originally in
two books: then it was altered and enlarged into nine, and finally
reduced to six. With the exception of the dream of Scipio, in the last
book, the whole treatise was lost till the year 1822, when the
librarian of the Vatican discovered a portion of them among the
palimpsests in that library. What he discovered is translated here; but
it is in a most imperfect and mutilated state.
The form selected was that of a dialogue, in imitation of those of
Plato; and the several conferences were supposed to have taken place
during the Latin holidays, 129 B.C., in the consulship of Caius
Sempronius, Tuditanus, and Marcus Aquilius. The speakers are Scipio
Africanus the younger, in whose garden the scene is laid; Caius Laelius;
Lucius Furius Philus; Marcus Manilius; Spurius Mummius, the brother of
the taker of Corinth, a Stoic; Quintus AElius Tubero, a nephew of
Africanus; Publius Rutilius Rufus; Quintus Mucius Scaevola, the tutor of
Cicero; and Caius Fannius, who was absent, however, on the second day
of the conference.