Cicero's Tusculan Disputations
much deprived of public counsel and jurisdiction; and under the rule of
an aristocracy the multitude can hardly possess its due share of
liberty, since it is allowed no share in the public deliberation, and
no power. And when all things are carried by a democracy, although it
be just and moderate, yet its very equality is a culpable levelling,
inasmuch as it allows no gradations of rank. Therefore, even if Cyrus,
the King of the Persians, was a most righteous and wise monarch, I
should still think that the interest of the people (for this is, as I
have said before, the same as the Commonwealth) could not be very
effectually promoted when all things depended on the beck and nod of
one individual. And though at present the people of Marseilles, our
clients, are governed with the greatest justice by elected magistrates
of the highest rank, still there is always in this condition of the
people a certain appearance of servitude; and when the Athenians, at a
certain period, having demolished their Areopagus, conducted all public
affairs by the acts and decrees of the democracy alone, their State, as
it no longer contained a distinct gradation of ranks, was no longer
able to retain its original fair appearance.
XXVIII. I have reasoned thus on the three forms of government, not
looking on them in their disorganized and confused conditions, but in
their proper and regular administration. These three particular forms,
however, contained in themselves, from the first, the faults and
defects I have mentioned; but they have also other dangerous vices, for
there is not one of these three forms of government which has not a
precipitous and slippery passage down to some proximate abuse. For,
after thinking of that endurable, or, as you will have it, most amiable
king, Cyrus--to name him in preference to any one else--then, to
produce a change in our minds, we behold the barbarous Phalaris, that
model of tyranny, to which the monarchical authority is easily abused
by a facile and natural inclination. And, in like manner, along-side of
the wise aristocracy of Marseilles, we might exhibit the oligarchical
faction of the thirty tyrants which once existed at Athens. And, not to
seek for other instances, among the same Athenians, we can show you
that when unlimited power was cast into the hands of the people, it
inflamed the fury of the multitude, and aggravated that universal
license which ruined their State.[306] * * *
XXIX. The worst condition of things sometimes results from a confusion
of those factious tyrannies into which kings, aristocrats, and
democrats are apt to degenerate. For thus, from these diverse elements,
there occasionally arises (as I have said before) a new kind of
government. And wonderful indeed are the revolutions and periodical
returns in natural constitutions of such alternations and vicissitudes,
which it is the part of the wise politician to investigate with the
closest attention. But to calculate their approach, and to join to this
foresight the skill which moderates the course of events, and retains
in a steady hand the reins of that authority which safely conducts the
people through all the dangers to which they expose themselves, is the
work of a most illustrious citizen, and of almost divine genius.
There is a fourth kind of government, therefore, which, in my opinion,
is preferable to all these: it is that mixed and moderate government
which is composed of the three particular forms which I have already
noticed.
XXX. _Laelius._ I am not ignorant, Scipio, that such is your opinion,
for I have often heard you say so. But I do not the less desire, if it
is not giving you too much trouble, to hear which you consider the best
of these three forms of commonwealths. For it may be of some use in
considering[307] * * *
XXXI. * * * And each commonwealth corresponds to the nature and will of
him who governs it. Therefore, in no other constitution than that in
which the people exercise sovereign power has liberty any sure abode,
than which there certainly is no more desirable blessing. And if it be
not equally established for every one, it is not even liberty at all.
And how can there be this character of equality, I do not say under a
monarchy, where slavery is least disguised or doubtful, but even in
those constitutions in which the people are free indeed in words, for
they give their suffrages, they elect officers, they are canvassed and
solicited for magistracies; but yet they only grant those things which
they are obliged to grant whether they will or not, and which are not
really in their free power, though others ask them for them? For they
are not themselves admitted to the government, to the exercise of
public authority, or to offices of select judges, which are permitted
to those only of ancient families and large fortunes. But in a free
people, as among the Rhodians and Athenians, there is no citizen
who[308] * * *
XXXII. * * * No sooner is one man, or several, elevated by wealth and
power, than they say that * * * arise from their pride and arrogance,
when the idle and the timid give way, and bow down to the insolence of
riches. But if the people knew how to maintain its rights, then they
say that nothing could be more glorious and prosperous than democracy;
inasmuch as they themselves would be the sovereign dispensers of laws,
judgments, war, peace, public treaties, and, finally, of the fortune
and life of each individual citizen; and this condition of things is
the only one which, in their opinion, can be really called a
commonwealth, that is to say, a constitution of the people. It is on
this principle that, according to them, a people often vindicates its
liberty from the domination of kings and nobles; while, on the other
hand, kings are not sought for among free peoples, nor are the power
and wealth of aristocracies. They deny, moreover, that it is fair to
reject this general constitution of freemen, on account of the vices of
the unbridled populace; but that if the people be united and inclined,
and directs all its efforts to the safety and freedom of the community,
nothing can be stronger or more unchangeable; and they assert that this
necessary union is easily obtained in a republic so constituted that
the good of all classes is the same; while the conflicting interests
that prevail in other constitutions inevitably produce dissensions;
therefore, say they, when the senate had the ascendency, the republic
had no stability; and when kings possess the power, this blessing is
still more rare, since, as Ennius expresses it,
In kingdoms there's no faith, and little love.
Wherefore, since the law is the bond of civil society, and the justice
of the law equal, by what rule can the association of citizens be held
together, if the condition of the citizens be not equal? For if the
fortunes of men cannot be reduced to this equality--if genius cannot be
equally the property of all--rights, at least, should be equal among
those who are citizens of the same republic. For what is a republic but
an association of rights?[309] * * *
XXXIII. But as to the other political constitutions, these democratical
advocates do not think they are worthy of being distinguished by the
name which they claim. For why, say they, should we apply the name of
king, the title of Jupiter the Beneficent, and not rather the title of
tyrant, to a man ambitious of sole authority and power, lording it over
a degraded multitude? For a tyrant may be as merciful as a king may be
oppressive; so that the whole difference to the people is, whether they
serve an indulgent master or a cruel one, since serve some one they
must. But how could Sparta, at the period of the boasted superiority of
her political institution, obtain a constant enjoyment of just and
virtuous kings, when they necessarily received an hereditary monarch,
good, bad, or indifferent, because he happened to be of the blood
royal? As to aristocrats, Who will endure, say they, that men should
distinguish themselves by such a title, and that not by the voice of
the people, but by their own votes? For how is such a one judged to be
best either in learning, sciences, or arts?[310] * * *
XXXIV. * * * If it does so by hap-hazard, it will be as easily upset as
a vessel if the pilot were chosen by lot from among the passengers. But
if a people, being free, chooses those to whom it can trust
itself--and, if it desires its own preservation, it will always choose
the noblest--then certainly it is in the counsels of the aristocracy
that the safety of the State consists, especially as nature has not
only appointed that these superior men should excel the inferior sort
in high virtue and courage, but has inspired the people also with the
desire of obedience towards these, their natural lords. But they say
this aristocratical State is destroyed by the depraved opinions of men,
who, through ignorance of virtue (which, as it belongs to few, can be
discerned and appreciated by few), imagine that not only rich and
powerful men, but also those who are nobly born, are necessarily the
best. And so when, through this popular error, the riches, and not the
virtue, of a few men has taken possession of the State, these chiefs
obstinately retain the title of nobles, though they want the essence of
nobility. For riches, fame, and power, without wisdom and a just method
of regulating ourselves and commanding others, are full of discredit
and insolent arrogance; nor is there any kind of government more
deformed than that in which the wealthiest are regarded as the noblest.
But when virtue governs the Commonwealth, what can be more glorious?
When he who commands the rest is himself enslaved by no lust or
passion; when he himself exhibits all the virtues to which he incites
and educates the citizens; when he imposes no law on the people which
he does not himself observe, but presents his life as a living law to
his fellow-countrymen; if a single individual could thus suffice for
all, there would be no need of more; and if the community could find a
chief ruler thus worthy of all their suffrages, none would require
elected magistrates.
It was the difficulty of forming plans which transferred the government
from a king into the hands of many; and the error and temerity of the
people likewise transferred it from the hands of the many into those of
the few. Thus, between the weakness of the monarch and the rashness of
the multitude, the aristocrats have occupied the middle place, than
which nothing can be better arranged; and while they superintend the
public interest, the people necessarily enjoy the greatest possible
prosperity, being free from all care and anxiety, having intrusted
their security to others, who ought sedulously to defend it, and not
allow the people to suspect that their advantage is neglected by their
rulers.
For as to that equality of rights which democracies so loudly boast of,
it can never be maintained; for the people themselves, so dissolute and
so unbridled, are always inclined to flatter a number of demagogues;
and there is in them a very great partiality for certain men and
dignities, so that their equality, so called, becomes most unfair and
iniquitous. For as equal honor is given to the most noble and the most
infamous, some of whom must exist in every State, then the equity which
they eulogize becomes most inequitable--an evil which never can happen
in those states which are governed by aristocracies. These reasonings,
my Laelius, and some others of the same kind, are usually brought
forward by those that so highly extol this form of political
constitution.
XXXV. Then Laelius said: But you have not told us, Scipio, which of
these three forms of government you yourself most approve.