Cicero's Tusculan Disputations
_Scipio._ You are right to shape your question, which of the three I
most approve, for there is not one of them which I approve at all by
itself, since, as I told you, I prefer that government which is mixed
and composed of all these forms, to any one of them taken separately.
But if I must confine myself to one of these particular forms simply
and exclusively, I must confess I prefer the royal one, and praise that
as the first and best. In this, which I here choose to call the
primitive form of government, I find the title of father attached to
that of king, to express that he watches over the citizens as over his
children, and endeavors rather to preserve them in freedom than reduce
them to slavery. So that it is more advantageous for those who are
insignificant in property and capacity to be supported by the care of
one excellent and eminently powerful man. The nobles here present
themselves, who profess that they can do all this in much better style;
for they say that there is much more wisdom in many than in one, and at
least as much faith and equity. And, last of all, come the people, who
cry with a loud voice that they will render obedience neither to the
one nor the few; that even to brute beasts nothing is so dear as
liberty; and that all men who serve either kings or nobles are deprived
of it. Thus, the kings attract us by affection, the nobles by talent,
the people by liberty; and in the comparison it is hard to choose the
best.
_Laelius._ I think so too, but yet it is impossible to despatch the
other branches of the question, if you leave this primary point
undetermined.
XXXVI. _Scipio._ We must then, I suppose, imitate Aratus, who, when he
prepared himself to treat of great things, thought himself in duty
bound to begin with Jupiter.
_Laelius._ Wherefore Jupiter? and what is there in this discussion which
resembles that poem?
_Scipio._ Why, it serves to teach us that we cannot better commence our
investigations than by invoking him whom, with one voice, both learned
and unlearned extol as the universal king of all gods and men.
How so? said Laelius.
Do you, then, asked Scipio, believe in nothing which is not before your
eyes? whether these ideas have been established by the chiefs of states
for the benefit of society, that there might be believed to exist one
Universal Monarch in heaven, at whose nod (as Homer expresses it) all
Olympus trembles, and that he might be accounted both king and father
of all creatures; for there is great authority, and there are many
witnesses, if you choose to call all many, who attest that all nations
have unanimously recognized, by the decrees of their chiefs, that
nothing is better than a king, since they think that all the Gods are
governed by the divine power of one sovereign; or if we suspect that
this opinion rests on the error of the ignorant, and should be classed
among the fables, let us listen to those universal testimonies of
erudite men, who have, as it were, seen with their eyes those things to
the knowledge of which we can hardly attain by report.
What men do you mean? said Laelius.
Those, replied Scipio, who, by the investigation of nature, have
arrived at the opinion that the whole universe [is animated] by a
single Mind[311]. * * *
XXXVII. But if you please, my Laelius, I will bring forward evidences
which are neither too ancient nor in any respect barbarous.
Those, said Laelius, are what I want.
_Scipio._ You are aware that it is now not four centuries since this
city of ours has been without kings.
_Laelius._ You are correct; it is less than four centuries.
_Scipio._ Well, then, what are four centuries in the age of a state or
city? is it a long time?
_Laelius._ It hardly amounts to the age of maturity.
_Scipio._ You say truly; and yet not four centuries have elapsed since
there was a king in Rome.
_Laelius._ And he was a proud king.
_Scipio._ But who was his predecessor?
_Laelius._ He was an admirably just one; and, indeed, we must bestow the
same praise on all his predecessors as far back as Romulus, who reigned
about six centuries ago.
_Scipio._ Even he, then, is not very ancient.
_Laelius._ No; he reigned when Greece was already becoming old.
_Scipio._ Agreed. Was Romulus, then, think you, king of a barbarous
people?
_Laelius._ Why, as to that, if we were to follow the example of the
Greeks, who say that all people are either Greeks or barbarians, I am
afraid that we must confess that he was a king of barbarians; but if
this name belongs rather to manners than to languages, then I believe
the Greeks were just as barbarous as the Romans.
Then Scipio said: But with respect to the present question, we do not
so much need to inquire into the nation as into the disposition. For if
intelligent men, at a period so little remote, desired the government
of kings, you will confess that I am producing authorities that are
neither antiquated, rude, nor insignificant.
XXXVIII. Then Laelius said: I see, Scipio, that you are very
sufficiently provided with authorities; but with me, as with every fair
judge, authorities are worth less than arguments.
Scipio replied: Then, Laelius, you shall yourself make use of an
argument derived from your own senses.
_Laelius._ What senses do you mean?
_Scipio._ The feelings which you experience when at any time you happen
to feel angry with any one.
_Laelius._ That happens rather oftener than I could wish.
_Scipio._ Well, then, when you are angry, do you permit your anger to
triumph over your judgment?
No, by Hercules! said Laelius; I imitate the famous Archytas of
Tarentum, who, when he came to his villa, and found all its
arrangements were contrary to his orders, said to his steward, "Ah! you
unlucky scoundrel, I would flog you to death, if it were not that I am
in a rage with you."
Capital, said Scipio. Archytas, then, regarded unreasonable anger as a
kind of sedition and rebellion of nature which he sought to appease by
reflection. And so, if we examine avarice, the ambition of power or of
glory, or the lusts of concupiscence and licentiousness, we shall find
a certain conscience in the mind of man, which, like a king, sways by
the force of counsel all the inferior faculties and propensities; and
this, in truth, is the noblest portion of our nature; for when
conscience reigns, it allows no resting-place to lust, violence, or
temerity.
_Laelius._ You have spoken the truth.
_Scipio._ Well, then, does a mind thus governed and regulated meet your
approbation?
_Laelius._ More than anything upon earth.
_Scipio._ Then you would not approve that the evil passions, which are
innumerable, should expel conscience, and that lusts and animal
propensities should assume an ascendency over us?
_Laelius._ For my part, I can conceive nothing more wretched than a mind
thus degraded, or a man animated by a soul so licentious.
_Scipio._ You desire, then, that all the faculties of the mind should
submit to a ruling power, and that conscience should reign over them
all?
_Laelius._ Certainly, that is my wish.
_Scipio._ How, then, can you doubt what opinion to form on the subject
of the Commonwealth? in which, if the State is thrown into many hands,
it is very plain that there will be no presiding authority; for if
power be not united, it soon comes to nothing.
XXXIX. Then Laelius asked: But what difference is there, I should like
to know, between the one and the many, if justice exists equally in
many?
And Scipio said: Since I see, my Laelius, that the authorities I have
adduced have no great influence on you, I must continue to employ you
yourself as my witness in proof of what I am saying.
In what way, said Laelius, are you going to make me again support your
argument?
_Scipio._ Why, thus: I recollect, when we were lately at Formiae, that
you told your servants repeatedly to obey the orders of more than one
master only.
_Laelius._ To be sure, those of my steward.
_Scipio._ What do you at home? Do you commit your affairs to the hands
of many persons?
_Laelius._ No, I trust them to myself alone.
_Scipio._ Well, in your whole establishment, is there any other master
but yourself?
_Laelius._ Not one.
_Scipio._ Then I think you must grant me that, as respects the State,
the government of single individuals, provided they are just, is
superior to any other.
_Laelius._ You have conducted me to this conclusion, and I entertain
very nearly that opinion.
XL. And Scipio said: You would still further agree with me, my Laelius,
if, omitting the common comparisons, that one pilot is better fitted to
steer a ship, and a physician to treat an invalid, provided they be
competent men in their respective professions, than many could be, I
should come at once to more illustrious examples.
_Laelius._ What examples do you mean?
_Scipio._ Do not you observe that it was the cruelty and pride of one
single Tarquin only that made the title of king unpopular among the
Romans?
_Laelius._ Yes, I acknowledge that.
_Scipio._ You are also aware of this fact, on which I think I shall
debate in the course of the coming discussion, that after the expulsion
of King Tarquin, the people was transported by a wonderful excess of
liberty. Then innocent men were driven into banishment; then the
estates of many individuals were pillaged, consulships were made
annual, public authorities were overawed by mobs, popular appeals took
place in all cases imaginable; then secessions of the lower orders
ensued, and, lastly, those proceedings which tended to place all powers
in the hands of the populace.
_Laelius._ I must confess this is all too true.
All these things now, said Scipio, happened during periods of peace and
tranquillity, for license is wont to prevail when there is little to
fear, as in a calm voyage or a trifling disease. But as we observe the
voyager and the invalid implore the aid of some one competent director,
as soon as the sea grows stormy and the disease alarming, so our nation
in peace and security commands, threatens, resists, appeals from, and
insults its magistrates, but in war obeys them as strictly as kings;
for public safety is, after all, rather more valuable than popular
license. And in the most serious wars, our countrymen have even chosen
the entire command to be deposited in the hands of some single chief,
without a colleague; the very name of which magistrate indicates the
absolute character of his power. For though he is evidently called
dictator because he is appointed (dicitur), yet do we still observe
him, my Laelius, in our sacred books entitled Magister Populi (the
master of the people).
This is certainly the case, said Laelius.
Our ancestors, therefore, said Scipio, acted wisely.[312] * * *
XLI. When the people is deprived of a just king, as Ennius says, after
the death of one of the best of monarchs,
They hold his memory dear, and, in the warmth
Of their discourse, they cry, O Romulus!
O prince divine, sprung from the might of Mars
To be thy country's guardian! O our sire!
Be our protector still, O heaven-begot!
Not heroes, nor lords alone, did they call those whom they lawfully
obeyed; nor merely as kings did they proclaim them; but they pronounced
them their country's guardians, their fathers, and their Gods. Nor,
indeed, without cause, for they added,
Thou, Prince, hast brought us to the gates of light.
And truly they believed that life and honor and glory had arisen to
them from the justice of their king. The same good-will would doubtless
have remained in their descendants, if the same virtues had been
preserved on the throne; but, as you see, by the injustice of one man
the whole of that kind of constitution fell into ruin.