Cicero's Tusculan Disputations
power--namely, the dictatorship--appears exceedingly similar to the
monarchical royalty. All his power, however, was vested in the supreme
authority of the senate, to which the people deferred; and in these
times great exploits were performed in war by brave men invested with
the supreme command, whether dictators or consuls.
XXXIII. But as the nature of things necessarily brought it to pass that
the people, once freed from its kings, should arrogate to itself more
and more authority, we observe that after a short interval of only
sixteen years, in the consulship of Postumus Cominius and Spurius
Cassius, they attained their object; an event explicable, perhaps, on
no distinct principle, but, nevertheless, in a manner independent of
any distinct principle. For recollect what I said in commencing our
discourse, that if there exists not in the State a just distribution
and subordination of rights, offices, and prerogatives, so as to give
sufficient domination to the chiefs, sufficient authority to the
counsel of the senators, and sufficient liberty to the people, this
form of the government cannot be durable.
For when the excessive debts of the citizens had thrown the State into
disorder, the people first retired to Mount Sacer, and next occupied
Mount Aventine. And even the rigid discipline of Lycurgus could not
maintain those restraints in the case of the Greeks. For in Sparta
itself, under the reign of Theopompus, the five magistrates whom they
term Ephori, and in Crete ten whom they entitle Cosmi, were established
in opposition to the royal power, just as tribunes were added among us
to counterbalance the consular authority.
XXXIV. There might have been a method, indeed, by which our ancestors
could have been relieved from the pressure of debt, a method with which
Solon the Athenian, who lived at no very distant period before, was
acquainted, and which our senate did not neglect when, in the
indignation which the odious avarice of one individual excited, all the
bonds of the citizens were cancelled, and the right of arrest for a
while suspended. In the same way, when the plebeians were oppressed by
the weight of the expenses occasioned by public misfortunes, a cure and
remedy were sought for the sake of public security. The senate,
however, having forgotten their former decision, gave an advantage to
the democracy; for, by the creation of two tribunes to appease the
sedition of the people, the power and authority of the senate were
diminished; which, however, still remained dignified and august,
inasmuch as it was still composed of the wisest and bravest men, who
protected their country both with their arms and with their counsels;
whose authority was exceedingly strong and flourishing, because in
honor they were as much before their fellow-citizens as they were
inferior in luxuriousness, and, as a general rule, not superior to them
in wealth. And their public virtues were the more agreeable to the
people, because even in private matters they were ready to serve every
citizen, by their exertions, their counsels, and their liberality.
XXXV. Such was the situation of the Commonwealth when the quaestor
impeached Spurius Cassius of being so much emboldened by the excessive
favor of the people as to endeavor to make himself master of
monarchical power. And, as you have heard, his own father, having said
that he had found that his son was really guilty of this crime,
condemned him to death at the instance of the people. About fifty-four
years after the first consulate, Spurius Tarpeius and Aulus Aternius
very much gratified the people by proposing, in the Comitia Centuriata,
the substitution of fines instead of corporal punishments. Twenty years
afterward, Lucius Papirius and Publius Pinarius, the censors, having by
a strict levy of fines confiscated to the State the entire flocks and
herds of many private individuals, a light tax on the cattle was
substituted for the law of fines in the consulship of Caius Julius and
Publius Papirius.
XXXVI. But, some years previous to this, at a period when the senate
possessed the supreme influence, and the people were submissive and
obedient, a new system was adopted. At that time both the consuls and
tribunes of the people abdicated their magistracies, and the decemviri
were appointed, who were invested with great authority, from which
there was no appeal whatever, so as to exercise the chief domination,
and to compile the laws. After having composed, with much wisdom and
equity, the Ten Tables of laws, they nominated as their successors in
the ensuing year other decemviri, whose good faith and justice do not
deserve equal praise. One member of this college, however, merits our
highest commendation. I allude to Caius Julius, who declared respecting
the nobleman Lucius Sestius, in whose chamber a dead body had been
exhumed under his own eyes, that though as decemvir he held the highest
power without appeal, he still required bail, because he was unwilling
to neglect that admirable law which permitted no court but the Comitia
Centuriata to pronounce final sentence on the life of a Roman citizen.
XXXVII. A third year followed under the authority of the same
decemvirs, and still they were not disposed to appoint their
successors. In a situation of the Commonwealth like this, which, as I
have often repeated, could not be durable, because it had not an equal
operation with respect to all the ranks of the citizens, the whole
public power was lodged in the hands of the chiefs and decemvirs of the
highest nobility, without the counterbalancing authority of the
tribunes of the people, without the sanction of any other magistracies,
and without appeal to the people in the case of a sentence of death or
scourging.
Thus, out of the injustice of these men, there was suddenly produced a
great revolution, which changed the entire condition of the government,
or they added two tables of very tyrannical laws, and though
matrimonial alliances had always been permitted, even with foreigners,
they forbade, by the most abominable and inhuman edict, that any
marriages should take place between the nobles and the commons--an
order which was afterward abrogated by the decree of Canuleius.
Besides, they introduced into all their political measures corruption,
cruelty, and avarice. And indeed the story is well known, and
celebrated in many literary compositions, that a certain Decimus
Virginius was obliged, on account of the libidinous violence of one of
these decemvirs, to stab his virgin daughter in the midst of the forum.
Then, when he in his desperation had fled to the Roman army which was
encamped on Mount Algidum, the soldiers abandoned the war in which they
were engaged, and took possession of the Sacred Mount, as they had done
before on a similar occasion, and next invested Mount Aventine in their
arms.[327] Our ancestors knew how to prove most thoroughly, and to
retain most wisely. * * *
XXXVIII. And when Scipio had spoken in this manner, and all his friends
were awaiting in silence the rest of his discourse, then said Tubero:
Since these men who are older than I, my Scipio, make no fresh demands
on you, I shall take the liberty to tell you what I particularly wish
you would explain in your subsequent remarks.
Do so, said Scipio, and I shall be glad to hear.
Then Tubero said: You appear to me to have spoken a panegyric on our
Commonwealth of Rome exclusively, though Laelius requested your views
not only of the government of our own State, but of the policy of
states in general. I have not, therefore, yet sufficiently learned from
your discourse, with respect to that mixed form of government you most
approve, by what discipline, moral and legal, we may be best able to
establish and maintain it.
XXXIX. Africanus replied: I think that we shall soon find an occasion
better adapted to the discussion you have proposed, respecting the
constitution and conservatism of states. As to the best form of
government, I think on this point I have sufficiently answered the
question of Laelius. For in answering him, I, in the first place,
specifically noticed the three simple forms of government--monarchy,
aristocracy, and democracy; and the three vicious constitutions
contrary to them, into which they often degenerate; and I said that
none of these forms, taken separately, was absolutely good; but I
described as preferable to either of them that mixed government which
is composed of a proper amalgamation of these simple ingredients. If I
have since depicted our own Roman constitution as an example, it was
not in order to define the very best form of government, for that may
be understood without an example; but I wished, in the exhibition of a
mighty commonwealth actually in existence, to render distinct and
visible what reason and discourse would vainly attempt to display
without the assistance of experimental illustration. Yet, if you still
require me to describe the best form of government, independent of all
particular examples, we must consult that exactly proportioned and
graduated image of government which nature herself presents to her
investigators. Since you * * * this model of a city and people[328]
* * *
XL. * * * which I also am searching for, and which I am anxious to
arrive at.
_Laelius._ You mean the model that would be approved by the truly
accomplished politician?
_Scipio._ The same.
_Laelius._ You have plenty of fair patterns even now before you, if you
would but begin with yourself.
Then Scipio said: I wish I could find even one such, even in the entire
senate. For he is really a wise politician who, as we have often seen
in Africa, while seated on a huge and unsightly elephant, can guide and
rule the monster, and turn him whichever way he likes by a slight
admonition, without any actual exertion.
_Laelius._ I recollect, and when I was your lieutenant I often saw, one
of these drivers.
_Scipio._ Thus an Indian or Carthaginian regulates one of these huge
animals, and renders him docile and familiar with human manners. But
the genius which resides in the mind of man, by whatever name it may be
called, is required to rein and tame a monster far more multiform and
intractable, whenever it can accomplish it, which indeed is seldom. It
is necessary to hold in with a strong hand that ferocious[329] * * *
XLI. * * * [beast, denominated the mob, which thirsts after blood] to
such a degree that it can scarcely be sated with the most hideous
massacres of men. * * *
But to a man who is greedy, and grasping, and lustful, and
fond of wallowing in voluptuousness.
The fourth kind of anxiety is that which is prone to mourning
and melancholy, and which is constantly worrying itself.
[_The next paragraph, "Esse autem angores," etc.,
is wholly unintelligible without the context._]
As an unskilful charioteer is dragged from his chariot,
covered with dirt, bruised, and lacerated.
The excitements of men's minds are like a chariot, with
horses harnessed to it; in the proper management of which,
the chief duty of the driver consists in knowing his road:
and if he keeps the road, then, however rapidly he proceeds,
he will encounter no obstacles; but if he quits the proper
track, then, although he may be going gently and slowly, he
will either be perplexed on rugged ground, or fall over some
steep place, or at least he will be carried where he has no
need to go.[330]
XLII. * * * can be said.
Then Laelius said: I now see the sort of politician you require, on whom
you would impose the office and task of government, which is what I
wished to understand.
He must be an almost unique specimen, said Africanus, for the task