Cicero's Tusculan Disputations
sides of a question, because you think that this is the best way of
getting at the truth.
And Philus said: Very well; I obey you, and wilfully, with my eyes
open, I will undertake this dirty business; because, since those who
seek for gold do not flinch at the sight of the mud, so we who are
searching for justice, which is far more precious than gold, are bound
to shrink from no annoyance. And I wish, as I am about to make use of
the antagonist arguments of a foreigner, I might also employ a foreign
language. The pleas, therefore, now to be urged by Lucius Furius Philus
are those [once employed by] the Greek Carneades, a man who was
accustomed to express whatever [served his turn].[335] * * *[336]Let it
be understood, therefore, that I by no means express my own sentiments,
but those of Carneades, in order that you may refute this philosopher,
who was wont to turn the best causes into joke, through the mere
wantonness of wit.
VI. He was a philosopher of the Academic School; and if any
one is ignorant of his great power, and eloquence, and
acuteness in arguing, he may learn it from the mention made
of him by Cicero or by Lucilius, when Neptune, discoursing on
a very difficult subject, declares that it cannot be
explained, not even if hell were to restore Carneades himself
for the purpose. This philosopher, having been sent by the
Athenians to Rome as an ambassador, discussed the subject of
justice very amply in the hearing of Galba and Cato the
Censor, who were the greatest orators of the day. And the
next day he overturned all his arguments by others of a
contrary tendency, and disparaged justice, which the day
before he had extolled; speaking not indeed with the gravity
of a philosopher whose wisdom ought to be steady, and whose
opinions unchangeable, but in a kind of rhetorical exercise
of arguing on each side--a practice which he was accustomed
to adopt, in order to be able to refute others who were
asserting anything. The arguments by which he disparaged
justice are mentioned by Lucius Furius in Cicero; I suppose,
since he was discussing the Commonwealth, in order to
introduce a defence and panegyric of that quality without
which he did not think a commonwealth could be administered.
But Carneades, in order to refute Aristotle and Plato, the
advocates of justice, collected in his first argument
everything that was in the habit of being advanced on behalf
of justice, in order afterward to be able to overturn it, as
he did.
VII. Many philosophers indeed, and especially Plato and
Aristotle, have spoken a great deal of justice, inculcating
that virtue, and extolling it with the highest praise, as
giving to every one what belongs to him, as preserving equity
in all things, and urging that while the other virtues are,
as it were, silent and shut up, justice is the only one which
is not absorbed in considerations of self-interest, and which
is not secret, but finds its whole field for exercise
out-of-doors, and is desirous of doing good and serving as
many people as possible; as if, forsooth, justice ought to
exist in judges only, and in men invested with a certain
authority, and not in every one! But there is no one, not
even a man of the lowest class, or a beggar, who is destitute
of opportunities of displaying justice. But because these
philosophers knew not what its essence was, or whence it
proceeded, or what its employment was, they attributed that
first of all virtues, which is the common good of all men, to
a few only, and asserted that it aimed at no advantage of its
own, but was anxious only for that of others. So it was well
that Carneades, a man of the greatest genius and acuteness,
refuted their assertions, and overthrew that justice which
had no firm foundation; not because he thought justice itself
deserving of blame, but in order to show that those its
defenders had brought forward no trustworthy or strong
arguments in its behalf.
Justice looks out-of-doors, and is prominent and conspicuous
in its whole essence.
Which virtue, beyond all others, wholly devotes and dedicates
itself to the advantage of others.
VIII. * * * Both to discover and maintain. While the other, Aristotle,
has filled four large volumes with a discussion on abstract justice.
For I did not expect anything grand or magnificent from Chrysippus,
who, after his usual fashion, examines everything rather by the
signification of words than the reality of things. But it was surely
worthy of those heroes of philosophy to ennoble by their genius a
virtue so eminently beneficent and liberal, which everywhere exalts the
social interests above the selfish, and teaches us to love others
rather than ourselves. It was worthy of their genius, we say, to
elevate this virtue to a divine throne, not far from that of Wisdom.
And certainly they neither wanted the will to accomplish this (for what
else could be the cause of their writing on the subject, or what could
have been their design?) nor the genius, in which they excelled all
men. But the weakness of their cause was too great for either their
intention or their eloquence to make it popular. In fact, this justice
on which we reason is a civil right, but no natural one; for if it were
natural and universal, then justice and injustice would be recognized
similarly by all men, just as the heat and cold, sweetness and
bitterness.
IX. Now, if any one, carried in that chariot of winged serpents of
which the poet Pacuvius makes mention, could take his flight over all
nations and cities, and accurately observe their proceedings, he would
see that the sense of justice and right varies in different regions. In
the first place, he would behold among the unchangeable people of
Egypt, which preserves in its archives the memory of so many ages and
events, a bull adored as a Deity, under the name of Apis, and a
multitude of other monsters, and all kinds of animals admitted by the
same nation into the number of the Gods.
In the next place, he would see in Greece, as among ourselves,
magnificent temples consecrated by images in human form, which the
Persians regarded as impious; and it is affirmed that the sole motive
of Xerxes for commanding the conflagration of the Athenian temples was
the belief that it was a superstitious sacrilege to keep confined
within narrow walls the Gods, whose proper home was the entire
universe. But afterward Philip, in his hostile projects against the
Persians, and Alexander, who carried them into execution, alleged this
plea for war, that they were desirous to avenge the temples of Greece,
which the Greeks had thought proper never to rebuild, that this
monument of the impiety of the Persians might always remain before the
eyes of their posterity.
How many--such as the inhabitants of Taurica along the Euxine Sea; as
the King of Egypt, Busiris; as the Gauls and the Carthaginians--have
thought it exceedingly pious and agreeable to the Gods to sacrifice
men! And, besides, the customs of life are so various that the Cretans
and AEtolians regard robbery as honorable. And the Lacedaemonians say
that their territory extends to all places which they can touch with a
lance. The Athenians had a custom of swearing, by a public
proclamation, that all the lands which produced olives and corn were
their own. The Gauls consider it a base employment to raise corn by
agricultural labor, and go with arms in their hands, and mow down the
harvests of neighboring peoples. But we ourselves, the most equitable
of all nations, who, in order to raise the value of our vines and
olives, do not permit the races beyond the Alps to cultivate either
vineyards or oliveyards, are said in this matter to act with prudence,
but not with justice. You see, then, that wisdom and policy are not
always the same as equity. And Lycurgus, that famous inventor of a most
admirable jurisprudence and most wholesome laws, gave the lands of the
rich to be cultivated by the common people, who were reduced to
slavery.
X. If I were to describe the diverse kinds of laws, institutions,
manners, and customs, not only as they vary in the numerous nations,
but as they vary likewise in single cities--in this one of ours, for
example--I could prove that they have had a thousand revolutions. For
instance, that eminent expositor of our laws who sits in the present
company--I mean Manilius--if you were to consult him relative to the
legacies and inheritances of women, he would tell you that the present
law is quite different from that he was accustomed to plead in his
youth, before the Voconian enactment came into force--an edict which
was passed in favor of the interests of the men, but which is evidently
full of injustice with regard to women. For why should a woman be
disabled from inheriting property? Why can a vestal virgin become an
heir, while her mother cannot? And why, admitting that it is necessary
to set some limit to the wealth of women, should Crassus's daughter, if
she be his only child, inherit thousands without offending the law,
while my daughter can only receive a small share in a bequest.[337]
* * *
XI. * * * [If this justice were natural, innate, and universal, all men
would admit the same] law and right, and the same men would not enact
different laws at different times. If a just man and a virtuous man is
bound to obey the laws, I ask, what laws do you mean? Do you intend all
the laws indifferently? But neither does virtue permit this inconstancy
in moral obligation, nor is such a variation compatible with natural
conscience. The laws are, therefore, based not on our sense of justice,
but on our fear of punishment. There is, therefore, no natural justice;
and hence it follows that men cannot be just by nature.
Are men, then, to say that variations indeed do exist in the laws, but
that men who are virtuous through natural conscience follow that which
is really justice, and not a mere semblance and disguise, and that it
is the distinguishing characteristic of the truly just and virtuous man
to render every one his due rights? Are we, then, to attribute the
first of these characteristics to animals? For not only men of moderate
abilities, but even first-rate sages and philosophers, as Pythagoras
and Empedocles, declare that all kinds of living creatures have a right
to the same justice. They declare that inexpiable penalties impend over
those who have done violence to any animal whatsoever. It is,
therefore, a crime to injure an animal, and the perpetrator of such
crime[338] * * *
XII. For when he[339] inquired of a pirate by what right he
dared to infest the sea with his little brigantine: "By the
same right," he replied, "which is your warrant for
conquering the world." * * *
Wisdom and prudence instruct us by all means to increase our power,
riches, and estates. For by what means could this same Alexander, that
illustrious general, who extended his empire over all Asia, without
violating the property of other men, have acquired such universal
dominion, enjoyed so many pleasures, such great power, and reigned
without bound or limit?
But justice commands us to have mercy upon all men, to consult the
interests of the whole human race, to give to every one his due, and
injure no sacred, public, or foreign rights, and to forbear touching
what does not belong to us. What is the result, then? If you obey the
dictates of wisdom, then wealth, power, riches, honors, provinces, and
kingdoms, from all classes, peoples, and nations, are to be aimed at.