Cicero's Tusculan Disputations
inevitable, but often even desirable; but when a state is put
an end to, it is destroyed, extinguished. It is in some
degree, to compare small things with great, as if this whole
world were to perish and fall to pieces."
In his treatise on the Commonwealth, Cicero says those wars
are unjust which are undertaken without reason. Again, after
a few sentences, he adds, No war is considered just unless it
be formally announced and declared, and unless it be to
obtain restitution of what has been taken away.
But our nation, by defending its allies, has now become the
master of all the whole world.
XXIV. Also, in that same treatise on the Commonwealth, he
argues most strenuously and vigorously in the cause of
justice against injustice. And since, when a little time
before the part of injustice was upheld against justice, and
the doctrine was urged that a republic could not prosper and
flourish except by injustice, this was put forward as the
strongest argument, that it was unjust for men to serve other
men as their masters; but that unless a dominant state, such
as a great republic, acted on this injustice, it could not
govern its provinces; answer was made on behalf of justice,
that it was just that it should be so, because slavery is
advantageous to such men, and their interests are consulted
by a right course of conduct--that is, by the license of
doing injury being taken from the wicked--and they will fare
better when subjugated, because when not subjugated they
fared worse: and to confirm this reasoning, a noble instance,
taken, as it were, from nature, was added, and it was said,
Why, then, does God govern man, and why does the mind govern
the body, and reason govern lust, and the other vicious parts
of the mind?
XXV. Hear what Tully says more plainly still in the third
book of his treatise on the Commonwealth, when discussing the
reasons for government. Do we not, says he, see that nature
herself has given the power of dominion to everything that is
best, to the extreme advantage of what is subjected to it?
Why, then, does God govern man, and why does the mind govern
the body, and reason govern lust and passion and the other
vicious parts of the same mind? Listen thus far; for
presently he adds, But still there are dissimilarities to be
recognized in governing and in obeying. For as the mind is
said to govern the body, and also to govern lust, still it
governs the body as a king governs his subjects, or a parent
his children; but it governs lust as a master governs his
slaves, because it restrains and breaks it. The authority of
kings, of generals, of magistrates, of fathers, and of
nations, rules their subjects and allies as the mind rules
bodies; but masters control their slaves, as the best part of
the mind--that is to say, wisdom--controls the vicious and
weak parts of itself, such as lust, passion, and the other
perturbations.
For there is a kind of unjust slavery when those belong to
some one else who might be their own masters; but when those
are slaves who cannot govern themselves, there is no injury
done.
XXVI. If, says Carneades, you were to know that an asp was
lying hidden anywhere, and that some one who did not know it
was going to sit upon it, whose death would be a gain to you,
you would act wickedly if you did not warn him not to sit
down. Still, you would not be liable to punishment; for who
could prove that you had known? But we are bringing forward
too many instances; for it is plain that unless equity, good
faith, and justice proceed from nature, and if all these
things are referred to interest, a good man cannot be found.
And on these topics a great deal is said by Laelius in our
treatise on the Republic.
If, as we are reminded by you, we have spoken well in that
treatise, when we said that nothing is good excepting what is
honorable, and nothing bad excepting what is disgraceful.
* * *
XXVII. I am glad that you approve of the doctrine that the
affection borne to our children is implanted by nature;
indeed, if it be not, there can be no conection between man
and man which has its origin in nature. And if there be not,
then there is an end of all society in life. May it turn out
well, says Carneades, speaking shamelessly, but still more
sensibly than my friend Lucius or Patro: for, as they refer
everything to themselves, do they think that anything is ever
done for the sake of another? And when they say that a man
ought to be good, in order to avoid misfortune, not because
it is right by nature, they do not perceive that they are
speaking of a cunning man, not of a good one. But these
arguments are argued, I think, in those books by praising
which you have given me spirits.
In which I agree that an anxious and hazardous justice is not
that of a wise man.
XXVIII. And again, in Cicero, that same advocate of justice,
Laelius, says, Virtue is clearly eager for honor, nor has she
any other reward; which, however, she accepts easily, and
exacts without bitterness. And in another place the same
Laelius says:
When a man is inspired by virtue such as this, what bribes can you
offer him, what treasures, what thrones, what empires? He considers
these but mortal goods, and esteems his own divine. And if the
ingratitude of the people, and the envy of his competitors, or the
violence of powerful enemies, despoil his virtue of its earthly
recompense, he still enjoys a thousand consolations in the approbation
of conscience, and sustains himself by contemplating the beauty of
moral rectitude.
XXIX. * * * This virtue, in order to be true, must be universal.
Tiberius Gracchus continued faithful to his fellow-citizens, but he
violated the rights and treaties guaranteed to our allies and the Latin
peoples. But if this habit of arbitrary violence begins to extend
itself further, and perverts our authority, leading it from right to
violence, so that those who had voluntarily obeyed us are only
restrained by fear, then, although we, during our days, may escape the
peril, yet am I solicitous respecting the safety of our posterity and
the immortality of the Commonwealth itself, which, doubtless, might
become perpetual and invincible if our people would maintain their
ancient institutions and manners.
XXX. When Laelius had ceased to speak, all those that were present
expressed the extreme pleasure they found in his discourse. But Scipio,
more affected than the rest, and ravished with the delight of sympathy,
exclaimed: You have pleaded, my Laelius, many causes with an eloquence
superior to that of Servius Galba, our colleague, whom you used during
his life to prefer to all others, even to the Attic orators [and never
did I hear you speak with more energy than to-day, while pleading the
cause of justice][345] * * *
* * * That two things were wanting to enable him to speak in
public and in the forum, confidence and voice.
XXXI. * * * This justice, continued Scipio, is the very foundation of
lawful government in political constitutions. Can we call the State of
Agrigentum a commonwealth, where all men are oppressed by the cruelty
of a single tyrant--where there is no universal bond of right, nor
social consent and fellowship, which should belong to every people,
properly so named? It is the same in Syracuse--that illustrious city
which Timaeus calls the greatest of the Grecian towns. It was indeed a
most beautiful city; and its admirable citadel, its canals distributed
through all its districts, its broad streets, its porticoes, its
temples, and its walls, gave Syracuse the appearance of a most
flourishing state. But while Dionysius its tyrant reigned there,
nothing of all its wealth belonged to the people, and the people were
nothing better than the slaves of one master. Thus, wherever I behold a
tyrant, I know that the social constitution must be not merely vicious
and corrupt, as I stated yesterday, but in strict truth no social
constitution at all.
XXXII. _Laelius._ You have spoken admirably, my Scipio, and I see the
point of your observations.
_Scipio._ You grant, then, that a state which is entirely in the power
of a faction cannot justly be entitled a political community?
_Laelius._ That is evident.
_Scipio._ You judge most correctly. For what was the State of Athens
when, during the great Peloponnesian war, she fell under the unjust
domination of the thirty tyrants? The antique glory of that city, the
imposing aspect of its edifices, its theatre, its gymnasium, its
porticoes, its temples, its citadel, the admirable sculptures of
Phidias, and the magnificent harbor of Piraeus--did they constitute it a
commonwealth?
_Laelius._ Certainly not, because these did not constitute the real
welfare of the community.
_Scipio._ And at Rome, when the decemvirs ruled without appeal from
their decisions, in the third year of their power, had not liberty lost
all its securities and all its blessings?
_Laelius._ Yes; the welfare of the community was no longer consulted,
and the people soon roused themselves, and recovered their appropriate
rights.
XXXIII. _Scipio._ I now come to the third, or democratical, form of
government, in which a considerable difficulty presents itself, because
all things are there said to lie at the disposition of the people, and
are carried into execution just as they please. Here the populace
inflict punishments at their pleasure, and act, and seize, and keep
possession, and distribute property, without let or hinderance. Can you
deny, my Laelius, that this is a fair definition of a democracy, where
the people are all in all, and where the people constitute the State?
_Laelius._ There is no political constitution to which I more absolutely
deny the name of a _commonwealth_ than that in which all things lie in
the power of the multitude. If a commonwealth, which implies the
welfare of the entire community, could not exist in Agrigentum,
Syracuse, or Athens when tyrants reigned over them--if it could not
exist in Rome when under the oligarchy of the decemvirs--neither do I
see how this sacred name of commonwealth can be applied to a democracy
and the sway of the mob; because, in the first place, my Scipio, I
build on your own admirable definition, that there can be no community,
properly so called, unless it be regulated by a combination of rights.
And, by this definition, it appears that a multitude of men may be just
as tyrannical as a single despot; and it is so much the worse, since no
monster can be more barbarous than the mob, which assumes the name and
appearance of the people. Nor is it at all reasonable, since the laws
place the property of madmen in the hands of their sane relations, that
we should do the [very reverse in politics, and throw the property of
the sane into the hands of the mad multitude][346] * * *
XXXIV. * * * [It is far more rational] to assert that a wise and
virtuous aristocratical government deserves the title of a
commonwealth, as it approaches to the nature of a kingdom.
And much more so in my opinion, said Mummius. For the unity of power
often exposes a king to become a despot; but when an aristocracy,
consisting of many virtuous men, exercise power, that is the most
fortunate circumstance possible for any state. However this be, I much
prefer royalty to democracy; for that is the third kind of government