Euthyphro
suffering?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the same holds as in the previous instances; the state of
being loved follows the act of being loved, and not the act the state.
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And what do you say of piety, Euthyphro: is not piety,
according to your definition, loved by all the gods?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Because it is pious or holy, or for some other reason?
EUTHYPHRO: No, that is the reason.
SOCRATES: It is loved because it is holy, not holy because it is loved?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And that which is dear to the gods is loved by them, and is in
a state to be loved of them because it is loved of them?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then that which is dear to the gods, Euthyphro, is not holy,
nor is that which is holy loved of God, as you affirm; but they are two
different things.
EUTHYPHRO: How do you mean, Socrates?
SOCRATES: I mean to say that the holy has been acknowledged by us to be
loved of God because it is holy, not to be holy because it is loved.
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: But that which is dear to the gods is dear to them because it
is loved by them, not loved by them because it is dear to them.
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: But, friend Euthyphro, if that which is holy is the same with
that which is dear to God, and is loved because it is holy, then that
which is dear to God would have been loved as being dear to God; but if
that which is dear to God is dear to him because loved by him, then that
which is holy would have been holy because loved by him. But now you see
that the reverse is the case, and that they are quite different from
one another. For one (theophiles) is of a kind to be loved cause it
is loved, and the other (osion) is loved because it is of a kind to
be loved. Thus you appear to me, Euthyphro, when I ask you what is
the essence of holiness, to offer an attribute only, and not the
essence--the attribute of being loved by all the gods. But you still
refuse to explain to me the nature of holiness. And therefore, if you
please, I will ask you not to hide your treasure, but to tell me once
more what holiness or piety really is, whether dear to the gods or not
(for that is a matter about which we will not quarrel); and what is
impiety?
EUTHYPHRO: I really do not know, Socrates, how to express what I mean.
For somehow or other our arguments, on whatever ground we rest them,
seem to turn round and walk away from us.
SOCRATES: Your words, Euthyphro, are like the handiwork of my ancestor
Daedalus; and if I were the sayer or propounder of them, you might say
that my arguments walk away and will not remain fixed where they are
placed because I am a descendant of his. But now, since these notions
are your own, you must find some other gibe, for they certainly, as you
yourself allow, show an inclination to be on the move.
EUTHYPHRO: Nay, Socrates, I shall still say that you are the Daedalus
who sets arguments in motion; not I, certainly, but you make them
move or go round, for they would never have stirred, as far as I am
concerned.
SOCRATES: Then I must be a greater than Daedalus: for whereas he only
made his own inventions to move, I move those of other people as well.
And the beauty of it is, that I would rather not. For I would give the
wisdom of Daedalus, and the wealth of Tantalus, to be able to detain
them and keep them fixed. But enough of this. As I perceive that you are
lazy, I will myself endeavour to show you how you might instruct me in
the nature of piety; and I hope that you will not grudge your labour.
Tell me, then--Is not that which is pious necessarily just?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And is, then, all which is just pious? or, is that which is
pious all just, but that which is just, only in part and not all, pious?
EUTHYPHRO: I do not understand you, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And yet I know that you are as much wiser than I am, as you
are younger. But, as I was saying, revered friend, the abundance of your
wisdom makes you lazy. Please to exert yourself, for there is no
real difficulty in understanding me. What I mean I may explain by an
illustration of what I do not mean. The poet (Stasinus) sings--
'Of Zeus, the author and creator of all these things, You will not tell:
for where there is fear there is also reverence.'
Now I disagree with this poet. Shall I tell you in what respect?
EUTHYPHRO: By all means.
SOCRATES: I should not say that where there is fear there is also
reverence; for I am sure that many persons fear poverty and disease, and
the like evils, but I do not perceive that they reverence the objects of
their fear.
EUTHYPHRO: Very true.
SOCRATES: But where reverence is, there is fear; for he who has a
feeling of reverence and shame about the commission of any action, fears
and is afraid of an ill reputation.
EUTHYPHRO: No doubt.
SOCRATES: Then we are wrong in saying that where there is fear there
is also reverence; and we should say, where there is reverence there is
also fear. But there is not always reverence where there is fear; for
fear is a more extended notion, and reverence is a part of fear, just as
the odd is a part of number, and number is a more extended notion than
the odd. I suppose that you follow me now?
EUTHYPHRO: Quite well.
SOCRATES: That was the sort of question which I meant to raise when
I asked whether the just is always the pious, or the pious always the
just; and whether there may not be justice where there is not piety; for
justice is the more extended notion of which piety is only a part. Do
you dissent?
EUTHYPHRO: No, I think that you are quite right.
SOCRATES: Then, if piety is a part of justice, I suppose that we should
enquire what part? If you had pursued the enquiry in the previous cases;
for instance, if you had asked me what is an even number, and what part
of number the even is, I should have had no difficulty in replying,
a number which represents a figure having two equal sides. Do you not
agree?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I quite agree.
SOCRATES: In like manner, I want you to tell me what part of justice
is piety or holiness, that I may be able to tell Meletus not to do me
injustice, or indict me for impiety, as I am now adequately instructed
by you in the nature of piety or holiness, and their opposites.
EUTHYPHRO: Piety or holiness, Socrates, appears to me to be that part of
justice which attends to the gods, as there is the other part of justice
which attends to men.
SOCRATES: That is good, Euthyphro; yet still there is a little point
about which I should like to have further information, What is the
meaning of 'attention'? For attention can hardly be used in the same
sense when applied to the gods as when applied to other things. For
instance, horses are said to require attention, and not every person is
able to attend to them, but only a person skilled in horsemanship. Is it
not so?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: I should suppose that the art of horsemanship is the art of
attending to horses?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Nor is every one qualified to attend to dogs, but only the
huntsman?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: And I should also conceive that the art of the huntsman is the
art of attending to dogs?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: As the art of the oxherd is the art of attending to oxen?
EUTHYPHRO: Very true.
SOCRATES: In like manner holiness or piety is the art of attending to
the gods?--that would be your meaning, Euthyphro?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And is not attention always designed for the good or benefit
of that to which the attention is given? As in the case of horses,
you may observe that when attended to by the horseman's art they are
benefited and improved, are they not?
EUTHYPHRO: True.
SOCRATES: As the dogs are benefited by the huntsman's art, and the oxen
by the art of the oxherd, and all other things are tended or attended
for their good and not for their hurt?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly, not for their hurt.
SOCRATES: But for their good?
EUTHYPHRO: Of course.
SOCRATES: And does piety or holiness, which has been defined to be the
art of attending to the gods, benefit or improve them? Would you say
that when you do a holy act you make any of the gods better?
EUTHYPHRO: No, no; that was certainly not what I meant.
SOCRATES: And I, Euthyphro, never supposed that you did. I asked you the
question about the nature of the attention, because I thought that you
did not.
EUTHYPHRO: You do me justice, Socrates; that is not the sort of
attention which I mean.
SOCRATES: Good: but I must still ask what is this attention to the gods
which is called piety?
EUTHYPHRO: It is such, Socrates, as servants show to their masters.
SOCRATES: I understand--a sort of ministration to the gods.
EUTHYPHRO: Exactly.
SOCRATES: Medicine is also a sort of ministration or service, having in
view the attainment of some object--would you not say of health?
EUTHYPHRO: I should.
SOCRATES: Again, there is an art which ministers to the ship-builder
with a view to the attainment of some result?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates, with a view to the building of a ship.
SOCRATES: As there is an art which ministers to the house-builder with a
view to the building of a house?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And now tell me, my good friend, about the art which ministers
to the gods: what work does that help to accomplish? For you must surely
know if, as you say, you are of all men living the one who is best
instructed in religion.
EUTHYPHRO: And I speak the truth, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Tell me then, oh tell me--what is that fair work which the
gods do by the help of our ministrations?
EUTHYPHRO: Many and fair, Socrates, are the works which they do.
SOCRATES: Why, my friend, and so are those of a general. But the chief
of them is easily told. Would you not say that victory in war is the
chief of them?
EUTHYPHRO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Many and fair, too, are the works of the husbandman, if I
am not mistaken; but his chief work is the production of food from the
earth?
EUTHYPHRO: Exactly.
SOCRATES: And of the many and fair things done by the gods, which is the
chief or principal one?
EUTHYPHRO: I have told you already, Socrates, that to learn all these
things accurately will be very tiresome. Let me simply say that piety or
holiness is learning how to please the gods in word and deed, by prayers
and sacrifices. Such piety is the salvation of families and states,
just as the impious, which is unpleasing to the gods, is their ruin and
destruction.
SOCRATES: I think that you could have answered in much fewer words the
chief question which I asked, Euthyphro, if you had chosen. But I see
plainly that you are not disposed to instruct me--clearly not: else why,
when we reached the point, did you turn aside? Had you only answered
me I should have truly learned of you by this time the nature of
piety. Now, as the asker of a question is necessarily dependent on the
answerer, whither he leads I must follow; and can only ask again, what
is the pious, and what is piety? Do you mean that they are a sort of
science of praying and sacrificing?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I do.
SOCRATES: And sacrificing is giving to the gods, and prayer is asking of
the gods?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Upon this view, then, piety is a science of asking and giving?
EUTHYPHRO: You understand me capitally, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Yes, my friend; the reason is that I am a votary of your
science, and give my mind to it, and therefore nothing which you say
will be thrown away upon me. Please then to tell me, what is the nature
of this service to the gods? Do you mean that we prefer requests and
give gifts to them?
EUTHYPHRO: Yes, I do.