Gorgias
mob-orator.
SOCRATES: That was the reason, Callicles, why I scared Polus and
Gorgias, until they were too modest to say what they thought; but you
will not be too modest and will not be scared, for you are a brave man.
And now, answer my question.
CALLICLES: I answer, that even the scratcher would live pleasantly.
SOCRATES: And if pleasantly, then also happily?
CALLICLES: To be sure.
SOCRATES: But what if the itching is not confined to the head? Shall I
pursue the question? And here, Callicles, I would have you consider how
you would reply if consequences are pressed upon you, especially if in
the last resort you are asked, whether the life of a catamite is not
terrible, foul, miserable? Or would you venture to say, that they too
are happy, if they only get enough of what they want?
CALLICLES: Are you not ashamed, Socrates, of introducing such topics
into the argument?
SOCRATES: Well, my fine friend, but am I the introducer of these
topics, or he who says without any qualification that all who feel
pleasure in whatever manner are happy, and who admits of no distinction
between good and bad pleasures? And I would still ask, whether you say
that pleasure and good are the same, or whether there is some pleasure
which is not a good?
CALLICLES: Well, then, for the sake of consistency, I will say that
they are the same.
SOCRATES: You are breaking the original agreement, Callicles, and will
no longer be a satisfactory companion in the search after truth, if you
say what is contrary to your real opinion.
CALLICLES: Why, that is what you are doing too, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Then we are both doing wrong. Still, my dear friend, I would
ask you to consider whether pleasure, from whatever source derived, is
the good; for, if this be true, then the disagreeable consequences
which have been darkly intimated must follow, and many others.
CALLICLES: That, Socrates, is only your opinion.
SOCRATES: And do you, Callicles, seriously maintain what you are
saying?
CALLICLES: Indeed I do.
SOCRATES: Then, as you are in earnest, shall we proceed with the
argument?
CALLICLES: By all means. (Or, “I am in profound earnest.”)
SOCRATES: Well, if you are willing to proceed, determine this question
for me:—There is something, I presume, which you would call knowledge?
CALLICLES: There is.
SOCRATES: And were you not saying just now, that some courage implied
knowledge?
CALLICLES: I was.
SOCRATES: And you were speaking of courage and knowledge as two things
different from one another?
CALLICLES: Certainly I was.
SOCRATES: And would you say that pleasure and knowledge are the same,
or not the same?
CALLICLES: Not the same, O man of wisdom.
SOCRATES: And would you say that courage differed from pleasure?
CALLICLES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Well, then, let us remember that Callicles, the Acharnian,
says that pleasure and good are the same; but that knowledge and
courage are not the same, either with one another, or with the good.
CALLICLES: And what does our friend Socrates, of Foxton, say—does he
assent to this, or not?
SOCRATES: He does not assent; neither will Callicles, when he sees
himself truly. You will admit, I suppose, that good and evil fortune
are opposed to each other?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And if they are opposed to each other, then, like health and
disease, they exclude one another; a man cannot have them both, or be
without them both, at the same time?
CALLICLES: What do you mean?
SOCRATES: Take the case of any bodily affection:—a man may have the
complaint in his eyes which is called ophthalmia?
CALLICLES: To be sure.
SOCRATES: But he surely cannot have the same eyes well and sound at the
same time?
CALLICLES: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: And when he has got rid of his ophthalmia, has he got rid of
the health of his eyes too? Is the final result, that he gets rid of
them both together?
CALLICLES: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: That would surely be marvellous and absurd?
CALLICLES: Very.
SOCRATES: I suppose that he is affected by them, and gets rid of them
in turns?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And he may have strength and weakness in the same way, by
fits?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Or swiftness and slowness?
CALLICLES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And does he have and not have good and happiness, and their
opposites, evil and misery, in a similar alternation? (Compare
Republic.)
CALLICLES: Certainly he has.
SOCRATES: If then there be anything which a man has and has not at the
same time, clearly that cannot be good and evil—do we agree? Please not
to answer without consideration.
CALLICLES: I entirely agree.
SOCRATES: Go back now to our former admissions.—Did you say that to
hunger, I mean the mere state of hunger, was pleasant or painful?
CALLICLES: I said painful, but that to eat when you are hungry is
pleasant.
SOCRATES: I know; but still the actual hunger is painful: am I not
right?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And thirst, too, is painful?
CALLICLES: Yes, very.
SOCRATES: Need I adduce any more instances, or would you agree that all
wants or desires are painful?
CALLICLES: I agree, and therefore you need not adduce any more
instances.
SOCRATES: Very good. And you would admit that to drink, when you are
thirsty, is pleasant?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And in the sentence which you have just uttered, the word
“thirsty” implies pain?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the word “drinking” is expressive of pleasure, and of the
satisfaction of the want?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: There is pleasure in drinking?
CALLICLES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: When you are thirsty?
SOCRATES: And in pain?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Do you see the inference:—that pleasure and pain are
simultaneous, when you say that being thirsty, you drink? For are they
not simultaneous, and do they not affect at the same time the same
part, whether of the soul or the body?—which of them is affected cannot
be supposed to be of any consequence: Is not this true?
CALLICLES: It is.
SOCRATES: You said also, that no man could have good and evil fortune
at the same time?
CALLICLES: Yes, I did.
SOCRATES: But you admitted, that when in pain a man might also have
pleasure?
CALLICLES: Clearly.
SOCRATES: Then pleasure is not the same as good fortune, or pain the
same as evil fortune, and therefore the good is not the same as the
pleasant?
CALLICLES: I wish I knew, Socrates, what your quibbling means.
SOCRATES: You know, Callicles, but you affect not to know.
CALLICLES: Well, get on, and don’t keep fooling: then you will know
what a wiseacre you are in your admonition of me.
SOCRATES: Does not a man cease from his thirst and from his pleasure in
drinking at the same time?
CALLICLES: I do not understand what you are saying.
GORGIAS: Nay, Callicles, answer, if only for our sakes;—we should like
to hear the argument out.
CALLICLES: Yes, Gorgias, but I must complain of the habitual trifling
of Socrates; he is always arguing about little and unworthy questions.
GORGIAS: What matter? Your reputation, Callicles, is not at stake. Let
Socrates argue in his own fashion.
CALLICLES: Well, then, Socrates, you shall ask these little peddling
questions, since Gorgias wishes to have them.
SOCRATES: I envy you, Callicles, for having been initiated into the
great mysteries before you were initiated into the lesser. I thought
that this was not allowable. But to return to our argument:—Does not a
man cease from thirsting and from the pleasure of drinking at the same
moment?
CALLICLES: True.
SOCRATES: And if he is hungry, or has any other desire, does he not
cease from the desire and the pleasure at the same moment?
CALLICLES: Very true.
SOCRATES: Then he ceases from pain and pleasure at the same moment?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: But he does not cease from good and evil at the same moment,
as you have admitted: do you still adhere to what you said?
CALLICLES: Yes, I do; but what is the inference?
SOCRATES: Why, my friend, the inference is that the good is not the
same as the pleasant, or the evil the same as the painful; there is a
cessation of pleasure and pain at the same moment; but not of good and
evil, for they are different. How then can pleasure be the same as
good, or pain as evil? And I would have you look at the matter in
another light, which could hardly, I think, have been considered by you
when you identified them: Are not the good good because they have good
present with them, as the beautiful are those who have beauty present
with them?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And do you call the fools and cowards good men? For you were
saying just now that the courageous and the wise are the good—would you
not say so?
CALLICLES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And did you never see a foolish child rejoicing?
CALLICLES: Yes, I have.
SOCRATES: And a foolish man too?
CALLICLES: Yes, certainly; but what is your drift?
SOCRATES: Nothing particular, if you will only answer.
CALLICLES: Yes, I have.
SOCRATES: And did you ever see a sensible man rejoicing or sorrowing?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Which rejoice and sorrow most—the wise or the foolish?
CALLICLES: They are much upon a par, I think, in that respect.
SOCRATES: Enough: And did you ever see a coward in battle?
CALLICLES: To be sure.
SOCRATES: And which rejoiced most at the departure of the enemy, the
coward or the brave?
CALLICLES: I should say “most” of both; or at any rate, they rejoiced
about equally.
SOCRATES: No matter; then the cowards, and not only the brave, rejoice?
CALLICLES: Greatly.
SOCRATES: And the foolish; so it would seem?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And are only the cowards pained at the approach of their
enemies, or are the brave also pained?
CALLICLES: Both are pained.
SOCRATES: And are they equally pained?
CALLICLES: I should imagine that the cowards are more pained.
SOCRATES: And are they not better pleased at the enemy’s departure?
CALLICLES: I dare say.
SOCRATES: Then are the foolish and the wise and the cowards and the
brave all pleased and pained, as you were saying, in nearly equal
degree; but are the cowards more pleased and pained than the brave?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: But surely the wise and brave are the good, and the foolish
and the cowardly are the bad?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then the good and the bad are pleased and pained in a nearly
equal degree?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then are the good and bad good and bad in a nearly equal
degree, or have the bad the advantage both in good and evil? (i.e. in
having more pleasure and more pain.)
CALLICLES: I really do not know what you mean.
SOCRATES: Why, do you not remember saying that the good were good
because good was present with them, and the evil because evil; and that
pleasures were goods and pains evils?
CALLICLES: Yes, I remember.
SOCRATES: And are not these pleasures or goods present to those who
rejoice—if they do rejoice?
CALLICLES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good when goods are present with
them?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And those who are in pain have evil or sorrow present with
them?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And would you still say that the evil are evil by reason of
the presence of evil?
CALLICLES: I should.
SOCRATES: Then those who rejoice are good, and those who are in pain
evil?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: The degrees of good and evil vary with the degrees of
pleasure and of pain?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Have the wise man and the fool, the brave and the coward, joy
and pain in nearly equal degrees? or would you say that the coward has
more?
CALLICLES: I should say that he has.