Gorgias
SOCRATES: Help me then to draw out the conclusion which follows from
our admissions; for it is good to repeat and review what is good twice
and thrice over, as they say. Both the wise man and the brave man we
allow to be good?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the foolish man and the coward to be evil?
CALLICLES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And he who has joy is good?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And he who is in pain is evil?
CALLICLES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: The good and evil both have joy and pain, but, perhaps, the
evil has more of them?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then must we not infer, that the bad man is as good and bad
as the good, or, perhaps, even better?—is not this a further inference
which follows equally with the preceding from the assertion that the
good and the pleasant are the same:—can this be denied, Callicles?
CALLICLES: I have been listening and making admissions to you,
Socrates; and I remark that if a person grants you anything in play,
you, like a child, want to keep hold and will not give it back. But do
you really suppose that I or any other human being denies that some
pleasures are good and others bad?
SOCRATES: Alas, Callicles, how unfair you are! you certainly treat me
as if I were a child, sometimes saying one thing, and then another, as
if you were meaning to deceive me. And yet I thought at first that you
were my friend, and would not have deceived me if you could have
helped. But I see that I was mistaken; and now I suppose that I must
make the best of a bad business, as they said of old, and take what I
can get out of you.—Well, then, as I understand you to say, I may
assume that some pleasures are good and others evil?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: The beneficial are good, and the hurtful are evil?
CALLICLES: To be sure.
SOCRATES: And the beneficial are those which do some good, and the
hurtful are those which do some evil?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Take, for example, the bodily pleasures of eating and
drinking, which we were just now mentioning—you mean to say that those
which promote health, or any other bodily excellence, are good, and
their opposites evil?
CALLICLES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And in the same way there are good pains and there are evil
pains?
CALLICLES: To be sure.
SOCRATES: And ought we not to choose and use the good pleasures and
pains?
CALLICLES: Certainly.
SOCRATES: But not the evil?
CALLICLES: Clearly.
SOCRATES: Because, if you remember, Polus and I have agreed that all
our actions are to be done for the sake of the good;—and will you agree
with us in saying, that the good is the end of all our actions, and
that all our actions are to be done for the sake of the good, and not
the good for the sake of them?—will you add a third vote to our two?
CALLICLES: I will.
SOCRATES: Then pleasure, like everything else, is to be sought for the
sake of that which is good, and not that which is good for the sake of
pleasure?
CALLICLES: To be sure.
SOCRATES: But can every man choose what pleasures are good and what are
evil, or must he have art or knowledge of them in detail?
CALLICLES: He must have art.
SOCRATES: Let me now remind you of what I was saying to Gorgias and
Polus; I was saying, as you will not have forgotten, that there were
some processes which aim only at pleasure, and know nothing of a better
and worse, and there are other processes which know good and evil. And
I considered that cookery, which I do not call an art, but only an
experience, was of the former class, which is concerned with pleasure,
and that the art of medicine was of the class which is concerned with
the good. And now, by the god of friendship, I must beg you, Callicles,
not to jest, or to imagine that I am jesting with you; do not answer at
random and contrary to your real opinion—for you will observe that we
are arguing about the way of human life; and to a man who has any sense
at all, what question can be more serious than this?—whether he should
follow after that way of life to which you exhort me, and act what you
call the manly part of speaking in the assembly, and cultivating
rhetoric, and engaging in public affairs, according to the principles
now in vogue; or whether he should pursue the life of philosophy;—and
in what the latter way differs from the former. But perhaps we had
better first try to distinguish them, as I did before, and when we have
come to an agreement that they are distinct, we may proceed to consider
in what they differ from one another, and which of them we should
choose. Perhaps, however, you do not even now understand what I mean?
CALLICLES: No, I do not.
SOCRATES: Then I will explain myself more clearly: seeing that you and
I have agreed that there is such a thing as good, and that there is
such a thing as pleasure, and that pleasure is not the same as good,
and that the pursuit and process of acquisition of the one, that is
pleasure, is different from the pursuit and process of acquisition of
the other, which is good—I wish that you would tell me whether you
agree with me thus far or not—do you agree?
CALLICLES: I do.
SOCRATES: Then I will proceed, and ask whether you also agree with me,
and whether you think that I spoke the truth when I further said to
Gorgias and Polus that cookery in my opinion is only an experience, and
not an art at all; and that whereas medicine is an art, and attends to
the nature and constitution of the patient, and has principles of
action and reason in each case, cookery in attending upon pleasure
never regards either the nature or reason of that pleasure to which she
devotes herself, but goes straight to her end, nor ever considers or
calculates anything, but works by experience and routine, and just
preserves the recollection of what she has usually done when producing
pleasure. And first, I would have you consider whether I have proved
what I was saying, and then whether there are not other similar
processes which have to do with the soul—some of them processes of art,
making a provision for the soul’s highest interest—others despising the
interest, and, as in the previous case, considering only the pleasure
of the soul, and how this may be acquired, but not considering what
pleasures are good or bad, and having no other aim but to afford
gratification, whether good or bad. In my opinion, Callicles, there are
such processes, and this is the sort of thing which I term flattery,
whether concerned with the body or the soul, or whenever employed with
a view to pleasure and without any consideration of good and evil. And
now I wish that you would tell me whether you agree with us in this
notion, or whether you differ.
CALLICLES: I do not differ; on the contrary, I agree; for in that way I
shall soonest bring the argument to an end, and shall oblige my friend
Gorgias.
SOCRATES: And is this notion true of one soul, or of two or more?
CALLICLES: Equally true of two or more.
SOCRATES: Then a man may delight a whole assembly, and yet have no
regard for their true interests?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Can you tell me the pursuits which delight mankind—or rather,
if you would prefer, let me ask, and do you answer, which of them
belong to the pleasurable class, and which of them not? In the first
place, what say you of flute-playing? Does not that appear to be an art
which seeks only pleasure, Callicles, and thinks of nothing else?
CALLICLES: I assent.
SOCRATES: And is not the same true of all similar arts, as, for
example, the art of playing the lyre at festivals?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: And what do you say of the choral art and of dithyrambic
poetry?—are not they of the same nature? Do you imagine that Cinesias
the son of Meles cares about what will tend to the moral improvement of
his hearers, or about what will give pleasure to the multitude?
CALLICLES: There can be no mistake about Cinesias, Socrates.
SOCRATES: And what do you say of his father, Meles the harp-player? Did
he perform with any view to the good of his hearers? Could he be said
to regard even their pleasure? For his singing was an infliction to his
audience. And of harp-playing and dithyrambic poetry in general, what
would you say? Have they not been invented wholly for the sake of
pleasure?
CALLICLES: That is my notion of them.
SOCRATES: And as for the Muse of Tragedy, that solemn and august
personage—what are her aspirations? Is all her aim and desire only to
give pleasure to the spectators, or does she fight against them and
refuse to speak of their pleasant vices, and willingly proclaim in word
and song truths welcome and unwelcome?—which in your judgment is her
character?
CALLICLES: There can be no doubt, Socrates, that Tragedy has her face
turned towards pleasure and the gratification of the audience.
SOCRATES: And is not that the sort of thing, Callicles, which we were
just now describing as flattery?
CALLICLES: Quite true.
SOCRATES: Well now, suppose that we strip all poetry of song and rhythm
and metre, there will remain speech? (Compare Republic.)
CALLICLES: To be sure.
SOCRATES: And this speech is addressed to a crowd of people?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then poetry is a sort of rhetoric?
CALLICLES: True.
SOCRATES: And do not the poets in the theatres seem to you to be
rhetoricians?
CALLICLES: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then now we have discovered a sort of rhetoric which is
addressed to a crowd of men, women, and children, freemen and slaves.
And this is not much to our taste, for we have described it as having
the nature of flattery.
CALLICLES: Quite true.
SOCRATES: Very good. And what do you say of that other rhetoric which
addresses the Athenian assembly and the assemblies of freemen in other
states? Do the rhetoricians appear to you always to aim at what is
best, and do they seek to improve the citizens by their speeches, or
are they too, like the rest of mankind, bent upon giving them pleasure,
forgetting the public good in the thought of their own interest,
playing with the people as with children, and trying to amuse them, but
never considering whether they are better or worse for this?
CALLICLES: I must distinguish. There are some who have a real care of
the public in what they say, while others are such as you describe.
SOCRATES: I am contented with the admission that rhetoric is of two
sorts; one, which is mere flattery and disgraceful declamation; the
other, which is noble and aims at the training and improvement of the
souls of the citizens, and strives to say what is best, whether welcome
or unwelcome, to the audience; but have you ever known such a rhetoric;
or if you have, and can point out any rhetorician who is of this stamp,
who is he?
CALLICLES: But, indeed, I am afraid that I cannot tell you of any such
among the orators who are at present living.
SOCRATES: Well, then, can you mention any one of a former generation,
who may be said to have improved the Athenians, who found them worse
and made them better, from the day that he began to make speeches? for,
indeed, I do not know of such a man.
CALLICLES: What! did you never hear that Themistocles was a good man,
and Cimon and Miltiades and Pericles, who is just lately dead, and whom
you heard yourself?
SOCRATES: Yes, Callicles, they were good men, if, as you said at first,
true virtue consists only in the satisfaction of our own desires and
those of others; but if not, and if, as we were afterwards compelled to
acknowledge, the satisfaction of some desires makes us better, and of
others, worse, and we ought to gratify the one and not the other, and
there is an art in distinguishing them,—can you tell me of any of these
statesmen who did distinguish them?
CALLICLES: No, indeed, I cannot.