L. Annaeus Seneca on Benefits
senses, yet all men have not on that account as keen a sight as Lynceus,
so a man that is a fool has not all vices in so active and vigorous a
form as some persons have spine of them, yet he has them all. All vices
exist in all of them, yet all are not prominent in each individual. One
man is naturally prone to avarice, another is the slave of wine, a third
of lust; or, if not yet enslaved by these passions, he is so fashioned
by nature that this is the direction in which his character would
probably lead him. Therefore, to return to my original proposition,
every bad man is ungrateful, because he has the seeds of every villainy
in him; but he alone is rightly so called who is naturally inclined to
this vice. Upon such a person as this, therefore, I shall not bestow a
benefit. One who betrothed his daughter to an ill-tempered man from whom
many women had sought a divorce, would be held to have neglected her
interests; a man would be thought a bad father if he entrusted the care
of his patrimony to one who had lost his own family estate, and it would
be the act of a madman to make a will naming as the guardian of one's
son a man who had already defrauded other wards. So will that man be
said to bestow benefits as badly as possible, who chooses ungrateful
persons, in whose hands they will perish.
XXVIII. "The gods," it may be said, "bestow much, even upon the
ungrateful." But what they bestow they had prepared for the good, and
the bad have their share as well, because they cannot be separated. It
is better to benefit the bad as well, for the sake of benefiting the
good, than to stint the good for fear of benefiting the bad. Therefore
the gods have created all that you speak of, the day, the sun, the
alternations of winter and summer, the transitions through spring and
autumn from one extreme to the other, showers, drinking fountains, and
regularly blowing winds for the use of all alike; they could not except
individuals from the enjoyment of them. A king bestows honours upon
those who deserve them, but he gives largesse to the undeserving as
well. The thief, the bearer of false witness, and the adulterer, alike
receive the public grant of corn, and all are placed on the register
without any examination as to character; good and bad men share alike in
all the other privileges which a man receives, because he is a citizen,
not because he is a good man. God likewise has bestowed certain gifts
upon the entire human race, from which no one is shut out. Indeed, it
could not be arranged that the wind which was fair for good men should
be foul for bad ones, while it is for the good of all men that the seas
should be open for traffic and the kingdom of mankind be enlarged; nor
could any law be appointed for the showers, so that they should not fall
upon the fields of wicked and evil men. Some things are given to all
alike: cities are founded for good and bad men alike; works of genius
reach, by publication, even unworthy men; medicine points out the
means of health even to the wicked; no one has checked the making up of
wholesome remedies for fear that the undeserving should be healed. You
must seek for examination and preference of individuals in such things
as are bestowed separately upon those who are thought to deserve them;
not in these, which admit the mob to share them without distinction.
There is a great difference between not shutting a man out and choosing
him. Even a thief receives justice; even murderers enjoy the blessings
of peace; even those who have plundered others can recover their own
property; assassins and private bravoes are defended against the common
enemy by the city wall; the laws protect even those who have sinned most
deeply against them. There are some things which no man could obtain
unless they were given to all; you need not, therefore, cavil about
those matters in which all mankind is invited to share. As for things
which men receive or not at my discretion, I shall not bestow them upon
one whom I know to be ungrateful.
XXIX. "Shall we, then," argues he, "not give our advice to an ungrateful
man when he is at a loss, or refuse him a drink of water when he is
thirsty, or not show him the path when he has lost his way? or would you
do him these services and yet not give him anything?" Here I will draw
a distinction, or at any rate endeavour to do so. A benefit is a useful
service, yet all useful service is not a benefit; for some are so
trifling as not to claim the title of benefits. To produce a benefit two
conditions must concur. First, the importance of the thing given; for
some things fall short of the dignity of a benefit. Who ever called a
hunch of bread a benefit, or a farthing dole tossed to a beggar, or the
means of lighting a fire? yet sometimes these are of more value than the
most costly benefits; still their cheapness detracts from their value
even when, by the exigency of time, they are rendered essential. The
next condition, which is the most important of all, must necessarily be
present, namely, that I should confer the benefit for the sake of him
whom I wish to receive it, that I should judge him worthy of it, bestow
it of my own free will, and receive pleasure from my own gift, none
of which conditions are present in the cases of which we have just now
spoken; for we do not bestow such things as those upon these who are
worthy of them, but we give them carelessly, as trifles, and do not give
them so much to a man as to humanity.
XXX. I shall not deny that sometimes I would give even to the unworthy,
out of respect for others; as, for instance, in competition for public
offices, some of the basest of men are preferred on account of their
noble birth, to industrious men of no family, and that for good reasons;
for the memory of great virtues is sacred, and more men will take
pleasure in being good, if the respect felt for good men does not cease
with their lives. What made Cicero's son a consul, except his father?
What lately brought Cinna [Footnote: See Seneca on "Clemency," book i.,
ch. ix.] out of the camp of the enemy and raised him to the consulate?
What made Sextus Pompeius and the other Pompeii consuls, unless it was
the greatness of one man, who once was raised so high that, by his very
fall, he sufficiently exalted all his relatives. What lately made Fabius
Persicus a member of more than one college of priests, though even
profligates avoided his kiss? Was it not Verrucosus, and Allobrogicus,
and the three hundred who to serve their country blocked the invader's
path with the force of a single family? It is our duty to respect the
virtuous, not only when present with us, but also when removed from our
sight: as they have made it their study not to bestow their benefits
upon one age alone, but to leave them existing after they themselves
have passed away, so let us not confine our gratitude to a single
age. If a man has begotten great men, he deserves to receive benefits,
whatever he himself may be: he has given us worthy men. If a man
descends from glorious ancestors, whatever he himself may be, let him
find refuge under the shadow of his ancestry. As mean places are lighted
up by the rays of the sun, so let the degenerate shine in the light of
their forefathers.
XXXI. In this place, my Liberalis, I wish to speak in defence of the
gods. We sometimes say, "What could Providence mean by placing an
Arrhidaeus upon the throne?" Do you suppose that the crown was given
to Arrhidaeus? nay, it was given to his father and his brother. Why
did Heaven bestow the empire of the world upon Caius Caesar, the most
bloodthirsty of mankind, who was wont to order blood to be shed in his
presence as freely as if he wished to drink of it? Why, do you suppose
that it was given to him? It was given to his father, Germanicus, to his
grandfather, his great grandfather, and to others before them, no less
illustrious men, though they lived as private citizens on a footing
of equality with others. Why, when you yourself were making Mamercus
Scaurus consul, were you ignorant of his vices? did he himself conceal
them? did he wish to appear decent?
Did you admit a man who was so openly filthy to the fasces and the
tribunal? Yes, it was because you were thinking of the great old
Scaurus, the chief of the Senate, and were unwilling that his descendant
should be despised.
XXXII. It is probable that the gods act in the same manner, that they
show greater indulgence to some for the sake of their parents and
their ancestry, and to others for the sake of their children and
grandchildren, and a long line of descendants beyond them; for they
know the whole course of their works, and have constant access to the
knowledge of all that shall hereafter pass through their hands. These
things come upon us from the unknown future, and the gods have foreseen
and are familiar with the events by which we are startled. "Let these
men," says Providence, "be kings, because their ancestors were good
kings, because they regarded righteousness and temperance as the highest
rule of life, because they did not devote the state to themselves, but
devoted themselves to the state. Let these others reign, because some
one of their ancestors before them was a good man, who bore a soul
superior to fortune, who preferred to be conquered rather than to
conquer in civil strife, because it was more to the advantage of
the state. [Footnote: Gertz, "Stud. Crit," p. 159, note.] It was not
possible to make a sufficient return to him for this during so long a
time; let this other, therefore, out of regard for him, be chief of the
people, not because he knows how, or is capable, but because the other
has earned it for him. This man is misshapen, loathsome to look upon,
and will disgrace the insignia of his office. Men will presently blame
me, calling me blind and reckless, not knowing upon whom I am conferring
what ought to be given to the greatest and noblest of men; but I know
that, in giving this dignity to one man, I am paying an old debt to
another. How should the men of to-day know that ancient hero, who so
resolutely avoided the glory which pressed upon him, who went into
danger with the same look which other men wear when they have escaped
from danger, who never regarded his own interest as apart from that
of the commonwealth?" "Where," you ask, "or who is he? whence does
he come?" "You know him not; it lies with me to balance the debit and
credit account in such cases as these; I know how much I owe to each
man; I repay some after a long interval, others beforehand, according
as my opportunities and the exigencies of my social system permit."
I shall, therefore, sometimes bestow somewhat upon an ungrateful man,
though not for his own sake.
XXXIII. "What," argues he, "if you do not know whether your man be
ungrateful or grateful--will you wait until you know, or will you
not lose the opportunity of bestowing a benefit? To wait is a long
business--for, as Plato says, it is hard to form an opinion about the
human mind,--not to wait, is rash." To this objector we shall answer,
that we never should wait for absolute knowledge of the whole case,
since the discovery of truth is an arduous task, but should proceed
in the direction in which truth appeared to direct us. All our actions
proceed in this direction: it is thus that we sow seed, that we sail
upon the sea, that we serve in the army, marry, and bring up children.
The result of all these actions is uncertain, so we take that course
from which we believe that good results may be hoped for. Who can
guarantee a harvest to the sower, a harbour to the sailor, victory
to the soldier, a modest wife to the husband, dutiful children to the
father? We proceed in the way in which reason, not absolute truth,