L. Annaeus Seneca on Benefits
by slaves in chains, in huge flocks and herds which require provinces
and kingdoms for their pasture ground, in a household of servants, more
in number than some of the most warlike nations, or in a private house
whose extent surpasses that of a large city! After he has carefully
reviewed all his wealth, in what it is invested, and on what it is
spent, and has rendered himself proud by the thoughts of it, let him
compare what he has with what he wants: he becomes a poor man at once.
"Let me go: restore me to those riches of mine. I know the kingdom of
wisdom, which is great and stable: I possess every thing, and in such a
manner that it belongs to all men nevertheless."
XI. When, therefore, Gaius Caesar offered him two hundred thousand
sesterces, he laughingly refused it, thinking it unworthy of himself to
boast of having refused so small a sum. Ye gods and goddesses, what a
mean mind must the emperor have had, if he hoped either to honour or to
corrupt him. I must here repeat a proof of his magnanimity. I have
heard that when he was expressing his wonder at the folly of Gaius at
supposing that he could be influenced by such a bribe, he said, "If
he meant to tempt me, he ought to have tried to do so by offering his
entire kingdom."
XII. It is possible, then, to give something to the wise man, although
all things belong to the wise man. Similarly, though we declare that
friends have all things in common, it is nevertheless possible to give
something to a friend: for I have not everything in common with a friend
in the same manner as with a partner, where one part belongs to him,
and another to me, but rather as a father and a mother possess their
children in common when they have two, not each parent possessing one
child, but each possessing both. First of all I will prove that any
chance would-be partner of mine has nothing in common with me: and why?
Because this community of goods can only exist between wise men, who
are alone capable of friendship: other men can neither be friends nor
partners one to another. In the next place, things may be owned in
common in various ways. The knights' seats in the theatre belong to all
the Roman knights; yet of these the seat which I occupy becomes my own,
and if I yield it up to any one, although I only yield him a thing
which we own in common, still I appear to have given him something. Some
things belong to certain persons under particular conditions. I have
a place among the knights, not to sell, or to let, or to dwell in, but
simply to see the spectacle from, wherefore I do not tell an untruth
when I say that I have a place among the knights' seats. Yet if, when I
come into the theatre, the knights' seats are full, I both have a seat
there by right, because I have the privilege of sitting there, and I
have not a seat there, because my seat is occupied by those who share my
right to those places. Suppose that the same thing takes place between
friends; whatever our friend possesses, is common to us, but is the
property of him who owns it; I cannot make use of it against his will.
"You are laughing at me," say you; "if what belongs to my friend is
mine, I am able to sell it." You are not able; for you are not able to
sell your place among the knights' seats, and yet they are in common
between you and the other knights. Consequently, the fact that you
cannot sell a thing, or consume it, or exchange it for the better or the
worse does not prove that it is not yours; for that which is yours under
certain conditions is yours nevertheless.
XIII. I have received, but certainly not less. Not to detain you longer
than is necessary, a benefit can be no more than a benefit; but the
means employed to convey benefits may be both greater and more numerous.
I mean those things by which kindness expresses and gives vent to
itself, like lovers, whose many kisses and close embraces do not
increase their love but give it play.
XIV. The next question which arises has been thoroughly threshed out in
the former books, so here it shall only be touched on shortly; for the
arguments which have been used for other cases can be transferred to it.
The question is, whether one who has done everything in his power to
return a benefit, has returned it. "You may know," says our adversary,
"that he has not returned it, because he did everything in his power to
return it; it is evident, therefore, that he did not not do that which
he did not have an opportunity of doing. A man who searches everywhere
for his creditor without finding him does not thereby pay him what
he owes." Some are in such a position that it is their duty to effect
something material; in the case of others to have done all in their
power to effect it is as good as effecting it. If a physician has done
all in his power to heal his patient he has performed his duty; an
advocate who employs his whole powers of eloquence on his client's
behalf, performs his duty even though his client be convicted; the
generalship even of a beaten commander is praised if he has prudently,
laboriously, and courageously exercised his functions. Your friend has
done all in his power to return your kindness, but your good fortune
stood in his way; no adversity befell you in which he could prove the
truth of his friendship; he could not give you money when you were
rich, or nurse you when you were in health, or help you when you were
succeeding; yet he repaid your kindness, even though you did not receive
a benefit from him. Moreover, this man, being always eager, and on the
watch for an opportunity of doing this, as he has expended much anxiety
and much trouble upon it, has really done more than he who quickly had
an opportunity of repaying your kindness. The case of a debtor is not
the same, for it is not enough for him to have tried to find the money
unless he pays it; in his case a harsh creditor stands over him who will
not let a single day pass without charging him interest; in yours there
is a most kind friend, who seeing you busy, troubled, and anxious would
say.
"'Dismiss this trouble from thy breast;'
leave off disturbing yourself; I have received from you all that I wish;
you wrong me, if you suppose that I want anything further; you have
fully repaid me in intention."
"Tell me," says our adversary, "if he had repaid the benefit you would
say that he had returned your kindness: is, then, he who repays it in
the same position as he who does not repay it?"
On the other hand, consider this: if he had forgotten the benefit which
he had received, if he had not even attempted to be grateful, you would
say that he had not returned the kindness; but this man has laboured day
and night to the neglect of all his other duties in his devoted care to
let no opportunity of proving his gratitude escape him; is then he who
took no pains to return a kindness to be classed with this man who never
ceased to take pains? you are unjust, if you require a material payment
from me when you see that I am not wanting in intention.
XV. In short, suppose that when you are taken captive, I have borrowed
money, made over my property as security to my creditor, that I have
sailed in a stormy winter season along coasts swarming with pirates,
that I have braved all the perils which necessarily attend a voyage even
on a peaceful sea, that I have wandered through all wildernesses seeking
for those men whom all others flee from, and that when I have at length
reached the pirates, someone else has already ransomed you: will you
say that I have not returned your kindness? Even if during this voyage I
have lost by shipwreck the money that I had raised to save you, even if
I myself have fallen into the prison from which I sought to release you,
will you say that I have not returned your kindness? No, by Hercules!
the Athenians call Harmodius and Aristogiton, tyrannicides; the hand of
Mucius which he left on the enemy's altar was equivalent to the death
of Porsena, and valour struggling against fortune is always illustrious,
even if it falls short of accomplishing its design. He who watches
each opportunity as it passes, and tries to avail himself of one
after another, does more to show his gratitude than he whom the first
opportunity enabled to be grateful without any trouble whatever. "But,"
says our adversary, "he gave you two things, material help and kindly
feeling; you, therefore, owe him two." You might justly say this to one
who returns your kindly feeling without troubling himself further; this
man is really in your debt; but you cannot say so of one who wishes to
repay you, who struggles and leaves no stone unturned to do so; for,
as far as in him lies, he repays you in both kinds; in the next place,
counting is not always a true test, sometimes one thing is equivalent to
two; consequently so intense and ardent a wish to repay takes the place
of a material repayment. Indeed, if a feeling of gratitude has no value
in repaying a kindness without giving something material, then no one
can be grateful to the gods, whom we can repay by gratitude alone. "We
cannot," says our adversary, "give the gods anything else." Well, but
if I am not able to give this man, whose kindness I am bound to return,
anything beside my gratitude, why should that which is all that I can
bestow on a god be insufficient to prove my gratitude towards a man?
XVI. If, however, you ask me what I really think, and wish me to give a
definite answer, I should say that the one party ought to consider his
benefit to have been returned, while the other ought to feel that he has
not returned it; the one should release his friend from the debt, the
other should hold himself bound to pay it; the one should say, "I have
received;" the other should answer, "I owe." In our whole investigation,
we ought to look entirely to the public good; we ought to prevent the
ungrateful having any excuses in which they can take refuge, and under
cover of which they can disown their debts. "I have done all in my
power," say you. Well, keep on doing so still. Do you suppose that our
ancestors were so foolish, as not to understand that it is most unjust
that the man who has wasted the money which he received from his
creditor on debauchery, or gambling, should be classed with one who has
lost his own property as well as that of others in a fire, by robbery,
or some sadder mischance? They would take no excuse, that men might
understand that they were always bound to keep their word; it was
thought better that even a good excuse should not be accepted from a few
persons, than that all men should be led to try to make excuses. You say
that you have done all in your power to repay your debt; this ought to
be enough for your friend, but not enough for you. He to whom you owe a
kindness, is unworthy of gratitude if he lets all your anxious care and
trouble to repay it go for nothing; and so, too, if your friend takes
your good will as a repayment, you are ungrateful if you are not all the
more eager to feel the obligation of the debt which he has forgiven you.
Do not snap up his receipt, or call witnesses to prove it; rather seek
opportunities for repaying not less than before; repay the one man
because he asks for repayment, the other because he forgives you your
debt; the one because he is good, the other because he is bad. You, need
not, therefore, think that you have anything to do with the question
whether a man be bound to repay the benefit which he has received from
a wise man, if that man has ceased to be wise and has turned into a bad
man. You would return a deposit which you had received from a wise man;
you would return a loan even to a bad man; what grounds have you for
not returning a benefit also? Because he has changed, ought he to change