Laws
CLEINIAS: Then, Stranger, our former assertion will hold; for we were
saying that laws generally should look to one thing only; and this, as
we admitted, was rightly said to be virtue.
ATHENIAN: Yes.
CLEINIAS: And we said that virtue was of four kinds?
ATHENIAN: Quite true.
CLEINIAS: And that mind was the leader of the four, and that to her the
three other virtues and all other things ought to have regard?
ATHENIAN: You follow me capitally, Cleinias, and I would ask you to
follow me to the end, for we have already said that the mind of the
pilot, the mind of the physician and of the general look to that
one thing to which they ought to look; and now we may turn to mind
political, of which, as of a human creature, we will ask a question: O
wonderful being, and to what are you looking? The physician is able
to tell his single aim in life, but you, the superior, as you declare
yourself to be, of all intelligent beings, when you are asked are not
able to tell. Can you, Megillus, and you, Cleinias, say distinctly what
is the aim of mind political, in return for the many explanations of
things which I have given you?
CLEINIAS: We cannot, Stranger.
ATHENIAN: Well, but ought we not to desire to see it, and to see where
it is to be found?
CLEINIAS: For example, where?
ATHENIAN: For example, we were saying that there are four kinds of
virtue, and as there are four of them, each of them must be one.
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: And further, all four of them we call one; for we say that
courage is virtue, and that prudence is virtue, and the same of the two
others, as if they were in reality not many but one, that is, virtue.
CLEINIAS: Quite so.
ATHENIAN: There is no difficulty in seeing in what way the two differ
from one another, and have received two names, and so of the rest. But
there is more difficulty in explaining why we call these two and the
rest of them by the single name of virtue.
CLEINIAS: How do you mean?
ATHENIAN: I have no difficulty in explaining what I mean. Let us
distribute the subject into questions and answers.
CLEINIAS: Once more, what do you mean?
ATHENIAN: Ask me what is that one thing which I call virtue, and then
again speak of as two, one part being courage and the other wisdom. I
will tell you how that occurs: One of them has to do with fear; in this
the beasts also participate, and quite young children--I mean courage;
for a courageous temper is a gift of nature and not of reason. But
without reason there never has been, or is, or will be a wise and
understanding soul; it is of a different nature.
CLEINIAS: That is true.
ATHENIAN: I have now told you in what way the two are different, and
do you in return tell me in what way they are one and the same. Suppose
that I ask you in what way the four are one, and when you have answered
me, you will have a right to ask of me in return in what way they are
four; and then let us proceed to enquire whether in the case of things
which have a name and also a definition to them, true knowledge consists
in knowing the name only and not the definition. Can he who is good
for anything be ignorant of all this without discredit where great and
glorious truths are concerned?
CLEINIAS: I suppose not.
ATHENIAN: And is there anything greater to the legislator and the
guardian of the law, and to him who thinks that he excels all other men
in virtue, and has won the palm of excellence, than these very qualities
of which we are now speaking--courage, temperance, wisdom, justice?
CLEINIAS: How can there be anything greater?
ATHENIAN: And ought not the interpreters, the teachers, the lawgivers,
the guardians of the other citizens, to excel the rest of mankind,
and perfectly to show him who desires to learn and know or whose evil
actions require to be punished and reproved, what is the nature of
virtue and vice? Or shall some poet who has found his way into the city,
or some chance person who pretends to be an instructor of youth, show
himself to be better than him who has won the prize for every virtue?
And can we wonder that when the guardians are not adequate in speech
or action, and have no adequate knowledge of virtue, the city being
unguarded should experience the common fate of cities in our day?
CLEINIAS: Wonder! no.
ATHENIAN: Well, then, must we do as we said? Or can we give our
guardians a more precise knowledge of virtue in speech and action than
the many have? or is there any way in which our city can be made to
resemble the head and senses of rational beings because possessing such
a guardian power?
CLEINIAS: What, Stranger, is the drift of your comparison?
ATHENIAN: Do we not see that the city is the trunk, and are not the
younger guardians, who are chosen for their natural gifts, placed in the
head of the state, having their souls all full of eyes, with which
they look about the whole city? They keep watch and hand over their
perceptions to the memory, and inform the elders of all that happens in
the city; and those whom we compared to the mind, because they have many
wise thoughts--that is to say, the old men--take counsel, and making use
of the younger men as their ministers, and advising with them--in this
way both together truly preserve the whole state: Shall this or some
other be the order of our state? Are all our citizens to be equal in
acquirements, or shall there be special persons among them who have
received a more careful training and education?
CLEINIAS: That they should be equal, my good sir, is impossible.
ATHENIAN: Then we ought to proceed to some more exact training than any
which has preceded.
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: And must not that of which we are in need be the one to which
we were just now alluding?
CLEINIAS: Very true.
ATHENIAN: Did we not say that the workman or guardian, if he be perfect
in every respect, ought not only to be able to see the many aims, but he
should press onward to the one? This he should know, and knowing, order
all things with a view to it.
CLEINIAS: True.
ATHENIAN: And can any one have a more exact way of considering or
contemplating anything, than the being able to look at one idea gathered
from many different things?
CLEINIAS: Perhaps not.
ATHENIAN: Not 'Perhaps not,' but 'Certainly not,' my good sir, is the
right answer. There never has been a truer method than this discovered
by any man.
CLEINIAS: I bow to your authority, Stranger; let us proceed in the way
which you propose.
ATHENIAN: Then, as would appear, we must compel the guardians of our
divine state to perceive, in the first place, what that principle is
which is the same in all the four--the same, as we affirm, in courage
and in temperance, and in justice and in prudence, and which, being one,
we call as we ought, by the single name of virtue. To this, my friends,
we will, if you please, hold fast, and not let go until we have
sufficiently explained what that is to which we are to look, whether to
be regarded as one, or as a whole, or as both, or in whatever way. Are
we likely ever to be in a virtuous condition, if we cannot tell whether
virtue is many, or four, or one? Certainly, if we take counsel among
ourselves, we shall in some way contrive that this principle has a place
amongst us; but if you have made up your mind that we should let the
matter alone, we will.
CLEINIAS: We must not, Stranger, by the God of strangers I swear that we
must not, for in our opinion you speak most truly; but we should like to
know how you will accomplish your purpose.
ATHENIAN: Wait a little before you ask; and let us, first of all, be
quite agreed with one another that the purpose has to be accomplished.
CLEINIAS: Certainly, it ought to be, if it can be.
ATHENIAN: Well, and about the good and the honourable, are we to take
the same view? Are our guardians only to know that each of them is many,
or also how and in what way they are one?
CLEINIAS: They must consider also in what sense they are one.
ATHENIAN: And are they to consider only, and to be unable to set forth
what they think?
CLEINIAS: Certainly not; that would be the state of a slave.
ATHENIAN: And may not the same be said of all good things--that the true
guardians of the laws ought to know the truth about them, and to be able
to interpret them in words, and carry them out in action, judging of
what is and of what is not well, according to nature?
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: Is not the knowledge of the Gods which we have set forth with
so much zeal one of the noblest sorts of knowledge--to know that they
are, and know how great is their power, as far as in man lies? We do
indeed excuse the mass of the citizens, who only follow the voice of
the laws, but we refuse to admit as guardians any who do not labour to
obtain every possible evidence that there is respecting the Gods; our
city is forbidden and not allowed to choose as a guardian of the law, or
to place in the select order of virtue, him who is not an inspired man,
and has not laboured at these things.
CLEINIAS: It is certainly just, as you say, that he who is indolent
about such matters or incapable should be rejected, and that things
honourable should be put away from him.
ATHENIAN: Are we assured that there are two things which lead men to
believe in the Gods, as we have already stated?
CLEINIAS: What are they?
ATHENIAN: One is the argument about the soul, which has been already
mentioned--that it is the eldest and most divine of all things, to which
motion attaining generation gives perpetual existence; the other was an
argument from the order of the motion of the stars, and of all things
under the dominion of the mind which ordered the universe. If a man look
upon the world not lightly or ignorantly, there was never any one so
godless who did not experience an effect opposite to that which the many
imagine. For they think that those who handle these matters by the help
of astronomy, and the accompanying arts of demonstration, may become
godless, because they see, as far as they can see, things happening by
necessity, and not by an intelligent will accomplishing good.
CLEINIAS: But what is the fact?
ATHENIAN: Just the opposite, as I said, of the opinion which once
prevailed among men, that the sun and stars are without soul. Even in
those days men wondered about them, and that which is now ascertained
was then conjectured by some who had a more exact knowledge of
them--that if they had been things without soul, and had no mind, they
could never have moved with numerical exactness so wonderful; and even
at that time some ventured to hazard the conjecture that mind was the
orderer of the universe. But these same persons again mistaking the
nature of the soul, which they conceived to be younger and not older
than the body, once more overturned the world, or rather, I should say,
themselves; for the bodies which they saw moving in heaven all appeared
to be full of stones, and earth, and many other lifeless substances, and
to these they assigned the causes of all things. Such studies gave
rise to much atheism and perplexity, and the poets took occasion to be
abusive--comparing the philosophers to she-dogs uttering vain howlings,
and talking other nonsense of the same sort. But now, as I said, the
case is reversed.
CLEINIAS: How so?
ATHENIAN: No man can be a true worshipper of the Gods who does not know
these two principles--that the soul is the eldest of all things which
are born, and is immortal and rules over all bodies; moreover, as I have
now said several times, he who has not contemplated the mind of nature
which is said to exist in the stars, and gone through the previous
training, and seen the connexion of music with these things, and