Laws
citizens; had the city been on the sea, and dependent for support
on other countries, no human power could have preserved you from
corruption. Even the distance of eleven miles is hardly enough. For the
sea, although an agreeable, is a dangerous companion, and a highway of
strange morals and manners as well as of commerce. But as the country is
only moderately fertile there will be no great export trade and no
great returns of gold and silver, which are the ruin of states. Is there
timber for ship-building? 'There is no pine, nor much cypress; and very
little stone-pine or plane wood for the interior of ships.' That is
good. 'Why?' Because the city will not be able to imitate the bad ways
of her enemies. 'What is the bearing of that remark?' To explain my
meaning, I would ask you to remember what we said about the Cretan laws,
that they had an eye to war only; whereas I maintained that they ought
to have included all virtue. And I hope that you in your turn will
retaliate upon me if I am false to my own principle. For I consider that
the lawgiver should go straight to the mark of virtue and justice, and
disregard wealth and every other good when separated from virtue.
What further I mean, when I speak of the imitation of enemies, I will
illustrate by the story of Minos, if our Cretan friend will allow me to
mention it. Minos, who was a great sea-king, imposed upon the Athenians
a cruel tribute, for in those days they were not a maritime power; they
had no timber for ship-building, and therefore they could not 'imitate
their enemies'; and better far, as I maintain, would it have been for
them to have lost many times over the lives which they devoted to the
tribute than to have turned soldiers into sailors. Naval warfare is not
a very praiseworthy art; men should not be taught to leap on shore, and
then again to hurry back to their ships, or to find specious excuses for
throwing away their arms; bad customs ought not to be gilded with fine
words. And retreat is always bad, as we are taught in Homer, when he
introduces Odysseus, setting forth to Agamemnon the danger of ships
being at hand when soldiers are disposed to fly. An army of lions
trained in such ways would fly before a herd of deer. Further, a city
which owes its preservation to a crowd of pilots and oarsmen and other
undeserving persons, cannot bestow rewards of honour properly; and
this is the ruin of states. 'Still, in Crete we say that the battle of
Salamis was the salvation of Hellas.' Such is the prevailing
opinion. But I and Megillus say that the battle of Marathon began the
deliverance, and that the battle of Plataea completed it; for these
battles made men better, whereas the battles of Salamis and Artemisium
made them no better. And we further affirm that mere existence is not
the great political good of individuals or states, but the continuance
of the best existence. 'Certainly.' Let us then endeavour to follow this
principle in colonization and legislation.
And first, let me ask you who are to be the colonists? May any one
come from any city of Crete? For you would surely not send a general
invitation to all Hellas. Yet I observe that in Crete there are people
who have come from Argos and Aegina and other places. 'Our recruits
will be drawn from all Crete, and of other Hellenes we should prefer
Peloponnesians. As you observe, there are Argives among the Cretans;
moreover the Gortynians, who are the best of all Cretans, have come from
Gortys in Peloponnesus.'
Colonization is in some ways easier when the colony goes out in a swarm
from one country, owing to the pressure of population, or revolution, or
war. In this case there is the advantage that the new colonists have
a community of race, language, and laws. But then again, they are less
obedient to the legislator; and often they are anxious to keep the very
laws and customs which caused their ruin at home. A mixed multitude,
on the other hand, is more tractable, although there is a difficulty
in making them pull together. There is nothing, however, which perfects
men's virtue more than legislation and colonization. And yet I have a
word to say which may seem to be depreciatory of legislators. 'What is
that?'
I was going to make the saddening reflection, that accidents of all
sorts are the true legislators,--wars and pestilences and famines and
the frequent recurrence of bad seasons. The observer will be inclined to
say that almost all human things are chance; and this is certainly true
about navigation and medicine, and the art of the general. But there is
another thing which may equally be said. 'What is it?' That God governs
all things, and that chance and opportunity co-operate with Him. And
according to yet a third view, art has part with them, for surely in a
storm it is well to have a pilot? And the same is true of legislation:
even if circumstances are favourable, a skilful lawgiver is still
necessary. 'Most true.' All artists would pray for certain conditions
under which to exercise their art: and would not the legislator do the
same? 'Certainly?' Come, legislator, let us say to him, and what are the
conditions which you would have? He will answer, Grant me a city which
is ruled by a tyrant; and let the tyrant be young, mindful, teachable,
courageous, magnanimous; and let him have the inseparable condition
of all virtue, which is temperance--not prudence, but that natural
temperance which is the gift of children and animals, and is hardly
reckoned among goods--with this he must be endowed, if the state is to
acquire the form most conducive to happiness in the speediest manner.
And I must add one other condition: the tyrant must be fortunate, and
his good fortune must consist in his having the co-operation of a great
legislator. When God has done all this, He has done the best which
He can for a state; not so well if He has given them two legislators
instead of one, and less and less well if He has given them a great
many. An orderly tyranny most easily passes into the perfect state;
in the second degree, a monarchy; in the third degree, a democracy; an
oligarchy is worst of all. 'I do not understand.' I suppose that you
have never seen a city which is subject to a tyranny? 'I have no desire
to see one.' You would have seen what I am describing, if you ever had.
The tyrant can speedily change the manners of a state, and affix
the stamp of praise or blame on any action which he pleases; for the
citizens readily follow the example which he sets. There is no quicker
way of making changes; but there is a counterbalancing difficulty. It is
hard to find the divine love of temperance and justice existing in any
powerful form of government, whether in a monarchy or an oligarchy. In
olden days there were chiefs like Nestor, who was the most eloquent and
temperate of mankind, but there is no one his equal now. If such an one
ever arises among us, blessed will he be, and blessed they who listen to
his words. For where power and wisdom and temperance meet in one, there
are the best laws and constitutions. I am endeavouring to show you how
easy under the conditions supposed, and how difficult under any other,
is the task of giving a city good laws. 'How do you mean?' Let us old
men attempt to mould in words a constitution for your new state, as
children make figures out of wax. 'Proceed. What constitution shall we
give--democracy, oligarchy, or aristocracy?' To which of these classes,
Megillus, do you refer your own state? 'The Spartan constitution seems
to me to contain all these elements. Our state is a democracy and also
an aristocracy; the power of the Ephors is tyrannical, and we have
an ancient monarchy.' 'Much the same,' adds Cleinias, 'may be said of
Cnosus.' The reason is that you have polities, but other states are
mere aggregations of men dwelling together, which are named after their
several ruling powers; whereas a state, if an 'ocracy' at all, should
be called a theocracy. A tale of old will explain my meaning. There is
a tradition of a golden age, in which all things were spontaneous and
abundant. Cronos, then lord of the world, knew that no mortal nature
could endure the temptations of power, and therefore he appointed demons
or demi-gods, who are of a superior race, to have dominion over man, as
man has dominion over the animals. They took care of us with great ease
and pleasure to themselves, and no less to us; and the tradition says
that only when God, and not man, is the ruler, can the human race cease
from ill. This was the manner of life which prevailed under Cronos, and
which we must strive to follow so far as the principle of immortality
still abides in us and we live according to law and the dictates of
right reason. But in an oligarchy or democracy, when the governing
principle is athirst for pleasure, the laws are trampled under foot, and
there is no possibility of salvation. Is it not often said that there
are as many forms of laws as there are governments, and that they
have no concern either with any one virtue or with all virtue, but are
relative to the will of the government? Which is as much as to say that
'might makes right.' 'What do you mean?' I mean that governments enact
their own laws, and that every government makes self-preservation its
principal aim. He who transgresses the laws is regarded as an evil-doer,
and punished accordingly. This was one of the unjust principles of
government which we mentioned when speaking of the different claims to
rule. We were agreed that parents should rule their children, the elder
the younger, the noble the ignoble. But there were also several other
principles, and among them Pindar's 'law of violence.' To whom then is
our state to be entrusted? For many a government is only a victorious
faction which has a monopoly of power, and refuses any share to the
conquered, lest when they get into office they should remember their
wrongs. Such governments are not polities, but parties; nor are any laws
good which are made in the interest of particular classes only, and not
of the whole. And in our state I mean to protest against making any
man a ruler because he is rich, or strong, or noble. But those who are
obedient to the laws, and who win the victory of obedience, shall be
promoted to the service of the Gods according to the degree of their
obedience. When I call the ruler the servant or minister of the law,
this is not a mere paradox, but I mean to say that upon a willingness to
obey the law the existence of the state depends. 'Truly, Stranger,
you have a keen vision.' Why, yes; every man when he is old has his
intellectual vision most keen. And now shall we call in our colonists
and make a speech to them? Friends, we say to them, God holds in His
hand the beginning, middle, and end of all things, and He moves in a
straight line towards the accomplishment of His will. Justice always
bears Him company, and punishes those who fall short of His laws. He who
would be happy follows humbly in her train; but he who is lifted up with
pride, or wealth, or honour, or beauty, is soon deserted by God, and,
being deserted, he lives in confusion and disorder. To many he seems a
great man; but in a short time he comes to utter destruction. Wherefore,
seeing these things, what ought we to do or think? 'Every man ought to
follow God.' What life, then, is pleasing to God? There is an old saying
that 'like agrees with like, measure with measure,' and God ought to
be our measure in all things. The temperate man is the friend of God
because he is like Him, and the intemperate man is not His friend,
because he is not like Him. And the conclusion is, that the best of all
things for a good man is to pray and sacrifice to the Gods; but the bad
man has a polluted soul; and therefore his service is wasted upon the