Laws
by Plato to the Magnesian state. He did not reflect that a non-maritime
power would always be at the mercy of one which had a command of the
great highway. Their many island homes, the vast extent of coast which
had to be protected by them, their struggles first of all with the
Phoenicians and Carthaginians, and secondly with the Persian fleets,
forced the Greeks, mostly against their will, to devote themselves to
the sea. The islanders before the inhabitants of the continent, the
maritime cities before the inland, the Corinthians and Athenians before
the Spartans, were compelled to fit out ships: last of all the Spartans,
by the pressure of the Peloponnesian War, were driven to establish a
naval force, which, after the battle of Aegospotami, for more than
a generation commanded the Aegean. Plato, like the Spartans, had a
prejudice against a navy, because he regarded it as the nursery of
democracy. But he either never considered, or did not care to explain,
how a city, set upon an island and 'distant not more than ten miles from
the sea, having a seaboard provided with excellent harbours,' could have
safely subsisted without one.
Neither the Spartans nor the Magnesian colonists were permitted to
engage in trade or commerce. In order to limit their dealings as far
as possible to their own country, they had a separate coinage; the
Magnesians were only allowed to use the common currency of Hellas when
they travelled abroad, which they were forbidden to do unless they
received permission from the government. Like the Spartans, Plato
was afraid of the evils which might be introduced into his state
by intercourse with foreigners; but he also shrinks from the utter
exclusiveness of Sparta, and is not unwilling to allow visitors of a
suitable age and rank to come from other states to his own, as he also
allows citizens of his own state to go to foreign countries and bring
back a report of them. Such international communication seemed to him
both honourable and useful.
We may now notice some points in which the commonwealth of the Laws
approximates to the Athenian model. These are much more numerous than
the previous class of resemblances; we are better able to compare the
laws of Plato with those of Athens, because a good deal more is known to
us of Athens than of Sparta.
The information which we possess about Athenian law, though
comparatively fuller, is still fragmentary. The sources from which our
knowledge is derived are chiefly the following:--
(1) The Orators,--Antiphon, Andocides, Lysias, Isocrates, Demosthenes,
Aeschines, Lycurgus, and others.
(2) Herodotus, Thucydides, Xenophon, Plato, Aristotle, as well as later
writers, such as Cicero de Legibus, Plutarch, Aelian, Pausanias.
(3) Lexicographers, such as Harpocration, Pollux, Hesychius, Suidas, and
the compiler of the Etymologicum Magnum, many of whom are of uncertain
date, and to a great extent based upon one another. Their writings
extend altogether over more than eight hundred years, from the second to
the tenth century.
(4) The Scholia on Aristophanes, Plato, Demosthenes.
(5) A few inscriptions.
Our knowledge of a subject derived from such various sources and for the
most part of uncertain date and origin, is necessarily precarious. No
critic can separate the actual laws of Solon from those which passed
under his name in later ages. Nor do the Scholiasts and Lexicographers
attempt to distinguish how many of these laws were still in force at the
time when they wrote, or when they fell into disuse and were to be found
in books only. Nor can we hastily assume that enactments which occur
in the Laws of Plato were also a part of Athenian law, however probable
this may appear.
There are two classes of similarities between Plato's Laws and those of
Athens: (i) of institutions (ii) of minor enactments.
(i) The constitution of the Laws in its general character resembles much
more nearly the Athenian constitution of Solon's time than that which
succeeded it, or the extreme democracy which prevailed in Plato's own
day. It was a mean state which he hoped to create, equally unlike a
Syracusan tyranny or the mob-government of the Athenian assembly. There
are various expedients by which he sought to impart to it the quality of
moderation. (1) The whole people were to be educated: they could not be
all trained in philosophy, but they were to acquire the simple elements
of music, arithmetic, geometry, astronomy; they were also to be subject
to military discipline, archontes kai archomenoi. (2) The majority of
them were, or had been at some time in their lives, magistrates, and had
the experience which is given by office. (3) The persons who held the
highest offices were to have a further education, not much inferior to
that provided for the guardians in the Republic, though the range of
their studies is narrowed to the nature and divisions of virtue: here
their philosophy comes to an end. (4) The entire number of the citizens
(5040) rarely, if ever, assembled, except for purposes of elections. The
whole people were divided into four classes, each having the right to be
represented by the same number of members in the Council. The result of
such an arrangement would be, as in the constitution of Servius Tullius,
to give a disproportionate share of power to the wealthier classes, who
may be supposed to be always much fewer in number than the poorer. This
tendency was qualified by the complicated system of selection by vote,
previous to the final election by lot, of which the object seems to be
to hand over to the wealthy few the power of selecting from the many
poor, and vice versa. (5) The most important body in the state was the
Nocturnal Council, which is borrowed from the Areopagus at Athens, as it
existed, or was supposed to have existed, in the days before Ephialtes
and the Eumenides of Aeschylus, when its power was undiminished. In
some particulars Plato appears to have copied exactly the customs and
procedure of the Areopagus: both assemblies sat at night (Telfy). There
was a resemblance also in more important matters. Like the Areopagus,
the Nocturnal Council was partly composed of magistrates and other
state officials, whose term of office had expired. (7) The constitution
included several diverse and even opposing elements, such as
the Assembly and the Nocturnal Council. (8) There was much less
exclusiveness than at Sparta; the citizens were to have an interest in
the government of neighbouring states, and to know what was going on in
the rest of the world.--All these were moderating influences.
A striking similarity between Athens and the constitution of the
Magnesian colony is the use of the lot in the election of judges
and other magistrates. That such a mode of election should have
been resorted to in any civilized state, or that it should have been
transferred by Plato to an ideal or imaginary one, is very singular
to us. The most extreme democracy of modern times has never thought of
leaving government wholly to chance. It was natural that Socrates
should scoff at it, and ask, 'Who would choose a pilot or carpenter or
flute-player by lot' (Xen. Mem.)? Yet there were many considerations
which made this mode of choice attractive both to the oligarch and to
the democrat:--(1) It seemed to recognize that one man was as good as
another, and that all the members of the governing body, whether few or
many, were on a perfect equality in every sense of the word. (2) To the
pious mind it appeared to be a choice made, not by man, but by heaven
(compare Laws). (3) It afforded a protection against corruption and
intrigue...It must also be remembered that, although elected by lot,
the persons so elected were subject to a scrutiny before they entered
on their office, and were therefore liable, after election, if
disqualified, to be rejected (Laws). They were, moreover, liable to be
called to account after the expiration of their office. In the election
of councillors Plato introduces a further check: they are not to be
chosen directly by lot from all the citizens, but from a select body
previously elected by vote. In Plato's state at least, as we may infer
from his silence on this point, judges and magistrates performed
their duties without pay, which was a guarantee both of their
disinterestedness and of their belonging probably to the higher class of
citizens (compare Arist. Pol.). Hence we are not surprised that the use
of the lot prevailed, not only in the election of the Athenian Council,
but also in many oligarchies, and even in Plato's colony. The
evil consequences of the lot are to a great extent avoided, if the
magistrates so elected do not, like the dicasts at Athens, receive pay
from the state.
Another parallel is that of the Popular Assembly, which at Athens was
omnipotent, but in the Laws has only a faded and secondary existence. In
Plato it was chiefly an elective body, having apparently no judicial and
little political power entrusted to it. At Athens it was the mainspring
of the democracy; it had the decision of war or peace, of life and
death; the acts of generals or statesmen were authorized or condemned
by it; no office or person was above its control. Plato was far from
allowing such a despotic power to exist in his model community, and
therefore he minimizes the importance of the Assembly and narrows its
functions. He probably never asked himself a question, which naturally
occurs to the modern reader, where was to be the central authority in
this new community, and by what supreme power would the differences of
inferior powers be decided. At the same time he magnifies and brings
into prominence the Nocturnal Council (which is in many respects a
reflection of the Areopagus), but does not make it the governing body of
the state.
Between the judicial system of the Laws and that of Athens there was
very great similarity, and a difference almost equally great. Plato not
unfrequently adopts the details when he rejects the principle. At
Athens any citizen might be a judge and member of the great court of
the Heliaea. This was ordinarily subdivided into a number of inferior
courts, but an occasion is recorded on which the whole body, in
number six thousand, met in a single court (Andoc. de Myst.). Plato
significantly remarks that a few judges, if they are good, are better
than a great number. He also, at least in capital cases, confines the
plaintiff and defendant to a single speech each, instead of allowing two
apiece, as was the common practice at Athens. On the other hand, in all
private suits he gives two appeals, from the arbiters to the courts of
the tribes, and from the courts of the tribes to the final or supreme
court. There was nothing answering to this at Athens. The three courts
were appointed in the following manner:--the arbiters were to be agreed
upon by the parties to the cause; the judges of the tribes to be elected
by lot; the highest tribunal to be chosen at the end of each year by the
great officers of state out of their own number--they were to serve for
a year, to undergo a scrutiny, and, unlike the Athenian judges, to vote
openly. Plato does not dwell upon methods of procedure: these are the
lesser matters which he leaves to the younger legislators. In cases of
murder and some other capital offences, the cause was to be tried by a
special tribunal, as was the custom at Athens: military offences, too,
as at Athens, were decided by the soldiers. Public causes in the Laws,
as sometimes at Athens, were voted upon by the whole people: because, as
Plato remarks, they are all equally concerned in them. They were to
be previously investigated by three of the principal magistrates. He
believes also that in private suits all should take part; 'for he who