Laws
better arrangement than the expedition against Troy. For, firstly,
the people of that day had, as they thought, in the Heraclidae better
leaders than the Pelopidae; in the next place, they considered that
their army was superior in valour to that which went against Troy;
for, although the latter conquered the Trojans, they were themselves
conquered by the Heraclidae--Achaeans by Dorians. May we not suppose
that this was the intention with which the men of those days framed the
constitutions of their states?
MEGILLUS: Quite true.
ATHENIAN: And would not men who had shared with one another many
dangers, and were governed by a single race of royal brothers, and had
taken the advice of oracles, and in particular of the Delphian Apollo,
be likely to think that such states would be firmly and lastingly
established?
MEGILLUS: Of course they would.
ATHENIAN: Yet these institutions, of which such great expectations were
entertained, seem to have all rapidly vanished away; with the exception,
as I was saying, of that small part of them which existed in your land.
And this third part has never to this day ceased warring against the two
others; whereas, if the original idea had been carried out, and they had
agreed to be one, their power would have been invincible in war.
MEGILLUS: No doubt.
ATHENIAN: But what was the ruin of this glorious confederacy? Here is a
subject well worthy of consideration.
MEGILLUS: Certainly, no one will ever find more striking instances of
laws or governments being the salvation or destruction of great and
noble interests, than are here presented to his view.
ATHENIAN: Then now we seem to have happily arrived at a real and
important question.
MEGILLUS: Very true.
ATHENIAN: Did you never remark, sage friend, that all men, and we
ourselves at this moment, often fancy that they see some beautiful thing
which might have effected wonders if any one had only known how to make
a right use of it in some way; and yet this mode of looking at things
may turn out after all to be a mistake, and not according to nature,
either in our own case or in any other?
MEGILLUS: To what are you referring, and what do you mean?
ATHENIAN: I was thinking of my own admiration of the aforesaid Heracleid
expedition, which was so noble, and might have had such wonderful
results for the Hellenes, if only rightly used; and I was just laughing
at myself.
MEGILLUS: But were you not right and wise in speaking as you did, and we
in assenting to you?
ATHENIAN: Perhaps; and yet I cannot help observing that any one who sees
anything great or powerful, immediately has the feeling that--'If the
owner only knew how to use his great and noble possession, how happy
would he be, and what great results would he achieve!'
MEGILLUS: And would he not be justified?
ATHENIAN: Reflect; in what point of view does this sort of praise
appear just: First, in reference to the question in hand:--If the then
commanders had known how to arrange their army properly, how would they
have attained success? Would not this have been the way? They would have
bound them all firmly together and preserved them for ever, giving them
freedom and dominion at pleasure, combined with the power of doing
in the whole world, Hellenic and barbarian, whatever they and their
descendants desired. What other aim would they have had?
MEGILLUS: Very good.
ATHENIAN: Suppose any one were in the same way to express his admiration
at the sight of great wealth or family honour, or the like, he would
praise them under the idea that through them he would attain either all
or the greater and chief part of what he desires.
MEGILLUS: He would.
ATHENIAN: Well, now, and does not the argument show that there is one
common desire of all mankind?
MEGILLUS: What is it?
ATHENIAN: The desire which a man has, that all things, if possible,--at
any rate, things human,--may come to pass in accordance with his soul's
desire.
MEGILLUS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: And having this desire always, and at every time of life,
in youth, in manhood, in age, he cannot help always praying for the
fulfilment of it.
MEGILLUS: No doubt.
ATHENIAN: And we join in the prayers of our friends, and ask for them
what they ask for themselves.
MEGILLUS: We do.
ATHENIAN: Dear is the son to the father--the younger to the elder.
MEGILLUS: Of course.
ATHENIAN: And yet the son often prays to obtain things which the father
prays that he may not obtain.
MEGILLUS: When the son is young and foolish, you mean?
ATHENIAN: Yes; or when the father, in the dotage of age or the heat of
youth, having no sense of right and justice, prays with fervour, under
the influence of feelings akin to those of Theseus when he cursed the
unfortunate Hippolytus, do you imagine that the son, having a sense of
right and justice, will join in his father's prayers?
MEGILLUS: I understand you to mean that a man should not desire or be in
a hurry to have all things according to his wish, for his wish may be at
variance with his reason. But every state and every individual ought to
pray and strive for wisdom.
ATHENIAN: Yes; and I remember, and you will remember, what I said at
first, that a statesman and legislator ought to ordain laws with a view
to wisdom; while you were arguing that the good lawgiver ought to order
all with a view to war. And to this I replied that there were four
virtues, but that upon your view one of them only was the aim of
legislation; whereas you ought to regard all virtue, and especially that
which comes first, and is the leader of all the rest--I mean wisdom and
mind and opinion, having affection and desire in their train. And now
the argument returns to the same point, and I say once more, in jest if
you like, or in earnest if you like, that the prayer of a fool is full
of danger, being likely to end in the opposite of what he desires. And
if you would rather receive my words in earnest, I am willing that you
should; and you will find, I suspect, as I have said already, that not
cowardice was the cause of the ruin of the Dorian kings and of their
whole design, nor ignorance of military matters, either on the part of
the rulers or of their subjects; but their misfortunes were due to
their general degeneracy, and especially to their ignorance of the most
important human affairs. That was then, and is still, and always will
be the case, as I will endeavour, if you will allow me, to make out
and demonstrate as well as I am able to you who are my friends, in the
course of the argument.
CLEINIAS: Pray go on, Stranger;--compliments are troublesome, but we
will show, not in word but in deed, how greatly we prize your words,
for we will give them our best attention; and that is the way in which a
freeman best shows his approval or disapproval.
MEGILLUS: Excellent, Cleinias; let us do as you say.
CLEINIAS: By all means, if Heaven wills. Go on.
ATHENIAN: Well, then, proceeding in the same train of thought, I say
that the greatest ignorance was the ruin of the Dorian power, and that
now, as then, ignorance is ruin. And if this be true, the legislator
must endeavour to implant wisdom in states, and banish ignorance to the
utmost of his power.
CLEINIAS: That is evident.
ATHENIAN: Then now consider what is really the greatest ignorance. I
should like to know whether you and Megillus would agree with me in what
I am about to say; for my opinion is--
CLEINIAS: What?
ATHENIAN: That the greatest ignorance is when a man hates that which he
nevertheless thinks to be good and noble, and loves and embraces that
which he knows to be unrighteous and evil. This disagreement between
the sense of pleasure and the judgment of reason in the soul is, in my
opinion, the worst ignorance; and also the greatest, because affecting
the great mass of the human soul; for the principle which feels pleasure
and pain in the individual is like the mass or populace in a state. And
when the soul is opposed to knowledge, or opinion, or reason, which are
her natural lords, that I call folly, just as in the state, when the
multitude refuses to obey their rulers and the laws; or, again, in the
individual, when fair reasonings have their habitation in the soul and
yet do no good, but rather the reverse of good. All these cases I term
the worst ignorance, whether in individuals or in states. You will
understand, Stranger, that I am speaking of something which is very
different from the ignorance of handicraftsmen.
CLEINIAS: Yes, my friend, we understand and agree.
ATHENIAN: Let us, then, in the first place declare and affirm that the
citizen who does not know these things ought never to have any kind of
authority entrusted to him: he must be stigmatized as ignorant,
even though he be versed in calculation and skilled in all sorts of
accomplishments, and feats of mental dexterity; and the opposite are to
be called wise, even although, in the words of the proverb, they know
neither how to read nor how to swim; and to them, as to men of sense,
authority is to be committed. For, O my friends, how can there be the
least shadow of wisdom when there is no harmony? There is none; but the
noblest and greatest of harmonies may be truly said to be the greatest
wisdom; and of this he is a partaker who lives according to reason;
whereas he who is devoid of reason is the destroyer of his house and
the very opposite of a saviour of the state: he is utterly ignorant of
political wisdom. Let this, then, as I was saying, be laid down by us.
CLEINIAS: Let it be so laid down.
ATHENIAN: I suppose that there must be rulers and subjects in states?
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: And what are the principles on which men rule and obey in
cities, whether great or small; and similarly in families? What are
they, and how many in number? Is there not one claim of authority
which is always just,--that of fathers and mothers and in general of
progenitors to rule over their offspring?
CLEINIAS: There is.
ATHENIAN: Next follows the principle that the noble should rule over the
ignoble; and, thirdly, that the elder should rule and the younger obey?
CLEINIAS: To be sure.
ATHENIAN: And, fourthly, that slaves should be ruled, and their masters
rule?
CLEINIAS: Of course.
ATHENIAN: Fifthly, if I am not mistaken, comes the principle that the
stronger shall rule, and the weaker be ruled?
CLEINIAS: That is a rule not to be disobeyed.
ATHENIAN: Yes, and a rule which prevails very widely among all
creatures, and is according to nature, as the Theban poet Pindar once
said; and the sixth principle, and the greatest of all, is, that the
wise should lead and command, and the ignorant follow and obey; and
yet, O thou most wise Pindar, as I should reply him, this surely is not
contrary to nature, but according to nature, being the rule of law over
willing subjects, and not a rule of compulsion.
CLEINIAS: Most true.
ATHENIAN: There is a seventh kind of rule which is awarded by lot, and
is dear to the Gods and a token of good fortune: he on whom the lot
falls is a ruler, and he who fails in obtaining the lot goes away and is
the subject; and this we affirm to be quite just.
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: 'Then now,' as we say playfully to any of those who lightly
undertake the making of laws, 'you see, legislator, the principles of
government, how many they are, and that they are naturally opposed to
each other. There we have discovered a fountain-head of seditions, to
which you must attend. And, first, we will ask you to consider with us,
how and in what respect the kings of Argos and Messene violated these
our maxims, and ruined themselves and the great and famous Hellenic
power of the olden time. Was it because they did not know how wisely