Laws
of votes, after he has undergone a scrutiny at the hands of all the
magistrates who have been his electors, with the exception of the
guardians of the law,--shall hold office for five years; and in the
sixth year let another be chosen in like manner to fill his office.
If any one dies while he is holding a public office, and more than
thirty days before his term of office expires, let those whose business
it is elect another to the office in the same manner as before. And if
any one who is entrusted with orphans dies, let the relations both on
the father's and mother's side, who are residing at home, including
cousins, appoint another guardian within ten days, or be fined a drachma
a day for neglect to do so.
A city which has no regular courts of law ceases to be a city; and
again, if a judge is silent and says no more in preliminary proceedings
than the litigants, as is the case in arbitrations, he will never be
able to decide justly; wherefore a multitude of judges will not easily
judge well, nor a few if they are bad. The point in dispute between the
parties should be made clear; and time, and deliberation, and repeated
examination, greatly tend to clear up doubts. For this reason, he who
goes to law with another, should go first of all to his neighbours and
friends who know best the questions at issue. And if he be unable to
obtain from them a satisfactory decision, let him have recourse to
another court; and if the two courts cannot settle the matter, let a
third put an end to the suit.
Now the establishment of courts of justice may be regarded as a choice
of magistrates, for every magistrate must also be a judge of some
things; and the judge, though he be not a magistrate, yet in certain
respects is a very important magistrate on the day on which he is
determining a suit. Regarding then the judges also as magistrates, let
us say who are fit to be judges, and of what they are to be judges,
and how many of them are to judge in each suit. Let that be the supreme
tribunal which the litigants appoint in common for themselves, choosing
certain persons by agreement. And let there be two other tribunals: one
for private causes, when a citizen accuses another of wronging him and
wishes to get a decision; the other for public causes, in which some
citizen is of opinion that the public has been wronged by an individual,
and is willing to vindicate the common interests. And we must not forget
to mention how the judges are to be qualified, and who they are to be.
In the first place, let there be a tribunal open to all private persons
who are trying causes one against another for the third time, and let
this be composed as follows:--All the officers of state, as well annual
as those holding office for a longer period, when the new year is about
to commence, in the month following after the summer solstice, on the
last day but one of the year, shall meet in some temple, and calling God
to witness, shall dedicate one judge from every magistracy to be their
first-fruits, choosing in each office him who seems to them to be
the best, and whom they deem likely to decide the causes of his
fellow-citizens during the ensuing year in the best and holiest manner.
And when the election is completed, a scrutiny shall be held in the
presence of the electors themselves, and if any one be rejected another
shall be chosen in the same manner. Those who have undergone the
scrutiny shall judge the causes of those who have declined the inferior
courts, and shall give their vote openly. The councillors and other
magistrates who have elected them shall be required to be hearers and
spectators of the causes; and any one else may be present who pleases.
If one man charges another with having intentionally decided wrong, let
him go to the guardians of the law and lay his accusation before them,
and he who is found guilty in such a case shall pay damages to the
injured party equal to half the injury; but if he shall appear to
deserve a greater penalty, the judges shall determine what additional
punishment he shall suffer, and how much more he ought to pay to the
public treasury, and to the party who brought the suit.
In the judgment of offences against the state, the people ought to
participate, for when any one wrongs the state all are wronged, and may
reasonably complain if they are not allowed to share in the decision.
Such causes ought to originate with the people, and the ought also to
have the final decision of them, but the trial of them shall take place
before three of the highest magistrates, upon whom the plaintiff and the
defendant shall agree; and if they are not able to come to an agreement
themselves, the council shall choose one of the two proposed. And in
private suits, too, as far as is possible, all should have a share; for
he who has no share in the administration of justice, is apt to imagine
that he has no share in the state at all. And for this reason there
shall be a court of law in every tribe, and the judges shall be
chosen by lot;--they shall give their decisions at once, and shall be
inaccessible to entreaties. The final judgment shall rest with
that court which, as we maintain, has been established in the most
incorruptible form of which human things admit: this shall be the court
established for those who are unable to get rid of their suits either in
the courts of neighbours or of the tribes.
Thus much of the courts of law, which, as I was saying, cannot be
precisely defined either as being or not being offices; a superficial
sketch has been given of them, in which some things have been told and
others omitted. For the right place of an exact statement of the laws
respecting suits, under their several heads, will be at the end of the
body of legislation;--let us then expect them at the end. Hitherto our
legislation has been chiefly occupied with the appointment of offices.
Perfect unity and exactness, extending to the whole and every particular
of political administration, cannot be attained to the full, until the
discussion shall have a beginning, middle, and end, and is complete in
every part. At present we have reached the election of magistrates, and
this may be regarded as a sufficient termination of what preceded. And
now there need no longer be any delay or hesitation in beginning the
work of legislation.
CLEINIAS: I like what you have said, Stranger; and I particularly like
your manner of tacking on the beginning of your new discourse to the end
of the former one.
ATHENIAN: Thus far, then, the old men's rational pastime has gone off
well.
CLEINIAS: You mean, I suppose, their serious and noble pursuit?
ATHENIAN: Perhaps; but I should like to know whether you and I are
agreed about a certain thing.
CLEINIAS: About what thing?
ATHENIAN: You know the endless labour which painters expend upon their
pictures--they are always putting in or taking out colours, or whatever
be the term which artists employ; they seem as if they would never cease
touching up their works, which are always being made brighter and more
beautiful.
CLEINIAS: I know something of these matters from report, although I have
never had any great acquaintance with the art.
ATHENIAN: No matter; we may make use of the illustration
notwithstanding:--Suppose that some one had a mind to paint a figure in
the most beautiful manner, in the hope that his work instead of losing
would always improve as time went on--do you not see that being a
mortal, unless he leaves some one to succeed him who will correct
the flaws which time may introduce, and be able to add what is left
imperfect through the defect of the artist, and who will further
brighten up and improve the picture, all his great labour will last but
a short time?
CLEINIAS: True.
ATHENIAN: And is not the aim of the legislator similar? First,
he desires that his laws should be written down with all possible
exactness; in the second place, as time goes on and he has made an
actual trial of his decrees, will he not find omissions? Do you imagine
that there ever was a legislator so foolish as not to know that many
things are necessarily omitted, which some one coming after him must
correct, if the constitution and the order of government is not to
deteriorate, but to improve in the state which he has established?
CLEINIAS: Assuredly, that is the sort of thing which every one would
desire.
ATHENIAN: And if any one possesses any means of accomplishing this by
word or deed, or has any way great or small by which he can teach a
person to understand how he can maintain and amend the laws, he should
finish what he has to say, and not leave the work incomplete.
CLEINIAS: By all means.
ATHENIAN: And is not this what you and I have to do at the present
moment?
CLEINIAS: What have we to do?
ATHENIAN: As we are about to legislate and have chosen our guardians of
the law, and are ourselves in the evening of life, and they as compared
with us are young men, we ought not only to legislate for them, but to
endeavour to make them not only guardians of the law but legislators
themselves, as far as this is possible.
CLEINIAS: Certainly; if we can.
ATHENIAN: At any rate, we must do our best.
CLEINIAS: Of course.
ATHENIAN: We will say to them--O friends and saviours of our laws, in
laying down any law, there are many particulars which we shall omit,
and this cannot be helped; at the same time, we will do our utmost to
describe what is important, and will give an outline which you shall
fill up. And I will explain on what principle you are to act. Megillus
and Cleinias and I have often spoken to one another touching these
matters, and we are of opinion that we have spoken well. And we hope
that you will be of the same mind with us, and become our disciples, and
keep in view the things which in our united opinion the legislator and
guardian of the law ought to keep in view. There was one main point
about which we were agreed--that a man's whole energies throughout life
should be devoted to the acquisition of the virtue proper to a man,
whether this was to be gained by study, or habit, or some mode of
acquisition, or desire, or opinion, or knowledge--and this applies
equally to men and women, old and young--the aim of all should always be
such as I have described; anything which may be an impediment, the good
man ought to show that he utterly disregards. And if at last necessity
plainly compels him to be an outlaw from his native land, rather than
bow his neck to the yoke of slavery and be ruled by inferiors, and he
has to fly, an exile he must be and endure all such trials, rather than
accept another form of government, which is likely to make men worse.
These are our original principles; and do you now, fixing your eyes
upon the standard of what a man and a citizen ought or ought not to
be, praise and blame the laws--blame those which have not this power
of making the citizen better, but embrace those which have; and with
gladness receive and live in them; bidding a long farewell to other
institutions which aim at goods, as they are termed, of a different
kind.
Let us proceed to another class of laws, beginning with their foundation
in religion. And we must first return to the number 5040--the entire
number had, and has, a great many convenient divisions, and the number
of the tribes which was a twelfth part of the whole, being correctly
formed by 21 x 20 (5040/(21 x 20), i.e., 5040/420 = 12), also has them.
And not only is the whole number divisible by twelve, but also the
number of each tribe is divisible by twelve. Now every portion should be
regarded by us as a sacred gift of Heaven, corresponding to the months
and to the revolution of the universe (compare Tim.). Every city has a