Laws
ATHENIAN: And ought the legislator alone among writers to withhold his
opinion about the beautiful, the good, and the just, and not to teach
what they are, and how they are to be pursued by those who intend to be
happy?
CLEINIAS: Certainly not.
ATHENIAN: And is it disgraceful for Homer and Tyrtaeus and other poets
to lay down evil precepts in their writings respecting life and the
pursuits of men, but not so disgraceful for Lycurgus and Solon and
others who were legislators as well as writers? Is it not true that of
all the writings to be found in cities, those which relate to laws, when
you unfold and read them, ought to be by far the noblest and the
best? and should not other writings either agree with them, or if they
disagree, be deemed ridiculous? We should consider whether the laws
of states ought not to have the character of loving and wise parents,
rather than of tyrants and masters, who command and threaten, and,
after writing their decrees on walls, go their ways; and whether, in
discoursing of laws, we should not take the gentler view of them which
may or may not be attainable--at any rate, we will show our readiness
to entertain such a view, and be prepared to undergo whatever may be the
result. And may the result be good, and if God be gracious, it will be
good!
CLEINIAS: Excellent; let us do as you say.
ATHENIAN: Then we will now consider accurately, as we proposed, what
relates to robbers of temples, and all kinds of thefts, and offences in
general; and we must not be annoyed if, in the course of legislation,
we have enacted some things, and have not made up our minds about some
others; for as yet we are not legislators, but we may soon be. Let us,
if you please, consider these matters.
CLEINIAS: By all means.
ATHENIAN: Concerning all things honourable and just, let us then
endeavour to ascertain how far we are consistent with ourselves, and how
far we are inconsistent, and how far the many, from whom at any rate we
should profess a desire to differ, agree and disagree among themselves.
CLEINIAS: What are the inconsistencies which you observe in us?
ATHENIAN: I will endeavour to explain. If I am not mistaken, we are all
agreed that justice, and just men and things and actions, are all fair,
and, if a person were to maintain that just men, even when they are
deformed in body, are still perfectly beautiful in respect of the
excellent justice of their minds, no one would say that there was any
inconsistency in this.
CLEINIAS: They would be quite right.
ATHENIAN: Perhaps; but let us consider further, that if all things which
are just are fair and honourable, in the term 'all' we must include just
sufferings which are the correlatives of just actions.
CLEINIAS: And what is the inference?
ATHENIAN: The inference is, that a just action in partaking of the just
partakes also in the same degree of the fair and honourable.
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: And must not a suffering which partakes of the just principle
be admitted to be in the same degree fair and honourable, if the
argument is consistently carried out?
CLEINIAS: True.
ATHENIAN: But then if we admit suffering to be just and yet
dishonourable, and the term 'dishonourable' is applied to justice, will
not the just and the honourable disagree?
CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
ATHENIAN: A thing not difficult to understand; the laws which have been
already enacted would seem to announce principles directly opposed to
what we are saying.
CLEINIAS: To what?
ATHENIAN: We had enacted, if I am not mistaken, that the robber of
temples, and he who was the enemy of law and order, might justly be put
to death, and we were proceeding to make divers other enactments of
a similar nature. But we stopped short, because we saw that these
sufferings are infinite in number and degree, and that they are, at
once, the most just and also the most dishonourable of all sufferings.
And if this be true, are not the just and the honourable at one time all
the same, and at another time in the most diametrical opposition?
CLEINIAS: Such appears to be the case.
ATHENIAN: In this discordant and inconsistent fashion does the language
of the many rend asunder the honourable and just.
CLEINIAS: Very true, Stranger.
ATHENIAN: Then now, Cleinias, let us see how far we ourselves are
consistent about these matters.
CLEINIAS: Consistent in what?
ATHENIAN: I think that I have clearly stated in the former part of the
discussion, but if I did not, let me now state--
CLEINIAS: What?
ATHENIAN: That all bad men are always involuntarily bad; and from this I
must proceed to draw a further inference.
CLEINIAS: What is it?
ATHENIAN: That the unjust man may be bad, but that he is bad against his
will. Now that an action which is voluntary should be done involuntarily
is a contradiction; wherefore he who maintains that injustice is
involuntary will deem that the unjust does injustice involuntarily.
I too admit that all men do injustice involuntarily, and if any
contentious or disputatious person says that men are unjust against
their will, and yet that many do injustice willingly, I do not agree
with him. But, then, how can I avoid being inconsistent with myself, if
you, Cleinias, and you, Megillus, say to me--Well, Stranger, if all this
be as you say, how about legislating for the city of the Magnetes--shall
we legislate or not--what do you advise? Certainly we will, I should
reply. Then will you determine for them what are voluntary and what
are involuntary crimes, and shall we make the punishments greater of
voluntary errors and crimes and less for the involuntary? or shall we
make the punishment of all to be alike, under the idea that there is no
such thing as voluntary crime?
CLEINIAS: Very good, Stranger; and what shall we say in answer to these
objections?
ATHENIAN: That is a very fair question. In the first place, let us--
CLEINIAS: Do what?
ATHENIAN: Let us remember what has been well said by us already,
that our ideas of justice are in the highest degree confused and
contradictory. Bearing this in mind, let us proceed to ask ourselves
once more whether we have discovered a way out of the difficulty. Have
we ever determined in what respect these two classes of actions differ
from one another? For in all states and by all legislators whatsoever,
two kinds of actions have been distinguished--the one, voluntary, the
other, involuntary; and they have legislated about them accordingly. But
shall this new word of ours, like an oracle of God, be only spoken, and
get away without giving any explanation or verification of itself?
How can a word not understood be the basis of legislation? Impossible.
Before proceeding to legislate, then, we must prove that they are two,
and what is the difference between them, that when we impose the penalty
upon either, every one may understand our proposal, and be able in some
way to judge whether the penalty is fitly or unfitly inflicted.
CLEINIAS: I agree with you, Stranger; for one of two things is certain:
either we must not say that all unjust acts are involuntary, or we must
show the meaning and truth of this statement.
ATHENIAN: Of these two alternatives, the one is quite intolerable--not
to speak what I believe to be the truth would be to me unlawful and
unholy. But if acts of injustice cannot be divided into voluntary and
involuntary, I must endeavour to find some other distinction between
them.
CLEINIAS: Very true, Stranger; there cannot be two opinions among us
upon that point.
ATHENIAN: Reflect, then; there are hurts of various kinds done by the
citizens to one another in the intercourse of life, affording plentiful
examples both of the voluntary and involuntary.
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: I would not have any one suppose that all these hurts are
injuries, and that these injuries are of two kinds--one, voluntary, and
the other, involuntary; for the involuntary hurts of all men are quite
as many and as great as the voluntary. And please to consider whether I
am right or quite wrong in what I am going to say; for I deny, Cleinias
and Megillus, that he who harms another involuntarily does him an injury
involuntarily, nor should I legislate about such an act under the idea
that I am legislating for an involuntary injury. But I should rather say
that such a hurt, whether great or small, is not an injury at all; and,
on the other hand, if I am right, when a benefit is wrongly conferred,
the author of the benefit may often be said to injure. For I maintain, O
my friends, that the mere giving or taking away of anything is not to be
described either as just or unjust; but the legislator has to consider
whether mankind do good or harm to one another out of a just principle
and intention. On the distinction between injustice and hurt he must
fix his eye; and when there is hurt, he must, as far as he can, make the
hurt good by law, and save that which is ruined, and raise up that
which is fallen, and make that which is dead or wounded whole. And when
compensation has been given for injustice, the law must always seek to
win over the doers and sufferers of the several hurts from feelings of
enmity to those of friendship.
CLEINIAS: Very good.
ATHENIAN: Then as to unjust hurts (and gains also, supposing the
injustice to bring gain), of these we may heal as many as are capable
of being healed, regarding them as diseases of the soul; and the cure of
injustice will take the following direction.
CLEINIAS: What direction?
ATHENIAN: When any one commits any injustice, small or great, the law
will admonish and compel him either never at all to do the like again,
or never voluntarily, or at any rate in a far less degree; and he must
in addition pay for the hurt. Whether the end is to be attained by word
or action, with pleasure or pain, by giving or taking away privileges,
by means of fines or gifts, or in whatsoever way the law shall proceed
to make a man hate injustice, and love or not hate the nature of the
just--this is quite the noblest work of law. But if the legislator sees
any one who is incurable, for him he will appoint a law and a penalty.
He knows quite well that to such men themselves there is no profit in
the continuance of their lives, and that they would do a double good to
the rest of mankind if they would take their departure, inasmuch as they
would be an example to other men not to offend, and they would relieve
the city of bad citizens. In such cases, and in such cases only, the
legislator ought to inflict death as the punishment of offences.
CLEINIAS: What you have said appears to me to be very reasonable, but
will you favour me by stating a little more clearly the difference
between hurt and injustice, and the various complications of the
voluntary and involuntary which enter into them?
ATHENIAN: I will endeavour to do as you wish: Concerning the soul, thus
much would be generally said and allowed, that one element in her nature
is passion, which may be described either as a state or a part of her,
and is hard to be striven against and contended with, and by irrational
force overturns many things.
CLEINIAS: Very true.
ATHENIAN: And pleasure is not the same with passion, but has an opposite
power, working her will by persuasion and by the force of deceit in all
things.
CLEINIAS: Quite true.
ATHENIAN: A man may truly say that ignorance is a third cause of crimes.
Ignorance, however, may be conveniently divided by the legislator into
two sorts: there is simple ignorance, which is the source of lighter
offences, and double ignorance, which is accompanied by a conceit of
wisdom; and he who is under the influence of the latter fancies that he
knows all about matters of which he knows nothing. This second kind of