Laws
rest?' To this I shall reply that some things are in motion and others
at rest. 'And do not things which move move in a place, and are not the
things which are at rest at rest in a place?' Certainly. 'And some move
or rest in one place and some in more places than one?' You mean to say,
we shall rejoin, that those things which rest at the centre move in one
place, just as the circumference goes round of globes which are said to
be at rest? 'Yes.' And we observe that, in the revolution, the motion
which carries round the larger and the lesser circle at the same time
is proportionally distributed to greater and smaller, and is greater and
smaller in a certain proportion. Here is a wonder which might be thought
an impossibility, that the same motion should impart swiftness and
slowness in due proportion to larger and lesser circles. 'Very true.'
And when you speak of bodies moving in many places, you seem to me to
mean those which move from one place to another, and sometimes have
one centre of motion and sometimes more than one because they turn upon
their axis; and whenever they meet anything, if it be stationary, they
are divided by it; but if they get in the midst between bodies which are
approaching and moving towards the same spot from opposite directions,
they unite with them. 'I admit the truth of what you are saying.'
Also when they unite they grow, and when they are divided they waste
away--that is, supposing the constitution of each to remain, or if that
fails, then there is a second reason of their dissolution. 'And when are
all things created and how?' Clearly, they are created when the first
principle receives increase and attains to the second dimension, and
from this arrives at the one which is neighbour to this, and after
reaching the third becomes perceptible to sense. Everything which is
thus changing and moving is in process of generation; only when at
rest has it real existence, but when passing into another state it is
destroyed utterly. Have we not mentioned all motions that there are,
and comprehended them under their kinds and numbered them with the
exception, my friends, of two?
CLEINIAS: Which are they?
ATHENIAN: Just the two, with which our present enquiry is concerned.
CLEINIAS: Speak plainer.
ATHENIAN: I suppose that our enquiry has reference to the soul?
CLEINIAS: Very true.
ATHENIAN: Let us assume that there is a motion able to move other
things, but not to move itself; that is one kind; and there is
another kind which can move itself as well as other things, working in
composition and decomposition, by increase and diminution and generation
and destruction--that is also one of the many kinds of motion.
CLEINIAS: Granted.
ATHENIAN: And we will assume that which moves other, and is changed by
other, to be the ninth, and that which changes itself and others, and
is coincident with every action and every passion, and is the true
principle of change and motion in all that is--that we shall be inclined
to call the tenth.
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: And which of these ten motions ought we to prefer as being the
mightiest and most efficient?
CLEINIAS: I must say that the motion which is able to move itself is ten
thousand times superior to all the others.
ATHENIAN: Very good; but may I make one or two corrections in what I
have been saying?
CLEINIAS: What are they?
ATHENIAN: When I spoke of the tenth sort of motion, that was not quite
correct.
CLEINIAS: What was the error?
ATHENIAN: According to the true order, the tenth was really the first
in generation and power; then follows the second, which was strangely
enough termed the ninth by us.
CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
ATHENIAN: I mean this: when one thing changes another, and that another,
of such will there be any primary changing element? How can a thing
which is moved by another ever be the beginning of change? Impossible.
But when the self-moved changes other, and that again other, and thus
thousands upon tens of thousands of bodies are set in motion, must
not the beginning of all this motion be the change of the self-moving
principle?
CLEINIAS: Very true, and I quite agree.
ATHENIAN: Or, to put the question in another way, making answer to
ourselves: If, as most of these philosophers have the audacity
to affirm, all things were at rest in one mass, which of the
above-mentioned principles of motion would first spring up among them?
CLEINIAS: Clearly the self-moving; for there could be no change in them
arising out of any external cause; the change must first take place in
themselves.
ATHENIAN: Then we must say that self-motion being the origin of all
motions, and the first which arises among things at rest as well as
among things in motion, is the eldest and mightiest principle of change,
and that which is changed by another and yet moves other is second.
CLEINIAS: Quite true.
ATHENIAN: At this stage of the argument let us put a question.
CLEINIAS: What question?
ATHENIAN: If we were to see this power existing in any earthy, watery,
or fiery substance, simple or compound--how should we describe it?
CLEINIAS: You mean to ask whether we should call such a self-moving
power life?
ATHENIAN: I do.
CLEINIAS: Certainly we should.
ATHENIAN: And when we see soul in anything, must we not do the
same--must we not admit that this is life?
CLEINIAS: We must.
ATHENIAN: And now, I beseech you, reflect--you would admit that we have
a threefold knowledge of things?
CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
ATHENIAN: I mean that we know the essence, and that we know the
definition of the essence, and the name--these are the three; and there
are two questions which may be raised about anything.
CLEINIAS: How two?
ATHENIAN: Sometimes a person may give the name and ask the definition;
or he may give the definition and ask the name. I may illustrate what I
mean in this way.
CLEINIAS: How?
ATHENIAN: Number like some other things is capable of being divided
into equal parts; when thus divided, number is named 'even,' and the
definition of the name 'even' is 'number divisible into two equal
parts'?
CLEINIAS: True.
ATHENIAN: I mean, that when we are asked about the definition and
give the name, or when we are asked about the name and give the
definition--in either case, whether we give name or definition, we speak
of the same thing, calling 'even' the number which is divided into two
equal parts.
CLEINIAS: Quite true.
ATHENIAN: And what is the definition of that which is named 'soul'? Can
we conceive of any other than that which has been already given--the
motion which can move itself?
CLEINIAS: You mean to say that the essence which is defined as the
self-moved is the same with that which has the name soul?
ATHENIAN: Yes; and if this is true, do we still maintain that there
is anything wanting in the proof that the soul is the first origin
and moving power of all that is, or has become, or will be, and their
contraries, when she has been clearly shown to be the source of change
and motion in all things?
CLEINIAS: Certainly not; the soul as being the source of motion, has
been most satisfactorily shown to be the oldest of all things.
ATHENIAN: And is not that motion which is produced in another, by reason
of another, but never has any self-moving power at all, being in truth
the change of an inanimate body, to be reckoned second, or by any lower
number which you may prefer?
CLEINIAS: Exactly.
ATHENIAN: Then we are right, and speak the most perfect and absolute
truth, when we say that the soul is prior to the body, and that the body
is second and comes afterwards, and is born to obey the soul, which is
the ruler?
CLEINIAS: Nothing can be more true.
ATHENIAN: Do you remember our old admission, that if the soul was prior
to the body the things of the soul were also prior to those of the body?
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: Then characters and manners, and wishes and reasonings, and
true opinions, and reflections, and recollections are prior to length
and breadth and depth and strength of bodies, if the soul is prior to
the body.
CLEINIAS: To be sure.
ATHENIAN: In the next place, we must not of necessity admit that the
soul is the cause of good and evil, base and honourable, just and
unjust, and of all other opposites, if we suppose her to be the cause of
all things?
CLEINIAS: We must.
ATHENIAN: And as the soul orders and inhabits all things that move,
however moving, must we not say that she orders also the heavens?
CLEINIAS: Of course.
ATHENIAN: One soul or more? More than one--I will answer for you; at any
rate, we must not suppose that there are less than two--one the author
of good, and the other of evil.
CLEINIAS: Very true.
ATHENIAN: Yes, very true; the soul then directs all things in heaven,
and earth, and sea by her movements, and these are described by the
terms--will, consideration, attention, deliberation, opinion true and
false, joy and sorrow, confidence, fear, hatred, love, and other primary
motions akin to these; which again receive the secondary motions of
corporeal substances, and guide all things to growth and decay, to
composition and decomposition, and to the qualities which accompany
them, such as heat and cold, heaviness and lightness, hardness and
softness, blackness and whiteness, bitterness and sweetness, and all
those other qualities which the soul uses, herself a goddess, when truly
receiving the divine mind she disciplines all things rightly to their
happiness; but when she is the companion of folly, she does the very
contrary of all this. Shall we assume so much, or do we still entertain
doubts?
CLEINIAS: There is no room at all for doubt.
ATHENIAN: Shall we say then that it is the soul which controls heaven
and earth, and the whole world? that it is a principle of wisdom and
virtue, or a principle which has neither wisdom nor virtue? Suppose that
we make answer as follows:
CLEINIAS: How would you answer?
ATHENIAN: If, my friend, we say that the whole path and movement of
heaven, and of all that is therein, is by nature akin to the movement
and revolution and calculation of mind, and proceeds by kindred laws,
then, as is plain, we must say that the best soul takes care of the
world and guides it along the good path.
CLEINIAS: True.
ATHENIAN: But if the world moves wildly and irregularly, then the evil
soul guides it.
CLEINIAS: True again.
ATHENIAN: Of what nature is the movement of mind? To this question it is
not easy to give an intelligent answer; and therefore I ought to assist
you in framing one.
CLEINIAS: Very good.
ATHENIAN: Then let us not answer as if we would look straight at the
sun, making ourselves darkness at midday--I mean as if we were under the
impression that we could see with mortal eyes, or know adequately the
nature of mind--it will be safer to look at the image only.
CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
ATHENIAN: Let us select of the ten motions the one which mind chiefly
resembles; this I will bring to your recollection, and will then make
the answer on behalf of us all.
CLEINIAS: That will be excellent.
ATHENIAN: You will surely remember our saying that all things were
either at rest or in motion?
CLEINIAS: I do.
ATHENIAN: And that of things in motion some were moving in one place,
and others in more than one?
CLEINIAS: Yes.
ATHENIAN: Of these two kinds of motion, that which moves in one place
must move about a centre like globes made in a lathe, and is most
entirely akin and similar to the circular movement of mind.
CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
ATHENIAN: In saying that both mind and the motion which is in one place
move in the same and like manner, in and about the same, and in relation