Laws
to the same, and according to one proportion and order, and are like the
motion of a globe, we invented a fair image, which does no discredit to
our ingenuity.
CLEINIAS: It does us great credit.
ATHENIAN: And the motion of the other sort which is not after the same
manner, nor in the same, nor about the same, nor in relation to the
same, nor in one place, nor in order, nor according to any rule or
proportion, may be said to be akin to senselessness and folly?
CLEINIAS: That is most true.
ATHENIAN: Then, after what has been said, there is no difficulty in
distinctly stating, that since soul carries all things round, either the
best soul or the contrary must of necessity carry round and order and
arrange the revolution of the heaven.
CLEINIAS: And judging from what has been said, Stranger, there would be
impiety in asserting that any but the most perfect soul or souls carries
round the heavens.
ATHENIAN: You have understood my meaning right well, Cleinias, and now
let me ask you another question.
CLEINIAS: What are you going to ask?
ATHENIAN: If the soul carries round the sun and moon, and the other
stars, does she not carry round each individual of them?
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: Then of one of them let us speak, and the same argument will
apply to all.
CLEINIAS: Which will you take?
ATHENIAN: Every one sees the body of the sun, but no one sees his soul,
nor the soul of any other body living or dead; and yet there is great
reason to believe that this nature, unperceived by any of our senses, is
circumfused around them all, but is perceived by mind; and therefore by
mind and reflection only let us apprehend the following point.
CLEINIAS: What is that?
ATHENIAN: If the soul carries round the sun, we shall not be far wrong
in supposing one of three alternatives.
CLEINIAS: What are they?
ATHENIAN: Either the soul which moves the sun this way and that, resides
within the circular and visible body, like the soul which carries us
about every way; or the soul provides herself with an external body
of fire or air, as some affirm, and violently propels body by body;
or thirdly, she is without such a body, but guides the sun by some
extraordinary and wonderful power.
CLEINIAS: Yes, certainly; the soul can only order all things in one of
these three ways.
ATHENIAN: And this soul of the sun, which is therefore better than the
sun, whether taking the sun about in a chariot to give light to men, or
acting from without, or in whatever way, ought by every man to be deemed
a God.
CLEINIAS: Yes, by every man who has the least particle of sense.
ATHENIAN: And of the stars too, and of the moon, and of the years and
months and seasons, must we not say in like manner, that since a soul
or souls having every sort of excellence are the causes of all of them,
those souls are Gods, whether they are living beings and reside in
bodies, and in this way order the whole heaven, or whatever be the
place and mode of their existence--and will any one who admits all this
venture to deny that all things are full of Gods?
CLEINIAS: No one, Stranger, would be such a madman.
ATHENIAN: And now, Megillus and Cleinias, let us offer terms to him who
has hitherto denied the existence of the Gods, and leave him.
CLEINIAS: What terms?
ATHENIAN: Either he shall teach us that we were wrong in saying that the
soul is the original of all things, and arguing accordingly; or, if he
be not able to say anything better, then he must yield to us and live
for the remainder of his life in the belief that there are Gods. Let us
see, then, whether we have said enough or not enough to those who deny
that there are Gods.
CLEINIAS: Certainly, quite enough, Stranger.
ATHENIAN: Then to them we will say no more. And now we are to address
him who, believing that there are Gods, believes also that they take no
heed of human affairs: To him we say--O thou best of men, in believing
that there are Gods you are led by some affinity to them, which attracts
you towards your kindred and makes you honour and believe in them. But
the fortunes of evil and unrighteous men in private as well as public
life, which, though not really happy, are wrongly counted happy in
the judgment of men, and are celebrated both by poets and prose
writers--these draw you aside from your natural piety. Perhaps you have
seen impious men growing old and leaving their children's children in
high offices, and their prosperity shakes your faith--you have known or
heard or been yourself an eyewitness of many monstrous impieties, and
have beheld men by such criminal means from small beginnings attaining
to sovereignty and the pinnacle of greatness; and considering all these
things you do not like to accuse the Gods of them, because they are your
relatives; and so from some want of reasoning power, and also from an
unwillingness to find fault with them, you have come to believe that
they exist indeed, but have no thought or care of human things. Now,
that your present evil opinion may not grow to still greater impiety,
and that we may if possible use arguments which may conjure away the
evil before it arrives, we will add another argument to that originally
addressed to him who utterly denied the existence of the Gods. And do
you, Megillus and Cleinias, answer for the young man as you did before;
and if any impediment comes in our way, I will take the word out of your
mouths, and carry you over the river as I did just now.
CLEINIAS: Very good; do as you say, and we will help you as well as we
can.
ATHENIAN: There will probably be no difficulty in proving to him that
the Gods care about the small as well as about the great. For he was
present and heard what was said, that they are perfectly good, and that
the care of all things is most entirely natural to them.
CLEINIAS: No doubt he heard that.
ATHENIAN: Let us consider together in the next place what we mean by
this virtue which we ascribe to them. Surely we should say that to be
temperate and to possess mind belongs to virtue, and the contrary to
vice?
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: Yes; and courage is a part of virtue, and cowardice of vice?
CLEINIAS: True.
ATHENIAN: And the one is honourable, and the other dishonourable?
CLEINIAS: To be sure.
ATHENIAN: And the one, like other meaner things, is a human quality, but
the Gods have no part in anything of the sort?
CLEINIAS: That again is what everybody will admit.
ATHENIAN: But do we imagine carelessness and idleness and luxury to be
virtues? What do you think?
CLEINIAS: Decidedly not.
ATHENIAN: They rank under the opposite class?
CLEINIAS: Yes.
ATHENIAN: And their opposites, therefore, would fall under the opposite
class?
CLEINIAS: Yes.
ATHENIAN: But are we to suppose that one who possesses all these good
qualities will be luxurious and heedless and idle, like those whom the
poet compares to stingless drones?
CLEINIAS: And the comparison is a most just one.
ATHENIAN: Surely God must not be supposed to have a nature which He
Himself hates? he who dares to say this sort of thing must not be
tolerated for a moment.
CLEINIAS: Of course not. How could he have?
ATHENIAN: Should we not on any principle be entirely mistaken in
praising any one who has some special business entrusted to him, if he
have a mind which takes care of great matters and no care of small ones?
Reflect; he who acts in this way, whether he be God or man, must act
from one of two principles.
CLEINIAS: What are they?
ATHENIAN: Either he must think that the neglect of the small matters
is of no consequence to the whole, or if he knows that they are of
consequence, and he neglects them, his neglect must be attributed to
carelessness and indolence. Is there any other way in which his neglect
can be explained? For surely, when it is impossible for him to take care
of all, he is not negligent if he fails to attend to these things
great or small, which a God or some inferior being might be wanting in
strength or capacity to manage?
CLEINIAS: Certainly not.
ATHENIAN: Now, then, let us examine the offenders, who both alike
confess that there are Gods, but with a difference--the one saying that
they may be appeased, and the other that they have no care of small
matters: there are three of us and two of them, and we will say to
them--In the first place, you both acknowledge that the Gods hear and
see and know all things, and that nothing can escape them which is
matter of sense and knowledge: do you admit this?
CLEINIAS: Yes.
ATHENIAN: And do you admit also that they have all power which mortals
and immortals can have?
CLEINIAS: They will, of course, admit this also.
ATHENIAN: And surely we three and they two--five in all--have
acknowledged that they are good and perfect?
CLEINIAS: Assuredly.
ATHENIAN: But, if they are such as we conceive them to be, can we
possibly suppose that they ever act in the spirit of carelessness
and indolence? For in us inactivity is the child of cowardice, and
carelessness of inactivity and indolence.
CLEINIAS: Most true.
ATHENIAN: Then not from inactivity and carelessness is any God ever
negligent; for there is no cowardice in them.
CLEINIAS: That is very true.
ATHENIAN: Then the alternative which remains is, that if the Gods
neglect the lighter and lesser concerns of the universe, they
neglect them because they know that they ought not to care about such
matters--what other alternative is there but the opposite of their
knowing?
CLEINIAS: There is none.
ATHENIAN: And, O most excellent and best of men, do I understand you to
mean that they are careless because they are ignorant, and do not
know that they ought to take care, or that they know, and yet like the
meanest sort of men, knowing the better, choose the worse because they
are overcome by pleasures and pains?
CLEINIAS: Impossible.
ATHENIAN: Do not all human things partake of the nature of soul? And is
not man the most religious of all animals?
CLEINIAS: That is not to be denied.
ATHENIAN: And we acknowledge that all mortal creatures are the property
of the Gods, to whom also the whole of heaven belongs?
CLEINIAS: Certainly.
ATHENIAN: And, therefore, whether a person says that these things are to
the Gods great or small--in either case it would not be natural for the
Gods who own us, and who are the most careful and the best of owners, to
neglect us. There is also a further consideration.
CLEINIAS: What is it?
ATHENIAN: Sensation and power are in an inverse ratio to each other in
respect to their ease and difficulty.
CLEINIAS: What do you mean?
ATHENIAN: I mean that there is greater difficulty in seeing and hearing
the small than the great, but more facility in moving and controlling
and taking care of small and unimportant things than of their opposites.
CLEINIAS: Far more.
ATHENIAN: Suppose the case of a physician who is willing and able to
cure some living thing as a whole--how will the whole fare at his hands
if he takes care only of the greater and neglects the parts which are
lesser?
CLEINIAS: Decidedly not well.
ATHENIAN: No better would be the result with pilots or generals, or
householders or statesmen, or any other such class, if they neglected
the small and regarded only the great--as the builders say, the larger
stones do not lie well without the lesser.
CLEINIAS: Of course not.
ATHENIAN: Let us not, then, deem God inferior to human workmen, who, in
proportion to their skill, finish and perfect their works, small as well
as great, by one and the same art; or that God, the wisest of
beings, who is both willing and able to take care, is like a lazy
good-for-nothing, or a coward, who turns his back upon labour and gives