Memoirs of the Duchesse de Dino (Afterwards Duchesse de Talleyrand et de Sagan), 1836-1840
Ministry has been re-established at Paris. The despatch was read to M.
Guizot and then to the King. Can it betoken a desire for a closer
union? I hardly think so, but I do think that there is a general wish
to avoid war in Russia as well as elsewhere; that there is a wish to
calm the feelings of France and induce her to disarm, and that
disarmament may follow elsewhere, for these general armaments are the
ruin of Europe.
APPENDIX
I
_Message from President Jackson of the United States_
Since the last session of the Congress the validity of our claims upon
France, as arranged by the treaty of 1831, has been recognised by both
branches of the Legislature, and the money has been voted for their
satisfaction, but I regret to be obliged to inform you that payment
has not yet been made.
A short summary of the most important incidents in this lengthy
controversy will show how far the motives, by which attempts are made
to justify this delay, are absolutely indefensible.
When I took office I found the United States applying in vain to the
justice of France for the satisfaction of claims the validity of which
has never been doubted, and has now been admitted by France herself in
the most solemn manner. The long-standing nature of these claims,
their entire justice, and the aggravating circumstances from which
they sprang, are too well known to the American people for a further
description of them to be necessary. It is enough to say that for a
period of ten years and more, with the exception of a few intervals,
our commerce has been the object of constant aggression on the part of
France, which usually took the form of condemning ships and cargo in
virtue of arbitrary decrees, contravening both international law and
the stipulations of the treaties, while ships were burnt on the high
seas, and seizures and confiscations took place under special Imperial
rescripts in the harbours of other nations then in French occupation
or under French control.
Such, as is admitted, has been the nature of our grievances,
grievances in many cases so flagrant that even the authors of them
never denied our right to satisfaction. Some idea of the extent of our
losses may be gained by considering the fact that the burning of
vessels at sea and the seizure and sacrifice in forced sales of
American property, apart from awards to privateers before condemnation
was pronounced, or without such formality, have brought the French
Treasury a sum of twenty-four millions of francs, apart from
considerable customs dues.
For twenty years this business has been the subject of negotiations,
which were interrupted only during the short period when France was
overwhelmed by the united forces of Europe. During this period, when
other nations were extorting their claims at the bayonet's point, the
United States suspended their demands in consideration of the
disasters that had overpowered the brave people to whom they felt
themselves bound, and in consideration of the brotherly help which
they had received from France in their own times of suffering and
danger. The effect of this prolonged and fruitless discussion,
disastrous both to our relations with France and to our national
character, was obvious, and my own course of duty was perfectly clear
to me. I was bound either to insist upon the satisfaction of our
claims within a reasonable period or to abandon them entirely. I could
not doubt that this course was most conformable to the interests and
honour of the two countries.
Instructions were therefore given from this point of view to the
Minister who was once more sent to demand satisfaction. When Congress
met on October 10, 1829, I considered it my duty to refer to these
claims and to the dilatory attitude of France, in terms sufficiently
strong to draw the serious attention of both countries to the matter.
The French Minister then in power took offence at the message, under
the idea that it contained a threat, upon which basis the French
Government did not care to negotiate. The American Minister refuted
the interpretation which the French authorities attempted to place
upon the message, and reminded the French Minister that the
President's message was a communication addressed not to foreign
governments, but to the Congress of the United States, and that in
this message it was his duty under the Constitution to provide this
body with information upon the state of the Union with reference both
to foreign as well as to domestic affairs. That if, again, in the
performance of this task he deemed it his duty to call the attention
of the Congress to the consequences which might result from strained
relations with another Government, one might reasonably suppose that
he acted under a sense of duty in thus frankly communicating with
another branch of his own Government, and not that he acted with the
object of threatening a foreign Power. The French Government was
satisfied and negotiations were continued. These were concluded by the
treaty of July 4, 1831, which partially recognised the justice of our
claims, and promised payment to the amount of twenty-five millions of
francs in six annual instalments. The ratifications of the treaty were
exchanged at Washington on February 2, 1832. Five days later the
treaty was presented to Congress, which immediately passed the Acts
necessary to secure to France the commercial advantages conceded to
her by the arrangement. The treaty had been previously ratified with
full solemnity by the King of France, in terms which are certainly no
mere formality: "We, regarding the above convention as satisfactory in
all and each of the conclusions which it contains, declare, both for
ourselves and for our heirs and successors, that it is accepted,
approved, ratified, and confirmed, and by these presents, signed with
our hand, we do accept, approve, ratify, and confirm it, promising
upon our faith and word as King to observe and to secure its
observance inviolably without contravention at any time and without
permitting direct or indirect contravention for any reason or pretext
whatsoever." The official announcement that ratifications had been
exchanged with the United States reached Paris while the Chambers were
in session. The extraordinary delays prejudicial to ourselves by the
introduction of which the French Government have prevented the
execution of the treaty, have already been explained to Congress. It
is sufficient to point out that the session then opened was allowed to
pass without any effort being made to obtain the necessary funds; that
the two following sessions also went by without any action resembling
a serious effort to secure a decision upon the question; and that not
until the fourth session, nearly four years after the conclusion of
the treaty, and more than two years after the exchange of
ratifications, was the law referring to the execution of the treaty
put to the vote and rejected.
Meanwhile the United States Government, in full confidence that the
treaty concluded would be executed in good faith, and with equal
confidence that measures would be taken to secure payment of the first
instalment, which was to fall due on February 2, 1833, negotiated a
bill for the amount through the Bank of the United States. When this
bill was presented by bearer the French Government allowed it to be
protested. Apart from the loss incurred by non-payment, the United
States had to meet the claims of the bank, which asserted infringement
of its interests, in satisfaction of which this institution seized and
still holds a corresponding amount from the State revenues.
Congress was in session when the decision of the Chambers was
communicated to Washington, and an immediate announcement of this
decision on the part of France was a step which was naturally expected
from the President. The profound discontent shown by public opinion
and the similar excitement which prevailed in the Congress, made it
more than probable that a recourse to immediate measures for securing
redress would be the consequence of any appeal made upon this question
to Congress itself.
With a sincere desire to preserve the peaceful relations which have so
long existed between the two countries, I wished to avoid this step if
I could be convinced that in thus acting, neither the interests nor
the honour of my country would be compromised. Without the most
complete assurance upon this point I could not hope to discharge the
responsibility which I assumed in allowing the Congress to adjourn
without giving it an account of the affair. These conditions seemed to
be satisfied by the assurances which were given to me.
The French Government had foreseen that the feeling in the United
States aroused by this second rejection of the credit vote would be as
I have described it, and prompt measures had been taken by the French
Government to anticipate the consequences. The King personally
expressed through our Minister at Paris his profound regret for the
decision of the Chambers and promised to send a ship of war with
despatches to his Minister here, forthwith authorising him to give
every assurance to the government and the people of the United States
that the treaty would be in any case faithfully performed by France.
The warship arrived and the Minister received his instructions.
Professing to act in virtue of these instructions he gave the most
solemn assurances that immediately after the new elections, and as
soon as ever the Chamber would allow, the French Chambers would be
convoked and that the attempt to obtain the necessary credit would be
renewed; that all the constitutional power of the King and his
Ministers would be exerted to secure this object. It was understood
that he pledged himself to this end, and this Government expressly
informed him that the question ought to be decided at a date
sufficiently near to enable Congress to learn the result at the
commencement of the session.
Relying upon these assurances, I undertook the responsibility of
allowing Congress to separate without offering any communication upon
the matter.
Our expectations, reasonably based upon promises so solemnly given,
were not realised. The French Chambers met on July 31, 1834, and
though our Minister at Paris urged the French Ministers to lay the
matter before the Chambers, they refused. He then insisted that if the
Chambers had been prorogued without coming to any conclusion in the
matter, they should be again convoked in time to enable their decision
to be known at Washington before the meeting of Congress. This
reasonable demand was not only refused, but the Chambers were
prorogued until December 29, a date so remote that their decision in
all probability could not have been obtained in time to reach
Washington before the Congress was forced to adjourn by the terms of
the Constitution. The reasons given by the Ministry for their refusal
to convoke the Chambers at a nearer date were afterwards shown to have
been by no means insurmountable, for the Chambers were convoked on
December 1 for the special purpose of considering home affairs, though
this fact did not become known to our Government until after the last
session of the Congress. As our reasonable expectations were thus
deceived, it was my imperative duty to consult Congress as to the
advisability of reprisals, in case the stipulations of the treaty were
not promptly carried out. For this purpose a communication was
indispensable. It would have been unworthy of us in the course of this
communication to refrain from an explanation of all the facts
necessary for an exact comprehension of the affair, or to shrink from
truth for fear of offending others. On the other hand, to have gone a
step further with the object of wounding the pride of a government and