Memoirs of the Duchesse de Dino (Afterwards Duchesse de Talleyrand et de Sagan), 1836-1840
_Memorandum addressed by_ LORD PALMERSTON _to the French
Government and handed to_ M. THIERS _by_ Mr. BÜLWER _at the
beginning of September 1840_.
FOREIGN OFFICE, _August 31, 1840._
SIR,
Various reasons have prevented me from sending you earlier and
transmitting through you to the French Government certain observations
which Her Majesty's Government desire to make upon the Memorandum
which was handed to me on July 24 by the French Ambassador to this
Court, in reply to the Memorandum which I had handed to His Excellency
on the 17th of that month; but I am now able to fulfil this task.
Her Majesty's Government observes with great satisfaction the friendly
tone of the French Memorandum and its assurances of keen desire to
maintain peace and the balance of power in Europe. The Memorandum of
July 17 was conceived in a spirit no less friendly towards France, and
Her Majesty's Government is equally anxious that France should be able
to keep peace in Europe and prevent the smallest disturbance of that
equilibrium which now exists between the Powers.
Her Majesty's Government has been equally delighted to see the
declarations contained in the French Memorandum stating that France
wishes to act in concert with the other four Powers with reference to
the affairs in the Levant.
On this point the sentiments of Her Majesty's Government correspond in
every respect with those of the French Government: for, in the first
place, throughout the negotiations which have proceeded upon this
question for more than twelve months, the British Government has
constantly been anxious that a concert of the five Powers should be
established, and that all five should agree to a common line of
action; Her Majesty's Government though not bound to defer, as proof
of this desire, to the other proposals which have been made from time
to time to the French Government, and to which reference has been made
in the French Memorandum, can unhesitatingly declare that no European
Power can be less influenced than Great Britain by private views or by
any desire and hope of exclusive advantage which might arise in her
favour from the conclusion of the questions in the Levant. On the
contrary, in these matters the interests of Great Britain are
identical with those of Europe in general, and are based upon the
maintenance of the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire as
a guarantee for the preservation of peace and as essential to the
maintenance of the balance of power in general.
To these principles the French Government has promised its full
adherence, and offered it in more than one instance, especially in a
despatch from Marshal Soult, under date July 17, 1839. This despatch
was officially communicated to the four Powers. It has also offered
support in a collective note, dated July 27, 1839, and in the speech
of the King of the French to the Chambers in December 1839.
In these documents the French Government declares its determination to
maintain the integrity and independence of the Ottoman Empire under
the reigning dynasty as essential to the balance of power and as a
guarantee for the preservation of peace; in a despatch from Marshal
Soult the French Government has shown its resolution to oppose by
action and influence any combination which might be hostile to the
maintenance of this integrity and this independence.
Hence the Governments of Great Britain and of France are entirely
agreed upon the object towards which their policy should be directed.
The only difference existing between the two Governments is a
difference of opinion concerning the means regarded as most advisable
to obtain this common end. On this point, as the French Memorandum
observes, a difference of opinion may naturally be expected.
On this point a great difference of opinion has arisen between the two
Governments, which seems to have become stronger and more pronounced
in proportion as the two Governments have more completely explained
their respective views, and this fact for the moment prevents the two
Governments from acting in concert to attain their common purpose. On
the one hand, Her Majesty's Government has repeatedly pointed out her
opinion that it would be impossible to maintain the integrity of the
Turkish Empire and to preserve the independence of the Sultan, if
Mehemet Ali were to be left in possession of Syria, as the military
key of Asiatic Turkey, and that if Mehemet Ali were to continue to
occupy this province as well as Egypt, he would be able at any time to
threaten Bagdad from the south, Diarbekir and Erzeroum from the east,
Koniah, Brousse, and Constantinople from the north; and that the same
ambitious spirit which has driven Mehemet Ali under other conditions
to revolt against his Sovereign, would soon induce him hereafter to
take up arms for further invasions; and that for this purpose he would
always maintain a large army on foot; that the Sultan, on the other
hand, would be continually on guard against the possible danger, and
would also be obliged to remain under arms, so that the Sultan and
Mehemet Ali would continue to maintain arms upon a war footing for the
purpose of observing one another; that a collision would be the
inevitable result of these continual suspicions and mutual alarms, and
that even if there should be no premeditated aggression upon either
side, any collision of the sort would necessarily lead to foreign
intervention in the Turkish Empire, while such intervention, thus
provoked, would produce the most serious discord between the Powers of
Europe.
Her Majesty's Government has pointed out as probable, if not as
certain, an even greater danger than this, which would result from the
continued occupation of Syria by Mehemet Ali; namely, that the Pasha,
trusting to military force and wearied by his political position as a
subject, would carry out an intention which he has frankly avowed to
the Powers of Europe that he would never abandon, and would declare
himself independent. Such a declaration upon his part would
incontestably amount to a dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, and,
what is more, this dismemberment might happen under such conditions as
would make it more difficult for the European Powers to act in concert
for the purpose of forcing the Pasha to withdraw such a declaration,
and more difficult than it is for them to-day to combine their forces
and oblige him to evacuate Syria.
Her Majesty's Government has therefore invariably asserted that the
Powers which are anxious to preserve the integrity of the Turkish
Empire and to maintain the independence of the Sultan should unite in
helping the latter to re-establish his direct authority over Syria.
The French Government, on the other hand, has asserted that if Mehemet
Ali were once assured of the permanent occupation of Egypt and Syria
he would remain a faithful subject and become the strongest support of
the Sultan; that the Sultan could not govern if the Pasha were not in
possession of this province, the military and financial resources of
which would then be of greater use to him than if they were in the
hands of the Sultan himself; that every confidence might be placed in
the sincerity with which Mehemet Ali had renounced all ulterior views,
and in his protestations of faithful devotion to his Sovereign; that
the Pasha is an old man, and upon his death, even if his rights are
recognised as hereditary, the totality of his acquired power would
revert to the Sultan, because all possessions in Mohammedan countries,
of whatever nature, are in reality held only upon tenure for lifetime.
The French Government has also maintained that Mehemet Ali will never
be willing to evacuate Syria of his own accord and that the only means
by which European Powers could use force would be operations by sea
which would be inadequate, or by land which would be dangerous; that
these operations by sea would not expel the Egyptians from Syria and
would merely rouse Mehemet Ali to begin an attack upon Constantinople;
while the measures which might be taken in such a case to defend the
capital and in particular any operations on land undertaken by the
troops of the allied Powers to expel the army of Mehemet Ali from
Syria, would be more fatal to the Turkish Empire than the state of
things could possibly be which these measures would be intended to
remedy.
To these objections Her Majesty's Government replied that no reliance
could be placed upon the recent protestations of Mehemet Ali; that his
ambition is insatiable and would only be increased by success; and
that to provide him with the opportunity of invading, or to leave
within his reach the objects of his desire would be to sow the seeds
of inevitable collisions; that Syria is no further from Constantinople
than a large number of well-administered provinces are from their
capitals in other States and can be as well governed from
Constantinople as from Alexandria; that it is impossible for the
resources of this province to be of any use to the Sultan in the hands
of a governor who might turn them against his master at any moment and
that they would be more useful if they were in the hands or at the
disposal of the Sultan himself; that, as Ibrahim had an army at his
orders, he had also the means, upon the decease of Mehemet Ali, of
securing his own succession to any power of which the latter might be
possessed at his death; that it was not fit that the Great Powers
should advise the Sultan to conclude a public arrangement with Mehemet
Ali, with the secret intention of hereafter breaking the arrangement
upon the first occasion that might seem opportune.
None the less the French Government maintained its opinion and refused
to take part in an arrangement which included the use of coercive
measures.
But the French Memorandum laid down that in the course of recent
circumstances no positive proposal has been made to France upon which
she was called to explain her attitude and that consequently the
resolution which England communicated to her in the Memorandum of July
17, doubtless in the name of the four Powers, must not be considered
as actuated by refusals which France has not made. This passage
obliges me briefly to remind you of the general course of
negotiations.
The original opinion conceived by Her Majesty's Government, of which
the five Powers were informed, including France, in 1839, was that the
arrangement between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali which might secure a
permanent state of peace in the Levant, would be of a nature to
confine the power delegated to Mehemet Ali to Egypt alone and would
re-establish the direct authority of the Sultan throughout Syria, both
in Candia and in all the towns of the Holy Land; thus interposing the
desert between the direct power of the Sultan and the province of
which the administration would be left to the Pasha. And Her Majesty's
Government proposed that by way of compensation for the evacuation of
Syria, Mehemet Ali should receive an assurance that his male
descendants should succeed him as governors in Egypt, under the
sovereignty of the Sultan.
To this proposal the French Government raised objections saying that
such an arrangement would doubtless be the best if there were any
means of executing it, but that Mehemet Ali would offer resistance and
that any measures of violence which the allies might employ to reduce
him, would produce effects which might be more dangerous to the peace
of Europe and to the independence of the Porte, than the actual state
of affairs between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali could possibly be; that
although the French Government thus refused to agree to England's
plan, during the long space of time which had subsequently elapsed, it
had not proposed any plan of its own. Further, in September 1839,