Memoirs of the Duchesse de Dino (Afterwards Duchesse de Talleyrand et de Sagan), 1836-1840
Comte Sébastiani, the French Ambassador at the Court of London,
proposed to draw a line from the east to the west of the sea, nearly
from Beyrout to the desert near Damascus and to declare that all the
land to the south of this line should be administered by Mehemet Ali
and that all to the north should be under the immediate authority of
the Sultan. The French Ambassador then gave Her Majesty's Government
to understand that if such an arrangement were admitted by the five
Powers, France would unite with the four Powers, in case of need, for
the use of coercive measures, with the object of forcing Mehemet Ali
to submission.
I pointed out to Comte Sébastiani that such an arrangement was open,
though in a less degree, to all the objections applicable to the
present relative position of the two parties and that consequently Her
Majesty's Government could not accede to it. I observed that it seemed
inconsistent on the part of France to express her willingness to force
Mehemet Ali to agree to an arrangement which would obviously be
incomplete and inadequate to secure the proposed object, while
objecting to coercive measures when they were proposed for the purpose
of forcing consent to the arrangement desired by Her Majesty, the
execution of which, as France admitted, would entirely fulfil the
desired object.
To these arguments Comte Sébastiani replied that the objections
advanced by the French Government to the employment of coercive
measures against Mehemet Ali, were founded upon considerations of
domestic government, and that these objections would be removed if
the French Government was enabled to prove to the nation and to the
Chambers that it had obtained the best possible conditions for Mehemet
All and that he had refused to accept them.
As this insinuation was not admitted by Her Majesty's Government, the
French Government communicated officially on September 27, 1839, its
own plan, which was that Mehemet Ali should become a hereditary
governor of Egypt and of all Syria, and governor for life of Candia,
surrendering nothing but the district of Adana and Arabia. The French
Government did not say a word as to its knowledge of Mehemet Ali's
inclination to adhere to this arrangement, nor did it declare that if
he refused to agree, France would take coercive measures to compel
him.
Obviously Her Majesty's Government could not consent to this plan,
which was open to more objections than the present state of things,
the more so as the gift to Mehemet Ali of the legal and hereditary
title to a third of the Ottoman Empire, which he now occupies only by
force, would have been to begin the positive dismemberment of the
Empire.
Her Majesty's Government, therefore, being desirous to show its
readiness to come to an agreement with France upon these questions,
stated that it would yield its well-founded objection to any extension
of Mehemet Ali's power beyond Egypt and would join the French
Government in recommending the Sultan to grant to Mehemet Ali, apart
from the pashalik of Egypt, the administration of the lower part of
Syria, to be bounded on the north by a line drawn from Cape Carmel to
the southern extremity of the Lake of Tiberias, and by a line from
this point to the Gulf of Akaba, provided that France would join the
four Powers in coercive measures if Mehemet Ali refused this offer.
This proposal, however, was not accepted by the French Government,
which now declared its inability to join in coercive measures or to be
a party to an arrangement to which Mehemet Ali would not consent.
While these discussions were proceeding with France, separate
negotiations were in progress between England and Russia, of which
full details and information have been sent to the French Government.
Negotiations with France were suspended for a time at the outset of
this year, firstly because a change of Ministry was expected, and
secondly because a change of Ministry took place.
In the month of May, however, Baron von Neumann and myself resolved,
upon the advice of our respective governments, to make a last effort
with the object of inducing France to begin a treaty which was to be
concluded with the other four Powers, and we submitted to the French
Government, through M. Guizot, another proposal for an arrangement
between the Sultan and Mehemet Ali. One objection put forward by the
French Government to the last proposals of England was that although
it was proposed to give Mehemet Ali the strong position extending from
Mount Carmel to Mount Tabor, he would be deprived of the fortress of
Acre.
To overcome this objection Baron von Neumann and myself proposed that
the northern frontiers of the part of Syria to be administered by the
Pasha should extend from Cape Nakhora to the furthest point of the
Lake of Tiberias, thus including within the boundary the fortress of
Acre; and that the eastern frontier should extend along the western
coast of the Lake of Tiberias and thence to the Gulf of Akaba. We
declared that the government of this part of Syria could be granted to
Mehemet Ali for life only, and that neither England nor Austria would
consent to grant Mehemet Ali hereditary rights over any part of Syria.
I further declared to M. Guizot that I could go no further in the way
of concessions in the hope of securing the co-operation of France, and
that this was our last proposal. Baron von Neumann and myself
communicated these facts separately to M. Guizot: Baron von Neumann
first, and myself the next day. M. Guizot told me he would inform his
Government of this proposal and of the facts which I had laid before
him, and that he would let me know the answer as soon as he had
received it. A short time afterwards the plenipotentiaries of Austria,
Prussia, and Russia informed me that they had every reason to believe
that the French Government, instead of deciding upon the proposal for
themselves, had sent it to Alexandria to learn the decision of Mehemet
Ali; that the four Powers who had undertaken the business were thus
confronted, not with France, but with Mehemet Ali; that, apart from
the inevitable delay, this was an action which their respective courts
had never intended to take and one to which they would never consent;
and that the French Government had thus placed the plenipotentiaries
in a very embarrassing position. I agreed with them that their
objections were justified with regard to the conduct which they
attributed to the French Government, but that M. Guizot had said not a
word to me of what would be done. Mehemet Ali had been informed that
the French Government at that moment was fully occupied with
parliamentary questions and could naturally ask for time before
sending an answer to our proposals, and that in any case delay could
do no great harm. About June 27, M. Guizot came to me and read me a
letter addressed to him by M. Thiers, containing the answer of the
French Government to our proposal. This answer was a formal refusal.
M. Thiers said that _the French Government positively knew that
Mehemet Ali would not consent to a division of Syria unless he were
forced to do so; that France could not co-operate in coercive measures
against Mehemet Ali under these conditions, and that therefore she
could not become a party to the proposed arrangement_.
As France had thus refused to yield to England's ultimatum, the
plenipotentiaries were bound to consider what steps should be adopted
by their Governments. The position of the five Powers was this: the
five had declared their conviction that in the interests of the
balance of power and of the peace of Europe it was essential to
preserve the independence and integrity of the Ottoman Empire under
the reigning dynasty; all five had declared that they would use all
their influence to maintain this integrity and this independence; but
France, on the one hand, insisted that the best means to secure this
result was to abandon the Sultan to the mercies of Mehemet Ali and to
advise him to submit to the conditions which Mehemet might impose upon
him in order to preserve peace _sine qua non_; while on the other side
the four Powers regarded any further military occupation of the
Sultan's provinces by Mehemet Ali as likely to destroy the integrity
of the Turkish Empire and to be fatal to its independence; they
therefore thought that it was advisable to confine Mehemet Ali within
narrower limits.
After about two months of deliberations, France not only refused to
consent to the plan proposed by the four Powers as an ultimatum upon
their part, but further declared that she would not become a party to
any arrangement to which Mehemet Ali did not voluntarily consent
without the use of force. It only remained then for the four Great
Powers to adopt as an alternative the principle laid down by France,
which consisted in the complete submission of the Sultan to the
demands of Mehemet Ali; or to act upon their principles and force
Mehemet Ali to accept an arrangement compatible in form with the
rights of the Sultan, and compatible in content with the integrity of
the Ottoman Empire. If the former alternative were adopted, the
co-operation of France would be secured; in the latter alternative the
hope of that co-operation must be abandoned.
The keen desire of the four Powers to secure the co-operation of
France has been shown by the fact that they have continued their
efforts for several months in the course of negotiations. They are
well aware of the value of French support, not only for the particular
object which they have in view, but also with reference to the general
and permanent interests of Europe. But what they failed to secure, and
what they esteemed, was the co-operation of France in the maintenance
of peace to secure the eventual safety of Europe and the practical
execution of the principles to which the five Powers had declared
their agreement. They desired the co-operation of France, not only for
themselves and for the advantage and opportunity of the moment, but
also for the good which it might have conferred, and for the future
consequences which might have resulted from it. They wished to
co-operate with France to do good, but they were not prepared to
co-operate with her in doing evil.
Thinking, therefore, that the policy advised by France was unjust, and
in no way judicious with regard to the Sultan; that it might become
the cause of misfortunes in Europe; that it was inconsistent with the
public engagement undertaken by the five Powers, and that it was
incompatible with the principles which they had wisely emphasised, the
four Powers felt that they could not make the sacrifice demanded of
them, and buy the help of France at so high a price--if, indeed, that
could be called co-operation which merely consisted in allowing events
to follow their natural course. As the four Powers were thus unable to
adopt the views of France, they determined to accomplish their
mission.
This determination, however, was not unexpected and the probable
eventualities had not been hidden from France. On the contrary, upon
several occasions during the course of negotiations, and no later than
October 1 last, I had pointed out to the French Ambassador that our
desire to remain united with France must have a limit, that we were
anxious to go forward with France but not disposed to come to a
standstill with her, and that if she could not contrive to act in
harmony with the four Powers, she must not be astonished if she saw
them come to an understanding between themselves and acting apart from
France.
Comte Sabastiani told me that he foresaw that we should thus act, and
that he could predict the result; that we were bound to try and
conclude our arrangements without the help of France, and that we
should find that our means were inadequate; that France would be a