Meno
SOCRATES: Because they require to be fastened in order to keep them, and
if they are not fastened they will play truant and run away.
MENO: Well, what of that?
SOCRATES: I mean to say that they are not very valuable possessions if
they are at liberty, for they will walk off like runaway slaves; but
when fastened, they are of great value, for they are really beautiful
works of art. Now this is an illustration of the nature of true
opinions: while they abide with us they are beautiful and fruitful,
but they run away out of the human soul, and do not remain long, and
therefore they are not of much value until they are fastened by the tie
of the cause; and this fastening of them, friend Meno, is recollection,
as you and I have agreed to call it. But when they are bound, in the
first place, they have the nature of knowledge; and, in the second
place, they are abiding. And this is why knowledge is more honourable
and excellent than true opinion, because fastened by a chain.
MENO: What you are saying, Socrates, seems to be very like the truth.
SOCRATES: I too speak rather in ignorance; I only conjecture. And yet
that knowledge differs from true opinion is no matter of conjecture with
me. There are not many things which I profess to know, but this is most
certainly one of them.
MENO: Yes, Socrates; and you are quite right in saying so.
SOCRATES: And am I not also right in saying that true opinion leading
the way perfects action quite as well as knowledge?
MENO: There again, Socrates, I think you are right.
SOCRATES: Then right opinion is not a whit inferior to knowledge, or
less useful in action; nor is the man who has right opinion inferior to
him who has knowledge?
MENO: True.
SOCRATES: And surely the good man has been acknowledged by us to be
useful?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Seeing then that men become good and useful to states, not
only because they have knowledge, but because they have right opinion,
and that neither knowledge nor right opinion is given to man by nature
or acquired by him--(do you imagine either of them to be given by
nature?
MENO: Not I.)
SOCRATES: Then if they are not given by nature, neither are the good by
nature good?
MENO: Certainly not.
SOCRATES: And nature being excluded, then came the question whether
virtue is acquired by teaching?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: If virtue was wisdom (or knowledge), then, as we thought, it
was taught?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And if it was taught it was wisdom?
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And if there were teachers, it might be taught; and if there
were no teachers, not?
MENO: True.
SOCRATES: But surely we acknowledged that there were no teachers of
virtue?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: Then we acknowledged that it was not taught, and was not
wisdom?
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And yet we admitted that it was a good?
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the right guide is useful and good?
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: And the only right guides are knowledge and true
opinion--these are the guides of man; for things which happen by chance
are not under the guidance of man: but the guides of man are true
opinion and knowledge.
MENO: I think so too.
SOCRATES: But if virtue is not taught, neither is virtue knowledge.
MENO: Clearly not.
SOCRATES: Then of two good and useful things, one, which is knowledge,
has been set aside, and cannot be supposed to be our guide in political
life.
MENO: I think not.
SOCRATES: And therefore not by any wisdom, and not because they were
wise, did Themistocles and those others of whom Anytus spoke govern
states. This was the reason why they were unable to make others like
themselves--because their virtue was not grounded on knowledge.
MENO: That is probably true, Socrates.
SOCRATES: But if not by knowledge, the only alternative which remains
is that statesmen must have guided states by right opinion, which is in
politics what divination is in religion; for diviners and also prophets
say many things truly, but they know not what they say.
MENO: So I believe.
SOCRATES: And may we not, Meno, truly call those men 'divine' who,
having no understanding, yet succeed in many a grand deed and word?
MENO: Certainly.
SOCRATES: Then we shall also be right in calling divine those whom we
were just now speaking of as diviners and prophets, including the whole
tribe of poets. Yes, and statesmen above all may be said to be divine
and illumined, being inspired and possessed of God, in which condition
they say many grand things, not knowing what they say.
MENO: Yes.
SOCRATES: And the women too, Meno, call good men divine--do they not?
and the Spartans, when they praise a good man, say 'that he is a divine
man.'
MENO: And I think, Socrates, that they are right; although very likely
our friend Anytus may take offence at the word.
SOCRATES: I do not care; as for Anytus, there will be another
opportunity of talking with him. To sum up our enquiry--the result
seems to be, if we are at all right in our view, that virtue is neither
natural nor acquired, but an instinct given by God to the virtuous. Nor
is the instinct accompanied by reason, unless there may be supposed to
be among statesmen some one who is capable of educating statesmen. And
if there be such an one, he may be said to be among the living
what Homer says that Tiresias was among the dead, 'he alone has
understanding; but the rest are flitting shades'; and he and his virtue
in like manner will be a reality among shadows.
MENO: That is excellent, Socrates.
SOCRATES: Then, Meno, the conclusion is that virtue comes to the
virtuous by the gift of God. But we shall never know the certain truth
until, before asking how virtue is given, we enquire into the actual
nature of virtue. I fear that I must go away, but do you, now that you
are persuaded yourself, persuade our friend Anytus. And do not let him
be so exasperated; if you can conciliate him, you will have done good
service to the Athenian people.