Pascal's Pensées
Who then will blame Christians for not being able to give a reason for
their belief, since they profess a religion for which they cannot give a
reason? They declare, in expounding it to the world, that it is a
foolishness, _stultitiam_;[90] and then you complain that they do not
prove it! If they proved it, they would not keep their word; it is in
lacking proofs, that they are not lacking in sense. "Yes, but although
this excuses those who offer it as such, and takes away from them the
blame of putting it forward without reason, it does not excuse those who
receive it." Let us then examine this point, and say, "God is, or He is
not." But to which side shall we incline? Reason can decide nothing
here. There is an infinite chaos which separated us. A game is being
played at the extremity of this infinite distance where heads or tails
will turn up. What will you wager? According to reason, you can do
neither the one thing nor the other; according to reason, you can defend
neither of the propositions.
Do not then reprove for error those who have made a choice; for you know
nothing about it. "No, but I blame them for having made, not this
choice, but a choice; for again both he who chooses heads and he who
chooses tails are equally at fault, they are both in the wrong. The true
course is not to wager at all."
Yes; but you must wager. It is not optional. You are embarked. Which
will you choose then? Let us see. Since you must choose, let us see
which interests you least. You have two things to lose, the true and the
good; and two things to stake, your reason and your will, your
knowledge and your happiness; and your nature has two things to shun,
error and misery. Your reason is no more shocked in choosing one rather
than the other, since you must of necessity choose. This is one point
settled. But your happiness? Let us weigh the gain and the loss in
wagering that God is. Let us estimate these two chances. If you gain,
you gain all; if you lose, you lose nothing. Wager, then, without
hesitation that He is.--"That is very fine. Yes, I must wager; but I may
perhaps wager too much."--Let us see. Since there is an equal risk of
gain and of loss, if you had only to gain two lives, instead of one, you
might still wager. But if there were three lives to gain, you would have
to play (since you are under the necessity of playing), and you would be
imprudent, when you are forced to play, not to chance your life to gain
three at a game where there is an equal risk of loss and gain. But there
is an eternity of life and happiness. And this being so, if there were
an infinity of chances, of which one only would be for you, you would
still be right in wagering one to win two, and you would act stupidly,
being obliged to play, by refusing to stake one life against three at a
game in which out of an infinity of chances there is one for you, if
there were an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain. But there is
here an infinity of an infinitely happy life to gain, a chance of gain
against a finite number of chances of loss, and what you stake is
finite. It is all divided; wherever the infinite is and there is not an
infinity of chances of loss against that of gain, there is no time to
hesitate, you must give all. And thus, when one is forced to play, he
must renounce reason to preserve his life, rather than risk it for
infinite gain, as likely to happen as the loss of nothingness.
For it is no use to say it is uncertain if we will gain, and it is
certain that we risk, and that the infinite distance between the
_certainty_ of what is staked and the _uncertainty_ of what will be
gained, equals the finite good which is certainly staked against the
uncertain infinite. It is not so, as every player stakes a certainty to
gain an uncertainty, and yet he stakes a finite certainty to gain a
finite uncertainty, without transgressing against reason. There is not
an infinite distance between the certainty staked and the uncertainty of
the gain; that is untrue. In truth, there is an infinity between the
certainty of gain and the certainty of loss. But the uncertainty of the
gain is proportioned to the certainty of the stake according to the
proportion of the chances of gain and loss. Hence it comes that, if
there are as many risks on one side as on the other, the course is to
play even; and then the certainty of the stake is equal to the
uncertainty of the gain, so far is it from fact that there is an
infinite distance between them. And so our proposition is of infinite
force, when there is the finite to stake in a game where there are equal
risks of gain and of loss, and the infinite to gain. This is
demonstrable; and if men are capable of any truths, this is one.
"I confess it, I admit it. But, still, is there no means of seeing the
faces of the cards?"--Yes, Scripture and the rest, etc. "Yes, but I have
my hands tied and my mouth closed; I am forced to wager, and am not
free. I am not released, and am so made that I cannot believe. What,
then, would you have me do?"
True. But at least learn your inability to believe, since reason brings
you to this, and yet you cannot believe. Endeavour then to convince
yourself, not by increase of proofs of God, but by the abatement of your
passions. You would like to attain faith, and do not know the way; you
would like to cure yourself of unbelief, and ask the remedy for it.
Learn of those who have been bound like you, and who now stake all their
possessions. These are people who know the way which you would follow,
and who are cured of an ill of which you would be cured. Follow the way
by which they began; by acting as if they believed, taking the holy
water, having masses said, etc. Even this will naturally make you
believe, and deaden your acuteness.--"But this is what I am afraid
of."--And why? What have you to lose?
But to show you that this leads you there, it is this which will lessen
the passions, which are your stumbling-blocks.
_The end of this discourse._--Now, what harm will befall you in taking
this side? You will be faithful, honest, humble, grateful, generous, a
sincere friend, truthful. Certainly you will not have those poisonous
pleasures, glory and luxury; but will you not have others? I will tell
you that you will thereby gain in this life, and that, at each step you
take on this road, you will see so great certainty of gain, so much
nothingness in what you risk, that you will at last recognise that you
have wagered for something certain and infinite, for which you have
given nothing.
"Ah! This discourse transports me, charms me," etc.
If this discourse pleases you and seems impressive, know that it is
made by a man who has knelt, both before and after it, in prayer to that
Being, infinite and without parts, before whom he lays all he has, for
you also to lay before Him all you have for your own good and for His
glory, that so strength may be given to lowliness.
234
If we must not act save on a certainty, we ought not to act on religion,
for it is not certain. But how many things we do on an uncertainty, sea
voyages, battles! I say then we must do nothing at all, for nothing is
certain, and that there is more certainty in religion than there is as
to whether we may see to-morrow; for it is not certain that we may see
to-morrow, and it is certainly possible that we may not see it. We
cannot say as much about religion. It is not certain that it is; but who
will venture to say that it is certainly possible that it is not? Now
when we work for to-morrow, and so on an uncertainty, we act reasonably;
for we ought to work for an uncertainty according to the doctrine of
chance which was demonstrated above.
Saint Augustine has seen that we work for an uncertainty, on sea, in
battle, etc. But he has not seen the doctrine of chance which proves
that we should do so. Montaigne has seen that we are shocked at a fool,
and that habit is all-powerful; but he has not seen the reason of this
effect.
All these persons have seen the effects, but they have not seen the
causes. They are, in comparison with those who have discovered the
causes, as those who have only eyes are in comparison with those who
have intellect. For the effects are perceptible by sense, and the causes
are visible only to the intellect. And although these effects are seen
by the mind, this mind is, in comparison with the mind which sees the
causes, as the bodily senses are in comparison with the intellect.
235
_Rem viderunt, causam non viderunt._
236
According to the doctrine of chance, you ought to put yourself to the
trouble of searching for the truth; for if you die without worshipping
the True Cause, you are lost.--"But," say you, "if He had wished me to
worship Him, He would have left me signs of His will."--He has done so;
but you neglect them. Seek them, therefore; it is well worth it.
237
_Chances._--We must live differently in the world, according to these
different assumptions: (1) that we could always remain in it; (2) that
it is certain that we shall not remain here long, and uncertain if we
shall remain here one hour. This last assumption is our condition.
238
What do you then promise me, in addition to certain troubles, but ten
years of self-love (for ten years is the chance), to try hard to please
without success?
239
_Objection._--Those who hope for salvation are so far happy; but they
have as a counterpoise the fear of hell.
_Reply._--Who has most reason to fear hell: he who is in ignorance
whether there is a hell, and who is certain of damnation if there is; or
he who certainly believes there is a hell, and hopes to be saved if
there is?
240
"I would soon have renounced pleasure," say they, "had I faith." For my
part I tell you, "You would soon have faith, if you renounced pleasure."
Now, it is for you to begin. If I could, I would give you faith. I
cannot do so, nor therefore test the truth of what you say. But you can
well renounce pleasure, and test whether what I say is true.
241
_Order._--I would have far more fear of being mistaken, and of finding
that the Christian religion was true, than of not being mistaken in
believing it true.
SECTION IV
OF THE MEANS OF BELIEF
242
_Preface to the second part._--To speak of those who have treated of
this matter.
I admire the boldness with which these persons undertake to speak of
God. In addressing their argument to infidels, their first chapter is to
prove Divinity from the works of nature.[91] I should not be astonished
at their enterprise, if they were addressing their argument to the
faithful; for it is certain that those who have the living faith in
their heart see at once that all existence is none other than the work
of the God whom they adore. But for those in whom this light is
extinguished, and in whom we purpose to rekindle it, persons destitute
of faith and grace, who, seeking with all their light whatever they see
in nature that can bring them to this knowledge, find only obscurity and
darkness; to tell them that they have only to look at the smallest
things which surround them, and they will see God openly, to give them,
as a complete proof of this great and important matter, the course of
the moon and planets, and to claim to have concluded the proof with such
an argument, is to give them ground for believing that the proofs of our
religion are very weak. And I see by reason and experience that nothing
is more calculated to arouse their contempt.
It is not after this manner that Scripture speaks, which has a better
knowledge of the things that are of God. It says, on the contrary, that
God is a hidden God, and that, since the corruption of nature, He has
left men in a darkness from which they can escape only through Jesus