Pascal's Pensées
he be not accustomed to contemplate the wonders of human imagination, he
will marvel that one century has gained for it so much pomp and
reverence. The art of opposition and of revolution is to unsettle
established customs, sounding them even to their source, to point out
their want of authority and justice. We must, it is said, get back to
the natural and fundamental laws of the State, which an unjust custom
has abolished. It is a game certain to result in the loss of all;
nothing will be just on the balance. Yet people readily lend their ear
to such arguments. They shake off the yoke as soon as they recognise it;
and the great profit by their ruin, and by that of these curious
investigators of accepted customs. But from a contrary mistake men
sometimes think they can justly do everything which is not without an
example. That is why the wisest of legislators[116] said that it was
necessary to deceive men for their own good; and another, a good
politician, _Cum veritatem qua liberetur ignoret, expedit quod
fallatur._[117] We must not see the fact of usurpation; law was once
introduced without reason, and has become reasonable. We must make it
regarded as authoritative, eternal, and conceal its origin, if we do not
wish that it should soon come to an end.
295
_Mine, thine._--"This dog is mine," said those poor children; "that is
my place in the sun." Here is the beginning and the image of the
usurpation of all the earth.
296
When the question for consideration is whether we ought to make war, and
kill so many men--condemn so many Spaniards to death--only one man is
judge, and he is an interested party. There should be a third, who is
disinterested.
297
_Veri juris._[118]--We have it no more; if we had it, we should take
conformity to the customs of a country as the rule of justice. It is
here that, not finding justice, we have found force, etc.
298
_Justice, might._--It is right that what is just should be obeyed; it is
necessary that what is strongest should be obeyed. Justice without might
is helpless; might without justice is tyrannical. Justice without might
is gainsaid, because there are always offenders; might without justice
is condemned. We must then combine justice and might, and for this end
make what is just strong, or what is strong just.
Justice is subject to dispute; might is easily recognised and is not
disputed. So we cannot give might to justice, because might has gainsaid
justice, and has declared that it is she herself who is just. And thus
being unable to make what is just strong, we have made what is strong
just.
299
The only universal rules are the laws of the country in ordinary
affairs, and of the majority in others. Whence comes this? From the
might which is in them. Hence it comes that kings, who have power of a
different kind, do not follow the majority of their ministers.
No doubt equality of goods is just; but, being unable to cause might to
obey justice, men have made it just to obey might. Unable to strengthen
justice, they have justified might; so that the just and the strong
should unite, and there should be peace, which is the sovereign good.
300
"When a strong man armed keepeth his goods, his goods are in
peace."[119]
301
Why do we follow the majority? It is because they have more reason? No,
because they have more power.
Why do we follow the ancient laws and opinions? Is it because they are
more sound? No, but because they are unique, and remove from us the root
of difference.
302
... It is the effect of might, not of custom. For those who are capable
of originality are few; the greater number will only follow, and refuse
glory to those inventors who seek it by their inventions. And if these
are obstinate in their wish to obtain glory, and despise those who do
not invent, the latter will call them ridiculous names, and would beat
them with a stick. Let no one then boast of his subtlety, or let him
keep his complacency to himself.
303
Might is the sovereign of the world, and not opinion.--But opinion makes
use of might.--It is might that makes opinion. Gentleness is beautiful
in our opinion. Why? Because he who will dance on a rope will be
alone,[120] and I will gather a stronger mob of people who will say that
it is unbecoming.
304
The cords which bind the respect of men to each other are in general
cords of necessity; for there must be different degrees, all men wishing
to rule, and not all being able to do so, but some being able.
Let us then imagine we see society in the process of formation. Men will
doubtless fight till the stronger party overcomes the weaker, and a
dominant party is established. But when this is once determined, the
masters, who do not desire the continuation of strife, then decree that
the power which is in their hands shall be transmitted as they please.
Some place it in election by the people, others in hereditary
succession, etc.
And this is the point where imagination begins to play its part. Till
now power makes fact; now power is sustained by imagination in a certain
party, in France in the nobility, in Switzerland in the burgesses, etc.
These cords which bind the respect of men to such and such an individual
are therefore the cords of imagination.
305
The Swiss are offended by being called gentlemen, and prove themselves
true plebeians in order to be thought worthy of great office.
306
As duchies, kingships, and magistracies are real and necessary, because
might rules all, they exist everywhere and always. But since only
caprice makes such and such a one a ruler, the principle is not
constant, but subject to variation, etc.
307
The chancellor is grave, and clothed with ornaments, for his position is
unreal. Not so the king, he has power, and has nothing to do with the
imagination. Judges, physicians, etc. appeal only to the imagination.
308
The habit of seeing kings accompanied by guards, drums, officers, and
all the paraphernalia which mechanically inspire respect and awe, makes
their countenance, when sometimes seen alone without these
accompaniments, impress respect and awe on their subjects; because we
cannot separate in thought their persons from the surroundings with
which we see them usually joined. And the world, which knows not that
this effect is the result of habit, believes that it arises by a natural
force, whence come these words, "The character of Divinity is stamped on
his countenance," etc.
309
_Justice._--As custom determines what is agreeable, so also does it
determine justice.
310
_King and tyrant._--I, too, will keep my thoughts secret.
I will take care on every journey.
Greatness of establishment, respect for establishment.
The pleasure of the great is the power to make people happy.
The property of riches is to be given liberally.
The property of each thing must be sought. The property of power is to
protect.
When force attacks humbug, when a private soldier takes the square cap
off a first president, and throws it out of the window.
311
The government founded on opinion and imagination reigns for some time,
and this government is pleasant and voluntary; that founded on might
lasts for ever. Thus opinion is the queen of the world, but might is its
tyrant.
312
Justice is what is established; and thus all our established laws will
necessarily be regarded as just without examination, since they are
established.
313
_Sound opinions of the people._--Civil wars are the greatest of
evils.[121] They are inevitable, if we wish to reward desert; for all
will say they are deserving. The evil we have to fear from a fool who
succeeds by right of birth, is neither so great nor so sure.
314
God has created all for Himself. He has bestowed upon Himself the power
of pain and pleasure.
You can apply it to God, or to yourself. If to God, the Gospel is the
rule. If to yourself, you will take the place of God. As God is
surrounded by persons full of charity, who ask of Him the blessings of
charity that are in His power, so ... Recognise then and learn that you
are only a king of lust, and take the ways of lust.
315
_The reason of effects._--It is wonderful that men would not have me
honour a man clothed in brocade, and followed by seven or eight lackeys!
Why! He will have me thrashed, if I do not salute him. This custom is a
force. It is the same with a horse in fine trappings in comparison with
another! Montaigne[122] is a fool not to see what difference there is,
to wonder at our finding any, and to ask the reason. "Indeed," says he,
"how comes it," etc....
316
_Sound opinions of the people._--To be spruce is not altogether foolish,
for it proves that a great number of people work for one. It shows by
one's hair, that one has a valet, a perfumer, etc., by one's band,
thread, lace, ... etc. Now it is not merely superficial nor merely
outward show to have many arms at command. The more arms one has, the
more powerful one is. To be spruce is to show one's power.
317
Deference means, "Put yourself to inconvenience." This is apparently
silly, but is quite right. For it is to say, "I would indeed put myself
to inconvenience if you required it, since indeed I do so when it is of
no service to you." Deference further serves to distinguish the great.
Now if deference was displayed by sitting in an arm-chair, we should
show deference to everybody, and so no distinction would be made; but,
being put to inconvenience, we distinguish very well.
318
He has four lackeys.
319
How rightly do we distinguish men by external appearances rather than by
internal qualities! Which of us two shall have precedence? Who will give
place to the other? The least clever. But I am as clever as he. We
should have to fight over this. He has four lackeys, and I have only
one. This can be seen; we have only to count. It falls to me to yield,
and I am a fool if I contest the matter. By this means we are at peace,
which is the greatest of boons.
320
The most unreasonable things in the world become most reasonable,
because of the unruliness of men. What is less reasonable than to choose
the eldest son of a queen to rule a State? We do not choose as captain
of a ship the passenger who is of the best family.
This law would be absurd and unjust; but because men are so themselves,
and always will be so, it becomes reasonable and just. For whom will men
choose, as the most virtuous and able? We at once come to blows, as each
claims to be the most virtuous and able. Let us then attach this quality
to something indisputable. This is the king's eldest son. That is clear,
and there is no dispute. Reason can do no better, for civil war is the
greatest of evils.
321
Children are astonished to see their comrades respected.
322
To be of noble birth is a great advantage. In eighteen years it places a
man within the select circle, known and respected, as another would have
merited in fifty years. It is a gain of thirty years without trouble.
323
What is the Ego?
Suppose a man puts himself at a window to see those who pass by. If I
pass by, can I say that he placed himself there to see me? No; for he
does not think of me in particular. But does he who loves someone on
account of beauty really love that person? No; for the small-pox, which
will kill beauty without killing the person, will cause him to love her
no more.
And if one loves me for my judgment, memory, he does not love _me_, for
I can lose these qualities without losing myself. Where, then, is this
Ego, if it be neither in the body nor in the soul? And how love the body
or the soul, except for these qualities which do not constitute _me_,