Pascal's Pensées
I do not admire the excess of a virtue as of valour, except I see at the
same time the excess of the opposite virtue, as in Epaminondas,[132] who
had the greatest valour and the greatest kindness. For otherwise it is
not to rise, it is to fall. We do not display greatness by going to one
extreme, but in touching both at once, and filling all the intervening
space. But perhaps this is only a sudden movement of the soul from one
to the other extreme, and in fact it is ever at one point only, as in
the case of a firebrand. Be it so, but at least this indicates agility
if not expanse of soul.
354
Man's nature is not always to advance; it has its advances and retreats.
Fever has its cold and hot fits; and the cold proves as well as the hot
the greatness of the fire of fever.
The discoveries of men from age to age turn out the same. The kindness
and the malice of the world in general are the same. _Plerumque gratæ
principibus vices._[133]
355
Continuous eloquence wearies.
Princes and kings sometimes play. They are not always on their thrones.
They weary there. Grandeur must be abandoned to be appreciated.
Continuity in everything is unpleasant. Cold is agreeable, that we may
get warm.
Nature acts by progress, _itus et reditus_. It goes and returns, then
advances further, then twice as much backwards, then more forward than
ever, etc.
The tide of the sea behaves in the same manner; and so apparently does
the sun in its course.
356
The nourishment of the body is little by little. Fullness of nourishment
and smallness of substance.
357
When we would pursue virtues to their extremes on either side, vices
present themselves, which insinuate themselves insensibly there, in
their insensible journey towards the infinitely little: and vices
present themselves in a crowd towards the infinitely great, so that we
lose ourselves in them, and no longer see virtues. We find fault with
perfection itself.
358
Man is neither angel nor brute, and the unfortunate thing is that he who
would act the angel acts the brute.[134]
359
We do not sustain ourselves in virtue by our own strength, but by the
balancing of two opposed vices, just as we remain upright amidst two
contrary gales. Remove one of the vices, and we fall into the other.
360
What the Stoics propose is so difficult and foolish!
The Stoics lay down that all those who are not at the high degree of
wisdom are equally foolish and vicious, as those who are two inches
under water.
361
_The sovereign good. Dispute about the sovereign good._--_Ut sis
contentus temetipso et ex te nascentibus bonis._[135] There is a
contradiction, for in the end they advise suicide. Oh! What a happy
life, from which we are to free ourselves as from the plague!
362
_Ex senatus-consultis et plebiscitis_ ...
To ask like passages.
363
_Ex senatus-consultis et plebiscitis scelera exercentur._ Sen. 588.[136]
_Nihil tam absurde dici potest quod non dicatur ab aliquo
philosophorum._ Divin.[137]
_Quibusdam destinatis sententiis consecrati quæ non probant coguntur
defendere._ Cic.[138]
_Ut omnium rerum sic litterarum quoque intemperantia laboramus._
Senec.[139]
_Id maxime quemque decet, quod est cujusque suum maxime._[140]
_Hos natura modos primum dedit._[141] Georg.
_Paucis opus est litteris ad bonam mentem._[142]
_Si quando turpe non sit, tamen non est non turpe quum id a multitudine
laudetur._
_Mihi sic usus est, tibi ut opus est facto, fac._[143] Ter.
364
_Rarum est enim ut satis se quisque vereatur._[144]
_Tot circa unum caput tumultuantes deos._[145]
_Nihil turpius quam cognitioni assertionem præcurrere._ Cic.[146]
_Nec me pudet, ut istos, fateri nescire quid nesciam._[147]
_Melius non incipient._[148]
365
_Thought._--All the dignity of man consists in thought. Thought is
therefore by its nature a wonderful and incomparable thing. It must have
strange defects to be contemptible. But it has such, so that nothing is
more ridiculous. How great it is in its nature! How vile it is in its
defects!
But what is this thought? How foolish it is!
366
The mind of this sovereign judge of the world is not so independent that
it is not liable to be disturbed by the first din about it. The noise of
a cannon is not necessary to hinder its thoughts; it needs only the
creaking of a weathercock or a pulley. Do not wonder if at present it
does not reason well; a fly is buzzing in its ears; that is enough to
render it incapable of good judgment. If you wish it to be able to reach
the truth, chase away that animal which holds its reason in check and
disturbs that powerful intellect which rules towns and kingdoms. Here is
a comical god! _O ridicolosissimo eroe!_
367
The power of flies; they win battles,[149] hinder our soul from acting,
eat our body.
368
When it is said that heat is only the motions of certain molecules, and
light the _conatus recedendi_ which we feel,[150] it astonishes us.
What! Is pleasure only the ballet of our spirits? We have conceived so
different an idea of it! And these sensations seem so removed from those
others which we say are the same as those with which we compare them!
The sensation from the fire, that warmth which affects us in a manner
wholly different from touch, the reception of sound and light, all this
appears to us mysterious, and yet it is material like the blow of a
stone. It is true that the smallness of the spirits which enter into the
pores touches other nerves, but there are always some nerves touched.
369
Memory is necessary for all the operations of reason.
370
[Chance gives rise to thoughts, and chance removes them; no art can keep
or acquire them.
A thought has escaped me. I wanted to write it down. I write instead,
that it has escaped me.]
371
[When I was small, I hugged my book; and because it sometimes happened
to me to ... in believing I hugged it, I doubted....]
372
In writing down my thought, it sometimes escapes me; but this makes me
remember my weakness, that I constantly forget. This is as instructive
to me as my forgotten thought; for I strive only to know my nothingness.
373
_Scepticism._--I shall here write my thoughts without order, and not
perhaps in unintentional confusion; that is true order, which will
always indicate my object by its very disorder. I should do too much
honour to my subject, if I treated it with order, since I want to show
that it is incapable of it.
374
What astonishes me most is to see that all the world is not astonished
at its own weakness. Men act seriously, and each follows his own mode of
life, not because it is in fact good to follow since it is the custom,
but as if each man knew certainly where reason and justice are. They
find themselves continually deceived, and by a comical humility think it
is their own fault, and not that of the art which they claim always to
possess. But it is well there are so many such people in the world, who
are not sceptics for the glory of scepticism, in order to show that man
is quite capable of the most extravagant opinions, since he is capable
of believing that he is not in a state of natural and inevitable
weakness, but, on the contrary, of natural wisdom. Nothing fortifies
scepticism more than that there are some who are not sceptics; if all
were so, they would be wrong.
375
[I have passed a great part of my life believing that there was justice,
and in this I was not mistaken; for there is justice according as God
has willed to reveal it to us. But I did not take it so, and this is
where I made a mistake; for I believed that our justice was essentially
just, and that I had that whereby to know and judge of it. But I have so
often found my right judgment at fault, that at last I have come to
distrust myself, and then others. I have seen changes in all nations and
men, and thus after many changes of judgment regarding true justice, I
have recognised that our nature was but in continual change, and I have
not changed since; and if I changed, I would confirm my opinion.
The sceptic Arcesilaus,[151] who became a dogmatist.]
376
This sect derives more strength from its enemies than from its friends;
for the weakness of man is far more evident in those who know it not
than in those who know it.
377
Discourses on humility are a source of pride in the vain, and of
humility in the humble. So those on scepticism cause believers to
affirm. Few men speak humbly of humility, chastely of chastity, few
doubtingly of scepticism. We are only falsehood, duplicity,
contradiction; we both conceal and disguise ourselves from ourselves.
378
_Scepticism._--Excess, like defect of intellect, is accused of madness.
Nothing is good but mediocrity. The majority has settled that, and finds
fault with him who escapes it at whichever end. I will not oppose it. I
quite consent to put myself there, and refuse to be at the lower end,
not because it is low, but because it is an end; for I would likewise
refuse to be placed at the top. To leave the mean is to abandon
humanity. The greatness of the human soul consists in knowing how to
preserve the mean. So far from greatness consisting in leaving it, it
consists in not leaving it.
379
It is not good to have too much liberty. It is not good to have all one
wants.
380
All good maxims are in the world. We only need to apply them. For
instance, we do not doubt that we ought to risk our lives in defence of
the public good; but for religion, no.
It is true there must be inequality among men; but if this be conceded,
the door is opened not only to the highest power, but to the highest
tyranny.
We must relax our minds a little; but this opens the door to the
greatest debauchery. Let us mark the limits. There are no limits in
things. Laws would put them there, and the mind cannot suffer it.
381
When we are too young, we do not judge well; so, also, when we are too
old. If we do not think enough, or if we think too much on any matter,
we get obstinate and infatuated about it. If one considers one's work
immediately after having done it, one is entirely prepossessed in its
favour; by delaying too long, one can no longer enter into the spirit of
it. So with pictures seen from too far or too near; there is but one
exact point which is the true place wherefrom to look at them: the rest
are too near, too far, too high, or too low. Perspective determines that
point in the art of painting. But who shall determine it in truth and
morality?
382
When all is equally agitated, nothing appears to be agitated, as in a
ship. When all tend to debauchery, none appears to do so. He who stops
draws attention to the excess of others, like a fixed point.
383
The licentious tell men of orderly lives that they stray from nature's
path, while they themselves follow it; as people in a ship think those
move who are on the shore. On all sides the language is similar. We must
have a fixed point in order to judge. The harbour decides for those who
are in a ship; but where shall we find a harbour in morality?
384
Contradiction is a bad sign of truth; several things which are certain
are contradicted; several things which are false pass without
contradiction. Contradiction is not a sign of falsity, nor the want of
contradiction a sign of truth.
385
_Scepticism._--Each thing here is partly true and partly false.
Essential truth is not so; it is altogether pure and altogether true.
This mixture dishonours and annihilates it. Nothing is purely true, and
thus nothing is true, meaning by that pure truth. You will say it is
true that homicide is wrong. Yes; for we know well the wrong and the